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This thesis proposes an ultra thin definition of the rule of law; it simply means 
‘the rule of the law.’1 It is a descriptive account of the law’s ultimate authority. Whilst 
Raz originally coined this phrase, it is argued that his formal depiction of the concept 
is not faithful to the expression. The notion of “the rule of the law” is inherently 
unconditional; it does not superimpose qualitative conditions on the substantive 
content of the law. Therefore, an unjust law may still rule. In this sense the rule of law 
is theoretically compatible with a wicked legal regime. To this extent Raz agrees. 
However, he suggests that the ‘basic idea’ of the rule of law is that the law must be 
capable of guiding behavior; it must meet certain minimum formal requirements.2 For 
example, the law must be reasonably clear, stable and prospective. It is argued that 
this capacity to guide creates an intangible political threshold; it displays an inherent 
‘political morality’ that differs only in degree not kind from other political definitions 
of the rule of law.3 Thus, the formal quality of Raz’s theory is self-defeating. Raz’s 
rule of law is a model of legal efficiency that inevitably induces a minimum element 
of procedural fairness; Raz disguises this moral affliction beneath a formal façade. 
Raz further suggests that in order to qualify as law at a very minimum it must be 
‘capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects.’4 The rule of law is thus thrust into a 
limbo; it graduates from a simple measure of the law’s efficiency to a formal model of 
legality. Portraying his basic idea as the minimum foundation of legal validity injects 
an element of political morality into the nature of law; this inevitably aggravates                                                         1 J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979) 212 2 Raz (n1) 214 3 C Synpnowich, “Utopia and the Rule of Law” in D Dyzenhaus (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: the Limits of 
Legal Order (Hart Publishing, Oxford- Portland Oregon, 1999) 193 4 Raz (n1) 213 
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Raz’s overarching legal positivist intentions. Legality should be dictated by social fact 
not degrees of morality. The ultra-thin endorsement of the “rule of the law” is 
agnostic towards both the substantive content of the law (however unjust) and its 
cosmetic appearance (however unclear or retrospective). It broadly incorporates the 
idea of the rule of valid law rather than the rule of only that law which is capable of 
formally guiding behavior. 
 This ultra-thin model of the rule of law inevitably provokes the complaint that 
it starves the rule of law of any content. It is viewed as an illiberal distortion of what 
is conventionally perceived as a force for good. It is conceded that the rule of law is 
much reduced, but necessarily so. The rule of law has succumbed to the fate of a 
political ‘slogan’; it is no more than a strap line for good government.5 It is this 
romanticisation of the rule of law as a panacea that results in an ‘empty tautology’ not 
the theoretical reductionism displayed in this definition.6 In a sophisticated legal 
society, viewed in isolation the notion that the law has ultimate authority is distinctly 
unremarkable. However, the very fact that “the rule of the law” is perceived as a 
common denominator in most states is a credit to its fundamental value. The rule of 
law is a mark of civilization; it reflects the decision to utilize the law as the 
authoritative social mechanism of organizing the state; as a man-made source of 
authority it indicates a minimum level of legal sophistication. Its evolution into “a 
matter of fact” does not detract from its value but on the contrary illustrates its 
dormant existence at the bedrock of a legal state.  
In any event, this thesis supports the view that the rule of law is a type of 
‘interaction technology’.7 Therefore, regarding the rule of law in isolation is 
                                                        5 Raz (n1) 210 6 Raz (n1) 213 7 M Krygier, “Approaching the rule of law” in Whit Mason (ed) The Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Missing 
Inaction (CUP, 2011) 22 
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superficial. The rule of law is organic; it interacts with different components within a 
constitutional framework and responds to variable political conditions. Ironically then, 
the question “what is the rule of law?” is a subsidiary concern to how best we should 
optimize the rule of law as a neutral legal mechanism to secure good government. The 
reality is that the rule of law is not a political ideal; it is therefore essential to adopt a 
more extrospective outlook and cultivate the prime political conditions inherent in a 
democratic constitution that would optimize its potential. In essence, it is necessary to 
harness the ultimate authority of law to help manufacture a just and effective legal 
system that maximizes the welfare of the citizen. In recognizing the social character 
of the rule of law and observing how it operates differently on varying constitutional 
terrain, it is easier to appreciate how the rule of law responds to a helix of political 
and legal factors. An important detour is made in the first chapter through the realms 
of Greek philosophy. Socrates’ vision of the rule of law in the Crito is synonymous 
with the ultra-thin definition. We are reconciled to the reality that the rule of law is 
not an ideal and it is not necessarily fair. It is therefore a useful reference point that 
encapsulates the ‘dark side’ to the rule of law.8 Equally, the Crito is arguably ahead of 
its time; it presents the blueprint of the rule of law as an ‘interaction technology’ by 
initiating a discussion regarding the relationship between the rule of law and a 
democratic constitution.9 It touches on the notion of active citizenship in imploring 
the citizen to change the Laws view of what is just. This level of participation 
inevitably requires a sophisticated judicial and political system to enable 
constitutional dialogue. A wicked legal regime exposes the acute danger that the rule 
of law may be utilized as a means to achieving incredible injustice; this is because the 
ultimate source of authority is man-made; it is susceptible to the manipulation of its                                                         8 B Tamanaha,  “The Dark Side of the Relationship between the Rule of Law and Liberalism” (2008) Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series Paper#08-0096 9 Krygier (n7) 22 
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creator. However, a failed legal state does not parallel a failure in the rule of law; it 
exposes an innate problem within that enigmatic constant, a state’s political culture.   
 This thesis is made up of two parts. Chapter I is jurisprudential in tone; it 
focuses on neatly dissecting the theoretical meaning of the rule of law. The result is a 
tidy differentiation between the ultra-thin model and its formal and more conventional 
counterparts. This negative approach to a definition resonates with the nature of the 
ultra-thin model; it seeks to disaffiliate the rule of law from political associations with 
morality, justice and democracy. In chapter II the ultra-thin model’s tidy theoretical 
existence is juxtaposed to its messy interaction with constitutional reality. This 
chapter focuses on ironing out the rule of law’s operation within the UK constitutional 
framework. In order for the law to rule, people must conform to it. Legal conformity 
is defined in a manner that resonates with the ram doctrine. The rule of law does not 
require the executive to gain legal authorization for all of its action in advance; it 
simply must not break the law. It thus dispels any positive discrimination between the 
individual and the state and in theory awards the executive the same legal liberty 
enjoyed by the citizen. However, it is argued that the executive should be subject to 
far greater legal regulation, in other words there are more laws to conform to. Equally 
the citizen’s liberties should be protected by law (most desirably statute); this way 
legal conformity becomes synonymous with the protection of rights by virtue of the 
law’s utilization rather than the meaning of the rule of law itself. Thus, whilst in 
theory the executive, like the citizen, enjoys a degree of residual liberty, in practice 
the executive has significantly less room to maneuver because the laws it must not 
break are far more populous. 
Chapter II moves on to consider the constitutional hierarchy that exists 
between different species of laws within the UK. This confuses the meaning of the 
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rule of valid law and potentially supplants its purpose. Greater codification in statute 
is encouraged to streamline the meaning of valid law and also to encourage a greater 
fluidity between the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty.  This chapter also 
considers how the ultra-thin model operates alongside the evolving nature of judicial 
review that has arguably exceeded its logical boundaries. Finally, the Chapter 
concludes by arguing that we should not overstate the importance of the law in 
deterring arbitrary government. The fact that the ultra-thin model does not portray the 
rule of law as the ‘ultimate controlling factor’ of the constitution does not mean that 
we are at a loss.10 Indeed, overstating the importance of the rule of law detracts from 
the essential value of politics in holding the executive to account. It is argued that a 
political constitution is invaluable to the rule of law. A political constitution is not 
depicted as a solution to compensate for the rule of law’s defects; rather it provides 









                                                        10 Lord Hope, R( Jackson and others) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, par 126 
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Chapter I 
The Rule of Law: the Ultra Thin Model 
 
The Crito and the Rule of Law 
The notion of the rule of law that Socrates proposes in the Crito is one based on 
the ultimate authority of law. Socrates identifies the rule of law as a benchmark of 
organized society. It is precious and should not be compromised. Socrates’ 
understanding of the rule of law is uncomplicated but in its simplicity inheres 
controversy. Plato exposes the cruel reality that the rule of law is not necessarily a 
force for good. In doing so Plato disaffiliates the rule of law from its mythical 
associations with justice and morality. Socrates is the victim of a concept that has 
enabled the permeation of injustice. It allows bad laws to rule, just as it does good. 
The rule of law is essential but it is dangerous. The importance of the Crito to this 
thesis is two-fold. First it encapsulates the ultra-thin understanding of the rule of law- 
simply that the law has ultimate authority. Presented in the context of an under-
developed society this definition is not perceived as minimalistic but appreciated by 
Greek philosophers as a revolutionary decision at the heart of organized society. In 
the contemporary context of a sophisticated political community the decision to 
organize a state by law is taken for granted and yet ironically this in itself illustrates 
its existence as the core component of a legal state. Thus, defining the rule of law in 
these simple terms is neither minimalistic nor deprecatory. Second, the rule of law is 
envisaged to operate alongside an effective political system. This is implicit in the 
Crito from the citizen’s option to either obey the laws or change their view of what is 
just. Thus, what is clear is that the law rules whatever the quality of its content. 
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However, Plato envisages that the citizen must ‘do what his country and his city order 
him; or he must change their view of what is just’ in order to ensure that the law that 
does rule is good.11 
Plato’s Crito contains two dialogues: the first occurs between Socrates and his 
close friend Crito, the other, an imagined conversation between the Laws and 
Socrates. Socrates is unjustly condemned for alleged impiety and corrupting youth. 
Crito visits the philosopher in prison and attempts to persuade him to escape Athens 
in order to avoid execution. Crito argues that in refusing to flee, Socrates not only 
risks shaming his friends, who would be presumed unable to finance his escape, but 
also leaves his children fatherless. It is an emotive plea that epitomizes Crito as an 
‘ordinary decent citizen’ and a ‘practical man.’12 Socrates, however, insists on 
submitting to this unjust punishment and persuades Crito that  ‘the laws should be 
obeyed even if he was condemned unjustly’; he thus ‘reconciles Crito to the rule of 
law’.13 His martyrdom secures Socrates’ reputation as the ‘model citizen’ and man of 
reason.14 The political philosophy behind Socrates’ acts is expressed through the 
personification of the Laws: Socrates entered into an ‘implied contract’ with the Laws, 
in return they ‘nurtured and educated’ Socrates and he is thus their ‘child and slave’.15 
This exchange of political freedom for legal security bears clear resemblances to early 
social contract theory.16  
The personification of the Laws is not purely for ‘emotional’ impact.17 It 
‘corresponds to the sense that the rule of law must appear as a supreme force that 
                                                        11 Plato, Crito (360 B.C.E) (trans) Benjamin Jowett 12 M J Rosano “Citizenship and Socrates in Plato’s “Crito”” (2000) 62(3) The Review of Politics 454 13 Rosano (n12) 452 14 Rosano (n12) 451 15 Plato (n11) 16 See T Hobbes, Leviathan (ed) M Oakeshott (US, First Touchstone Edition, 1997); J Locke Second Treatise of 
Government (ed) C B Macpherson (Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Inc, 1980) 17 N A Greenberg, “Socrates’ Choice in the Crito” (1965) 70 Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 45, 61 
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stands above the fray.’18 The Laws are ‘oratorical bullies’ which reinforces their 
supreme authority over man.19 Indeed, there can be no doubt that the law “rules” in 
the Crito. Furthermore, by giving the Laws their own voice it distinguishes them as a 
living entity in their own right, independent from the legislators who made them. As 
in Salamon v A Salamon (1897)20 where a company is identified as a separate legal 
person, a corporate veil is drawn between the law and political actors.  Whether the 
‘…views espoused by the Laws are the views of the Laws- not of Socrates’ exceeds 
the scope of this discussion; we are not concerned with how “Socratic” the Laws’ 
views are but how they present the rule of law.21 The Laws hypothetically address 
Socrates: 
 
‘…if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the 
covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom 
you ought least to wrong, that is to say yourself, your friends, your country, and 
us…the laws of the world below will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that 
you have done your best to destroy us.’22 
 
This passage is concerned with assigning liability for injustice. The Laws 
proclaim that disobedience is unjustified on three counts. Firstly, disobedience breaks 
the ‘covenants and agreements’ made with the Laws and sanctions their destruction. 
This is because ‘every time any one disobeys a law he weakens that set of institutions 
which holds society together and keeps it from lapsing into chaotic barbarity.’23 The                                                         18 M J Rosano (n12) 468 19 R Weiss, “Socrates dissatisfied: an analysis of Plato’s Crito” (New york, Oxford University Press, 1998) (Oxford Scholarship Online 2003) 133 20 Salamon v A Salamon & Co ltd (1897) AC 22 21 Weiss (n19) 1-2 22 Plato (n11) 23 Greenberg (n17) 61 
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rule of law is essential to organized society. Greenberg expresses two concerns with 
this argument. First, he objects on the grounds that ‘it justifies and demands 
obedience to any law, just or unjust…’24 Of course this is undesirable. However, 
equally the ‘practice of doing particularized justice’ clearly conflicts with the 
necessary universal application of law.25 The law cannot be obeyed subject to 
individual convenience and subjective perceptions of what is just. Weiss’ proposition 
that a citizen is ‘bound only by correct verdicts’ invites disingenuous conceptions of 
what is “correct” and “just”; this is arguably more detrimental to the citizen’s 
welfare.26 Indeed, Lewis F Powell Jnr rightly remarked that ‘(a)n ordered society 
cannot exist if every man may determine which laws he will obey…that only “just” 
laws need to be obeyed and that every man is free to determine for himself the 
question of “justness”.’27 It is a social reality that the ‘unique potential’ of ‘every 
individual can only be realized within organized society’.28 Those ‘sources of 
coercion that prevent us from achieving our highest potential’ simultaneously enable 
the optimum conditions for an individual to thrive within a contained setting.29 After 
all, without society, justice has no value. Therefore, the idea that the citizen must 
submit to the law, however unjust, resonates with the effective survival of a political 
community. Society aspires towards efficiency: ‘the best political system will be one 
that allows each individual to satisfy egoistic drives in the most efficient way.’30  
                                                        24 Greenberg (n17) 61 25 L B Solum “Equity and the Rule of Law” in I Shapiro (ed) The Rule of Law (New York University Press 1994) 123 26 R Weiss (n19) 84 27 Lewis F Powell Jnr, Miami Convention August 1965 28 A J Minton, Philosophy- Paradox & Discovery (University of Missain, Kansas City, McGraw-Hill Book Company, McGraw-Hill Inc, 1976) 371 29 A J Minton (n28) 372 30 A J Minton (n28) 373 
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Greenberg however objects to this prioritization of the ‘survival and continued 
well-being of the state’ as a ‘primary goal’.31 He argues that if this is the case ‘one 
need not obey a law which is conducive to that goal.’32 His criticism is anarchic in 
tone; he simply delegates the task of deducing when a law supports the well being of 
society to the citizen. The rule of law cannot be conditional on how “just” the law is 
perceived; subjectivity is equally as dangerous as universality. Greenberg is right to 
challenge the injustice of Socrates’ situation. However, Greenberg’s “solution” is, like 
Crito’s, inappropriate. It is retrospective, as opposed to preemptive and it undermines 
the legal infrastructure that acts as the ultimate safeguard of the citizen’s liberty.  
Secondly, the Laws question whether Socrates would ‘flee from well-ordered 
cities and virtuous men’, a challenge is made as to whether ‘existence is worth having 
on these terms?’33 The rhetorical question clearly indicates that the rule of the law 
with the potential for injustice is better than no law at all. Bolt similarly alludes to this 
philosophy in his historical play A Man For All Seasons. In Act One whilst Roper 
proclaims that he would ‘cut down every law in England’ to get after the devil, Sir 
Thomas More responds, ‘And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned on 
you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?’34 More clearly values the 
default safety inherent in the law’s existence over an equity-driven prioritization of 
selective justice. Making exceptions in the name of fairness is potentially more 
arbitrary than the universal application of arbitrary laws. Indeed, More concludes that 
he would ‘give the devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.’35 Dyzenhaus 
neatly summarises Hobbes’ own philosophy that ‘…peace and order, whatever its 
                                                        31 Greenberg (n17) 61 32 Greenberg (n17) 61 33 Plato (n11) 34 R Bolt, A Man For All Seasons, (Methuen Drama Modern Classics, London, 1995) 41-42 35 Bolt (n34) 42 
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nature are preferable to chaos…’36 It is debatable whether chaos would ensue in the 
absence of law but MacCormick validly notes that ‘where law is faithfully observed, 
the rule of law obtains; and societies that live under the rule of law enjoy great 
benefits by comparison with those that do not’, ‘our life as humans in community 
with others is greatly enriched by it.’37 Bolt neatly encapsulates the philosophy that 
the existence of bad law is arguably better than no law at all. Certainly any 
substantive inadequacy in the laws is reflective of a politically deficient system that 
has allowed bad governments to flourish, rather than the legal framework. However, 
governments are inevitably temporary reflecting the ebb and flow of political 
sentiment. The law, on the contrary, is a permanent institution that stabilizes society. 
The existence of bad law at least indicates that there is a legal foundation in place that 
can be utilized for good purposes. 
 Finally, the Laws allude to the ‘unequal terms’ of the implied contract between 
the Laws and the citizen.38 The Laws aggressively rebuke the citizen: ‘you are not on 
equal terms with us, nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are 
doing to you?’39 The citizen is both child and slave to the Laws, thus the level of 
justice due to each party is unequal. The depiction of the citizen as slave to the state is 
evidently outdated. However, whilst the Laws’ notion of unequal justice is fallacious, 
the allusion to misdirected justice is of significant importance in relation to a formal 
perception of the rule of law. Indeed, the Laws propose that by disobeying the law the 
citizen wrongs ‘those whom you ought least to wrong’.40 In particular, wronging ‘us’, 
                                                        36 D Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 9 37 N MacCormick “Rhetoric and the Rule of Law” in D Dyzenhaus (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: the Limits 
of Legal Order (Oxford, Hart Publishing, Portland Oregon 1999) 165-166 38 Plato (n11) 39 Plato (n11) 40 Plato (n11) 
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the Laws, is unjust.41 This relates to identifying culpability for unjust laws. A law 
against criminalising impiety and the corruption of youth is not innately unjust; it is 
legitimate. It is the application of this law to Socrates’ own circumstances where the 
injustice arises. The Law is not self-enforcing; it is not responsible for its own 
application. It is the political actors that chose to unjustly misapply the law. The Laws 
allude to this reality by insisting that Socrates is the victim of “men” not of law. It is 
therefore wrong to blame the legal infrastructure, or in essence the rule of law, for the 
activities of political actors. If, then, Socrates was subject to a law composed of unjust 
content, rather than simply its unjust application, are the Laws responsible? Arguably 
not: It has already been ascertained from the process of personification that the Laws 
are independent living entities distinct from the legislators or political actors who 
dictate the content of legislation. In summary, the rule of unjust law does not indicate 
a flaw in the concept but the political system. 
 
Socrates- Options? 
The conception of the rule of law in the Crito (where the law rules however 
unjust) is ‘distinctly unappealing’.42 The Crito exposes the reality that the rule of law 
is not necessarily a force for good, nor is it synonymous with connotations of justice 
and morality. Rather the rule of law represents an essential but potentially dangerous 
truth that the law has ultimate authority. In light of this, it is necessary to discuss how 
the citizen may defend its welfare without undermining the ultimate authority of the 
law. At a critical point the Laws give Socrates a choice: ‘he must do what his city and 
his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just.’43 It is this latter 
                                                        41 Plato (n11) 42 D Bostock, “The Interpretation of Plato’s Crito” (1990) 35(1) Phronesis 1 43 Plato (n11) (emphasis added) 
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“persuasive” option that is most striking.44 Primarily, despite initial perceptions, it is 
not an alternative to submission. The concept of the rule of law is non-negotiable but 
the quality of the law that rules is. In changing the Laws’ view of what is just it 
equally recognises their ultimate authority to retain the last say. Persuasion may be 
compartmentalized into three categories. Primarily, pre-emptive political action may 
inhibit the legalization of bad laws in the first place. This inevitably requires an 
efficient political system with the resources to enable active political citizenship. 
Second, if political pre-emption is ineffective (or comes too late), recourse must be 
had to the courts where the citizen may persuade the government to change the 
substantive content of the law. Alternatively, Valcke proposes a theory of civil 
disobedience that upholds the rule of law. 45 It reconciles an apolitical rule of law with 
a ‘feedback mechanism’ designed to encourage political participation and relieve, but 
not negate, legal submission.46 What can be inferred from the “persuasive option” is 
that the rule of law is envisaged to operate within a politically efficient and legally 
sophisticated society. Indeed, it is a running argument within this thesis that the rule 
of law provides the foundation of a legal state. However, the rule of law alone is not 
enough. Political and legal infrastructure is required to provide an ideal constitutional 
landscape. 
Socrates is given the option to ‘either obey the Laws or by persuasion to change 
their views of what is just.’47 However, Greenberg rightly questions ‘how one goes 
about attempting to persuade a state or laws, particularly if one makes the distinction 
between men on the one hand and the state and the laws on the other.’48 Indeed, the 
                                                        44 See D Bostock (n42) 13 45 C Valcke, “Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law- A Lockean Insight” in I Shapiro (ed) The Rule of Law  (New York and London, New York University Press, 1994) 46 Valcke (n45) 54 47 Greenberg (n17) 66 48 Greenberg (n17) 66 
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Laws may be independent entities distinct from political actors, however they remain 
inanimate and incapable of persuasion. Thus, Greenberg concludes that ‘if the option 
means anything at all, persuasion must be directed not at laws but at people.’49 
Evidently the object must be capable of being persuaded in the first place. Therefore, 
it is clear that persuasion must be directed at the political actors or legislators who 
operate in the political system; they are the only ones capable of being moved by 
rhetoric. However, it is unclear what this method of persuasion actually entails. 
Rosano simply refers to persuasion as a ‘privilege’ as opposed to an ‘absolute right.’50 
This is vague and unhelpful. However, whilst Weiss reduces the option to mere 
‘fawning and flattering’, she does appear to presume that persuasion occurs through 
the political system as she contemplates how a citizen ‘ought to proceed in the 
Assembly to prevent unjust laws from being passed or to have already existing unjust 
laws repealed.’51 She clearly envisages persuasion occurring in the political domain 
through political institutions such as the Assembly. Whilst Weiss suggests that the 
Laws do not ‘extol the virtues of the democracy in which citizens function regularly 
as persuaders’, Greenberg insists that the possibility of persuasion is ‘a mighty one’ 
and ‘to the extent that a society allows the centers of power to be approached by 
persuasion, to that extent such a society is praiseworthy.’52 Greenberg here implicitly 
endorses persuasion as a political tactic by emphasizing its direction at the ‘centers of 
power’ rather than tempering legal authority. The level of persuasion exercised by an 
individual on the substantive content of the law is an indication of a state’s political 
health. What can be drawn from these interpretations is that the rule of law is 
envisaged to co-exist alongside an effective and developed political system. In this 
                                                        49 Greenberg (n17) 66 50 Rosano (n12) 470 51 Weiss (n19) 105-107 52 Weiss (n19) 107-108; Greenberg (n17) 80 
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sense, Socrates hinted at progressive political aspirations. The Crito reinforces the 
fact that the rule of an unjust law is not a legal but a political concern. Consequently, 
the rule of law is distinctly less unappealing. Failing pre-emption, persuasion in the 
legal courts may provide the necessary impetus to change the law. Of course, this 
requires a degree of legal sophistication, at a minimum: a court system, an 
experienced and independent judiciary and equal access to the courts. These are not 
definitive characteristics of the rule of law but they depict a political and legal 
landscape that would complement the rule of law and discourage the bad press 
inflicted on the ultra-thin model. 
In the alternative, Valcke reconciles disobedience with the rule of law in a manner 
that may please Greenberg. At the core of both the Crito and Valcke’s theory on civil 
disobedience and the rule of law is social contract theory. Valcke explicitly builds on 
this theory to encourage political activism. Indeed, Valcke interprets Locke’s social 
contract as ‘embodying a commitment on the part of all citizens to partake in the 
process of deciphering the law of nature, and on the part of the elected officials in turn 
to enforce the rules produced by this deciphering process.’53 Thus, the interpretive 
part of the process is deemed a ‘collective enterprise involving all citizens.’54 Valcke 
argues that the citizens’ ‘duty to manifest their disapproval stems from the 
commitment they made in the social contract to contribute to the law-making 
process.’55 We have seen that the Crito also encourages political activism and 
engagement with the political law-making process. Indeed, whilst the citizen is clearly 
depicted as a “slave” to the law, in contrast the Laws encourage the citizen to exert 
political fortitude by insinuating that the content of the law is open for discussion, 
though the law’s authority is not. Valcke’s lockean idealization of the social contract                                                         53 Valcke (n45) 52 54 Valcke (n45) 52 55 Valcke (n45) 53 
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certainly echoes the contractual relations between the Laws and the citizen in the 
Crito.56 Furthermore, this alternative of persuasion mirrors Valcke’s inclusion of the 
citizen as a participant in the law-making process. Indeed, persuasion also acts as a 
healthy, political ‘feed back mechanism’ that simultaneously secures the rule of law.57 
However, Valcke goes a step further by arguing that civil disobedience itself may 
act as a helpful ‘feedback mechanism’ that promotes the gradual improvement of the 
laws.58 Certainly, Raz agrees that civil disobedience is essentially ‘a political act, an 
attempt by the agent to change public policies.’59 It is argued that whilst the Crito 
expressly condemns legal disobedience, it is not incompatible with the text to 
condone political disobedience. Valcke argues that if civil disobedience is performed 
‘in all willingness to bear whatever legal sanction comes with the offense, it is no 
challenge to the official’s legislative authority.’60 Whilst Raz is skeptical whether 
individuals engaged in civil disobedience should ‘voluntarily submit to punishment’, 
he encourages this position by suggesting that legal submission proves the ‘purity of 
one’s motives; a trial or a term in gaol may serve as a focal point for the mobilization 
of more opposition to the law or policy protested against, etc.’.61 In this sense, legal 
submission to punishment is politically effective. He further accepts that ‘some 
writers have included submission to punishment in their definition of civil 
disobedience.’62 Valcke argues that ‘while disobeying, the citizens willingly undergo 
whatever penalty the officials have provided for the offense’, therefore ‘civil 
disobedience does not here constitute a challenge to the official’s authority, and thus a 
                                                        56 See J Locke Second Treatise of Government (ed) C B Macpherson (Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Inc, 1980) 57 Valcke (n45) 54 58 Valcke (n45) 54 59 Raz (n1) 278 60 Valcke (n45) 54 61 Raz (n1) 265 62 Raz (n1) 265 
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violation of the rule of law’.63 This is arguably a valuable way of improving the 
political content of a law without detracting from the law’s ultimate authority. Civil 
disobedience may therefore legitimately act as a method of persuasion. In other words, 
accepting the supremacy of the law does not necessarily equate to a political 
ultimatum. 
Valcke’s theory is compatible with the Crito; her advocacy of political 
disobedience does not temper the law’s ultimate authority. It is a challenge to the 
content of the law, not to its authority. Indeed, a citizen may disobey the content of 
legislation but nevertheless accept the consequential legal sanctions. In both, the 
political legitimacy of a law is an independent issue from the ultimate legal authority 
of the law. It is then the act of legal conformity that upholds the law’s ultimate 
authority; the moral or political quality of the obedience is superfluous to the act itself. 
In light of this, civil disobedience may be an unconventional way of submitting to 
legal sanctions. However, it simultaneously expresses a point of view that may be 
persuasive in the eyes of political actors and legislators. Rev Martin Luther King 
argued that ‘to accept passively an unjust system is to cooperate with that system… 
non-cooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with 
good.’64 The Crito does not envisage passive citizenship. However, an effective 
political and legal system must be in place to enable participation and dialogue. 
Alternatively, by dissecting the distinctive aspects of “obedience” it is arguably 
possible both to satisfy moral conscience and uphold the rule of an unjust law. In 
other words, it is possible both to submit to the authority of law and challenge its 
political legitimacy. Valcke’s theory is then academically pleasing. The precise 
dissection of law and politics results in a neat reconciliation of the rule of law and                                                         63 Valcke (n45) 58 64 Martin Luther King Jnr, Stride Toward Freedom; see M L King, “Loving Your Enemies” Sermon delivered at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama (17 November 1957) 
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civil disobedience. However, beyond the academic domain, the result is still 
unsatisfactory. The model citizen, similar to Socrates, is entitled to disobey the law in 
the face of injustice so long as he accepts the penalty for doing so.  
Socrates was a philosopher making a point about the rule of law. The point is that 
the rule of law is necessary but it is not necessarily fair. It is this reality that drives 
this thesis. Indeed, ‘Developing the rule of law does not ensure that the law or legal 
system is good or deserves obedience’, it is a ‘necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a fair and just legal system.’65  The reality is that the rule of law is not immune 
from the ‘passion’ of men.66 The law is independent of politics; however, it is always 
susceptible to abuse by those in power. Therefore, it is essential to cultivate the 
political and legal avenues to ensure that the law is utilized for the correct purposes. 
In the Crito The Laws invite the citizen to submit or change their view of what is just. 
Thus it appears to envisage an open discussion between the citizen and the state about 
the content and purpose of the law. In order to facilitate such dialogue, the appropriate 
constitutional forum needs to be in place. In particular political accountability 
mechanisms need to be adopted to pre-empt the creation of unjust law and 
sophisticated legal infrastructure needs to be constructed, including an experienced 
and independent judiciary, to challenge those laws that manage to slip through the 
political net. The rule of law is not an ideal but with a little persuasion it could 
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The rule of the law 
Raz states that ‘“(t)he rule of law” means literally what it says: the rule of the 
law.’67 The pedant would point out that the additional lexeme (“the”) supplies new 
meaning. However, literalism does not seek a mirror image but an interpretation 
faithful to the plain meaning of the text.68 The concept, literally interpreted, states that 
the law rules. It does not indicate why, nor does it supply conditions of the law’s 
supremacy; it simply states that the law rules. This thesis therefore supports an ultra-
thin understanding of the rule of law. The rule of law is not a measure of how efficient 
a law or indeed a legal system is; it reflects a choice to use law as the authoritative 
mechanism of organizing a state. The “rule of law” is thus inherently descriptive of a 
process by which the law is supreme, the automatic consequence of this is an explicit 
demand of neither more, nor less, than legality. The demand of legality may vary in 
scope depending on one’s view of the nature of law. For instance, “legality” to some 
may necessarily impose moral conditions.69 This thesis lends support to the opposing 
legal positivist distinction between law and morality. The question “what is law?” is 
not essential to the question “what is the rule of law?” Indeed, the latter describes the 
law’s supremacy, not its quality. However, it is useful in terms of understanding the 
legal and political consequences of the law’s rule when the law is understood as a 
legal positivist phenomenon; the Law, amoral in nature, is supreme. It is a description 
of a process by which the law rules; it does not prescribe desirable political conditions. 
It indicates the legality of a state, not its political adequacy. The rule of law is then not 
a political ideal; it is not a litmus to indicate how “just” a regime is, nor does it 
indicate whether formal standards of procedure are met. 
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Raz similarly argues that the rule of law places no constraints on the 
substantive content of the law; it is not synonymous with ‘the rule of the good law’.70 
In this limited sense it is legitimate to adopt Raz’s definition of the rule of law as 
simply “the rule of the law”. It boasts an appealing literalism that awards the 
definition clarity. However, it is questionable how consistent Raz’s ‘basic idea’ of the 
rule of law is with his own initial definition.71 Raz differentiates between ‘the rule of 
the law’ ‘in its broadest sense’ which he states means that ‘people should obey the 
law and be ruled by it’ and its ‘narrower’ meaning in political and legal theory which 
proposes that ‘government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it.’72 Whilst the 
former prioritises legal obedience, the latter is specifically concerned with the legal 
conformity of the executive. It is the former that in Raz’s opinion provides the ‘basic 
idea’ of the rule of law.73 In order to obey the law, a person must have a necessary 
minimum knowledge of it. Therefore, ‘if the law is to be obeyed it must be capable of 
guiding the behavior of its subjects. It must be such that they can find out what it is 
and act on it.’74 The concept thus adopts a more particularized meaning: the rule of 
only that law which is capable of being obeyed. Various principles ‘can be derived 
from this one basic idea’ that the law must be capable of guiding its subjects.75 For 
example, the laws must be clear, open, prospective and stable; the independence of 
the judiciary must be guaranteed and natural justice must be observed. This thesis 
argues that the rule of law is based on legal conformity rather than legal obedience; 
the former is more conducive to the ultra-thin model. Raz explains that ‘a person 
                                                        70 J Raz “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in R L Cunningham (ed) Liberty and the Rule of Law (eds) (Texas A&M University Press, College Station and London, 1979) 4 71 Raz (n1) 214 72 Raz (n1) 212 73 Raz (n70) 5 74 Raz (n1) 213 75 Raz (n1) 214 
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conforms to the law to the extent that he does not break the law’.76 For the lawyer 
‘anything is the law if it meets the conditions of validity laid down in the system’s 
rules of recognition or in other rules of the system.’77 Therefore, from this perspective, 
the “rule of the law” means simply the rule of valid law. It will be further argued in 
chapter two that this notion of legal conformity should not be conditional upon the 
entity being monitored: the individual or the state. Raz suggests that both are ruled by 
the law; however, whilst the people obey the law, the government must be subject to it. 
It is necessary to dispel this positive discrimination to do justice to the universality 
principle inherent in the concept of “the rule of the law”. 
A law that is clear, prospective and public may well be unjust. The rule of law 
is agnostic towards the substantive value of the law; it does not discriminate between 
the type of law that rules. In this sense Raz validly claims that the rule of law ‘is not 
to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human 
rights of any kind or respect for persons or the dignity of man.’78 To this extent the 
formal and ultra-thin concepts overlap. Indeed, the rule of law is a ‘necessary but not 
sufficient condition for a fair and just legal system’.79 It imposes a requirement that 
the government’s actions are legal but not necessarily just. Certainly then the rule of 
law ‘is just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess and by which it is to 
be judged.’80 Legality is an essential component of a regime and a defining legal 
feature. However, beyond legalism lie other political elements that assist in 
characterizing a regime. To this extent Raz correctly identifies the fallacious 
‘assumption of its overriding importance’; the rule of law is only useful in indicating 
                                                        76 Raz (n1) 213 77 Raz (n1) 213 78 Raz (n1) 211 79 Tamanaha (n65) 80 Raz (n1) 211 
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the legality of a regime, rather than its political or moral achievements.81  He validly 
notes that ‘a non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on 
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious persecution 
may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law…It will be an 
immeasurably worse legal system, but it will excel in one respect: in its conformity to 
the rule of law.’82 Here Raz appears to agree that it is the “legality” of the system that 
satisfies conformity to the rule of law. However, it will be argued that this becomes 
problematic when Raz inadvertently hints that the capacity to guide is in itself a 
condition of legality which inevitably results in the uncertain scenario whereby rule of 
law (and indeed legality) is a ‘political ideal which a political system may possess to a 
greater or lesser degree.’83 It is argued that there are no degrees of legality; either 
something is legal or it is not. This is dictated by social fact rather than political 
values. Raz’s formal conception of the rule of law sits uneasily with Raz’s exclusive 
positivism. 
Furthermore, Raz’s reconciliation of the rule of law with an unjust legal 
regime adheres to an ultra-thin concept but is arguably inconsistent with his formal 
theory. It will be argued that Raz’s formal depiction of the rule of law promotes a 
degree of ‘political morality’ through its pursuit of procedural fairness.84 Indeed, the 
basic idea that inheres in Raz’s conception of the rule of law is this capacity to guide 
which surely interacts with human rights, equality and ultimately demonstrates a 
respect for persons. Whilst Raz purports to discourage the rule of law’s misguided 
synonymy with the rule of good law, one will discuss how his alternative proposal 
displays a political morality inherent in the formal requirements of procedural justice. 
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The rule of efficient law is not necessarily a moral but it is a political ideal that strives 
to preserve “good” law. A system that conforms to a ‘political ideal’ (as Raz himself 
labels the rule of law) is surely substantially less wicked.85 Therefore, an element of 
inconsistency pervades Raz’s understanding of the rule of law. Thus in relation to the 
moralization of the rule of law, Raz firmly bolts the front door but leaves the 
backdoor discreetly ajar. It is thus important to distinguish between Raz’s formal 
conceptualization of the rule of law and the ultra-thin definition pursued in this thesis. 
It is necessary to dissect Raz’s theory in order to justify one’s further political 
reduction of the rule of law from a formal political ideal to an ultra-thin legal concept.  
It may seem rash even to dismiss Raz’s formal conception of the rule of law. It 
inevitably prompts the challenge: What are we left with? The distinguishing factor of 
Raz’s formal definition is that he requires the law to be capable of guiding behavior; 
this is the defining and distinctive “political” feature of Raz’s theory. Raz insists that 
these minimum principles that derive from his basic idea are necessary to prevent the 
rule of law from becoming an ‘empty tautology’.86 However, what is suggested is that 
Raz’s definition is in itself inherently political and thus differs from the more 
substantive conceptions of the rule of law only in degree not kind. What distinguishes 
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The dangers of politics 
In order to retain its conceptual identity it is essential that the rule of law has 
no political content. This immediately begs the question as to what content classifies 
as “political”. Ironically, the inability to accurately answer this question defines the 
nature of politics.  Political norms have contestable meanings; this indeterminacy 
invites conflict. Hampshire argues that the ‘normality of conflict’ in the political 
domain requires a ‘kind of moral conversion…a new way of looking at all virtues, 
including the virtue of justice.’87 This new perspective realizes that ‘there will always 
be a plurality of different and incompatible conceptions of the good’, it thus negates 
the existence of a ‘single comprehensive and consistent theory of human virtue.’88 
Political virtues are both a consequence and a source of conflict: They have inevitably 
prevailed as ‘rejections of their rivals’ but are equally subject to competing claims; 
‘all modern societies are, to a greater or lesser degree, morally mixed with rival 
conceptions of justice, conservative and radical, flaring into open conflict and needing 
arbitration’.89 Using Hampshire’s theory as a template, if the rule of law is deemed to 
embody a single conception of “justice” and “fairness” it is reduced to another 
competing claim, condemned to the fate of any other political virtue within a 
pluralistic society; it may prevail but it will inevitably be overridden. As a 
constitutional ultimatum, by its very nature, the rule of law must not be overridden. 
On the other hand, if it is perceived as embodying the current prevailing conception 
of justice identifying what the rule of law is becomes a futile task because it naturally 
becomes a matter of conflict. It becomes a template for subjective notions of justice. 
This is because, ‘Justice and fairness in substantial matters…will always vary with 
                                                        87 S Hampshire, Justice is Conflict: The Soul and the City (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Harvard University, Oct 30-31 1996) 163 88 Hampshire (n87) 164 89 Hampshire (n87) 164 & 162 
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varying moral outlooks and with varying conceptions of the good.’90 This is not to say 
that conflict is the ‘sign of a vice, or a defect, or a malfunctioning’, it is simply stating 
that politics is necessarily a matter of conflict and the rule of law is necessarily not.91 
If the rule of law is to have any practical purpose it must be known. It must not 
become acclimatized to the ‘antagonistic pluralism’ that commands political 
territory. 92 What qualifies as “political” covers anything deemed arguable in 
character.93 Politics invites an impractical intangibility that jeopardises the rule of 
law’s function as a determinate legal threshold. Raz warns that when a political ideal 
‘captures the imagination of large numbers of people its name becomes a slogan used 
by supporters of ideals which bear little or no relation to the one it originally 
designated.’94 Politicizing the rule of law sets the precedent for its further infiltration 
by intangible political ideals. The rule of law is defunct if no one can agree on what it 
is.  
Ironically, it is the politicization of the rule of law that empties the concept of 
any value as a force for good. We have observed that what is “moral” or “just” is a 
matter of conflict. ‘Whatever a person’s moral outlook and conception of the good, 
and whatever his beliefs about issues of substantial justice, he knows that he will 
sometimes clash with others who make contrary judgments…he will find himself to 
some extent constrained by certain nearly universal habits of argumentative 
behavior…’95 By “bulking” out the rule of law with political concepts, it loses 
objective value. Indeed, if all the rule of law demands is legal conformity, the limit it 
imposes on the government may be limited (or at worst formal) but it is at least                                                         90 Hampshire (n87) 148  91 Hampshire (n87) 163 92 Loughlin M, Swords and Scales, An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) 123 93 See N MacCormick “Rhetoric and the Rule of Law” in D Dyzenhaus (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: the 
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tangible. Equally, if the rule of law can only ever indicate the legality of a regime it 
provides only a limited resource to a government seeking to establish a wicked regime. 
In this sense, the rule of law is pre-emptive. It disarms a government from utilizing 
the rule of law as a legitimating factor. It may excuse a regime in terms of legality but 
it can never justify a regime in the language of morality. This is because the rule of 
law is ‘agnostic’ towards politics and morality.96 Indeed, ‘(r)espect for a process can, 
as a matter of habit, coexist with the detestation of the outcome of the process…’97 
Appreciating the rule of law as a process allows one to both appreciate the efficiency 
of its operation and condemn a possible immoral outcome. If the rule of law is 
saturated with political ideals, a government may defend their regime in the name of 
the rule of law by simply asserting what they perceive as just or moral. What limited 
constraint the rule of law did impose in terms of legality is lost. To the extent that the 
Nazi regime was legal, it was in conformity with the rule of law. However, equally, 
this legal stamp of approval does not disable any form of moral disapproval. However, 
the danger of the rule of law’s politicization is heightened in light of what Bentham 
termed ‘obsequious quietism’.98 Dyzenhaus neatly summarises this as the ‘danger that 
the existing law may supplant morality as a final test of conduct and so escape 
criticism.’99 Similarly, if a government pays lip service to the rule of law that is 
presumed to epitomise notions of justice then this discourages citizens to challenge 
the government on moral grounds. Reducing morality to an offset of legal validity 
discourages challenges to be made on independent moral grounds. In other words, 
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they will ‘unthinkingly obey bad laws instead of doing what Bentham thinks to be 
morally required- criticizing the law with a view to its reform.’100 
‘We cannot escape the need for an explicit conception of the rule of law’- to 
this extent most agree.101  Indeed, as the ‘preeminent legitimating political ideal in the 
world today’ it is essential that we secure ‘…agreement on precisely what it 
means’.102 Tamanaha’s analogy of the rule of law as ‘the notion of the “good”’ 
usefully captures the idea that the rule of law is largely considered to positively 
contribute to civilization; as an authoritative rule-making system law provides 
structure and stability.103 It is in this purely legal capacity that the rule of law should 
be deemed ‘essential’ but this does not necessarily translate to an understanding that it 
is ‘good for everyone’; this overarching claim jeopardises its agnosticism towards 
“good” government.104  The rule of law has been interpreted as incorporating 
‘protection of individual rights’, others contend that ‘democracy is part of the rule of 
law’ whilst others still interpret the rule of law as ‘purely formal in nature’.105 Its 
multi-faceted character is not indicative of an inherent ideological complexity; rather 
it reflects a misplaced insulation of the debate about what is “good for everyone”.  It 
is ‘thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use’ that the rule of law has been 
emptied; what remains is a ‘meaningless’ notion.106  
Under my understanding, a commitment to the rule of law is at least a claim to 
legality, rather than an empty promise of “good” government. A commitment to 
establishing the rule of law is reduced to a catch phrase; a government is relieved of 
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identifying the policies behind establishing “the rule of law” because it is generally 
seen as a good thing. This argument draws parallels with Bentham’s positivist 
argument against “obsequious quietism”; that merging law and morality disarms 
moral scrutiny.107 Furthermore, the politicization of the rule of law may detrimentally 
impact the quality of legal judgments.  Already there are instances of judges paying 
lip service to an ideal without fully explaining (or indeed realizing) what it is they are 
endorsing; in particular it has been romanticized as the ‘ultimate controlling factor’ of 
the constitution but it is unclear what this actually means and entails.108 Inadequate 
precedent is dangerous for two reasons: First, it provides the judiciary with a 
scapegoat to avoid proper reasoning; second, the sheer scope of the political meaning 
of the rule of law as a ‘method with the perceived potential to tackle problems ranging 
from poverty to conflict to corruption to lack of human rights’ has the potential to 
inadvertently politically affiliate the judiciary.109 Raz argues that if the rule of law is 
‘the rule of good law then to explain its nature is to propound a complete social 
philosophy’ and it ‘lacks any useful function’.110 However, the fear is that it becomes 
useful for the wrong purposes whether in the form of political deception or judicial 
laziness. Furthermore, on the international stage, exporting the rule of law becomes 
inherently more difficult if it is simply reduced to a matter of converting others to the 
belief that ‘good shall triumph’.111 
By insisting that conflict is the ‘proper domain of politics’, Hampshire assumes 
the existence of such a “domain” whereby politics can exist as an independent and 
insular entity in which conflict is a normal and defining characteristic.112 Thus                                                         107 Bentham (n98) 498  108 See Lord Hope in R(on the application of Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, par 126  109 R Coniglio, Methods of Judicial Decision-making and the rule of law: the case of apartheid South Africa (2012) 30 Boston University International Law Journal 497, 498 110 Raz (n70) 4 111 Raz (n1) 211 112 Hampshire (n87) 165 
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isolating the rule of law from the ‘normality of conflict’ is not superficial; it simply 
situates the rule of law in an alternative legal domain. This insistence that the rule of 
law is a legal rather than a political phenomenon fundamentally assumes that there is 
a distinction between the two; Cerar supports this distinction as both ‘necessary and 
indispensable’. 113 It is certainly essential to an appreciation of the ultra-thin model on 
two levels: the beneficial interaction between legal authority and political power is 
vital to the effective operation of the ultra-thin model and the distinction between law 
and politics is essential to its conceptual lucidity. Law and politics interact but they 
do not react. The difference is equivalent to that between a mixture and a compound 
in chemistry. With the former, the two elements mix but do not combine chemically; 
they retain their integrity as distinct components of a mixture. The difference may 
appear negligible to the naked eye but this illusion should not deny its existence. The 
British Constitution is similarly heterogeneous. Law and politics interact to the extent 
that it is difficult to decipher where law ends and politics begins. On a practical level 
it is not always necessary to delineate the parameter. However, in conceptualizing the 
rule of law it is essential to recognize that the law is concerned with authority and 
politics with power. 
Allan contends that the ‘stark separation of legal rule from political principle…is 
ultimately incoherent.’114 He grounds this prognosis in the theory of ‘unbounded 
legislative supremacy’ that, he argues, is ‘unlimited not merely as a matter of practical 
politics but even as a matter of legal principle.’115 However, it is exactly Dicey’s 
theory of parliamentary sovereignty that neatly clarifies the distinction between legal 
authority and political power. Dicey in The Law of the Constitution states that 
                                                        113 Cerar Dr Miro, “Relationship between Law and Politics” (2009) 15(1) Annual survey of International and 
Comparative Law, Article 3) 2 114 Allan (n101) 2 115 Allan (n101) 1 
 33 
Parliament has ‘the right to make or unmake any law whatever’.116 Parliament’s 
ability to legislate freely is presented purely in terms of “right” he explicitly denies 
that this right is equivalent to ‘unrestricted power’.117 He thus clearly recognizes a 
distinction. Parliament has the legal right to make any law but whether it will do so is 
inevitably dictated by political factors. However, Dicey’s distinction between law and 
politics should not be misconstrued in terms of theory and practice. Elliott points to 
the incoherent ‘gap’ between ‘the theory of unlimited legislative authority and the 
political reality which in practice constrains the exercise of that power.’118 He 
therefore suggests that there is a ‘divergence between what is theoretically possible 
and what is actually possible.’119 In theory Parliament can legislate freely but in 
practice it cannot. This is wrong. Dicey captures the political reality of the 
legislature’s restricted power within his definition. Both in theory and in practice 
there exists a very real distinction between what Parliament has the legal right to do 
and what political conditions will allow it to do. Dicey does not paper over the “gap”; 
he accepts it as a political reality. This does not mean that legal right exists in theory 
alone- Parliament’s unlimited legal authority is just as much a political reality as its 
restricted power. Authority and power are simply distinct standards of measurement- 
the former measures an entity’s right to act, the latter its capacity to do so.  
The tendency to deprive legal authority of practical force derives from this 
uncertainty over what authority actually is. Authority is an unknown quantity; it is 
both ‘numbingly familiar’ and a ‘daunting mystery’, ‘at once indispensable but also 
                                                        116 A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edition, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1959) 39-40 117 Dicey (n116) 71 118 M Elliott, “Parliamentary sovereignty and the new constitutional order: Legislative freedom, political reality and convention” (2002) 22(3) Legal Studies 340, 341 119 Elliott (n118) 341 
 34 
elusive.’120 However, Arendt insists that ‘authority has vanished from the modern 
world…Practically as well as theoretically, we are no longer in a position to know 
what authority really is.’121 A lack of understanding cannot simply eradicate its 
existence. Hart’s certainly assists us in deducing what authority is not; authority is not 
power. Hart understands obligation and authority as ‘correlative concepts- different 
sides of the same coin.’122 This is epitomized in his analogy to a gunman who orders 
you to give him your money or be killed.123 Smith explains, ‘you might say that you 
were “obliged” to give the gunman your money, but you surely would not say that 
you hold an obligation or a “duty” to pay him anything.’124 Smith thus concludes that 
“the power to coerce conduct in that way just isn’t what we understand “authority” to 
be”.125 ‘We have a conception of what authority is- or at least a dim or inchoate 
notion- and the gunman’s power to coerce just doesn’t fit within that conception. Or 
what the gunman possesses (power to coerce) just isn’t what authority is.’126 Thus 
there is a distinction between feeling obliged to act and having an obligation to do so, 
between power and authority, between politics and the law. This is a logical 
distinction that resides in Dicey’s theory on sovereignty. No amount of political 
cohesion can mutate into a form of legal authority, the difference is in kind, not 
degree.  
Smith further identifies the ‘undeniable fact that…people surely do talk about 
authority; and they routinely make (or reject) claims and ascriptions of authority with 
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respect to various institutions and legal regimes.’127 Indeed, people don’t merely talk 
about authority but act on the resolute assumption that it must exist. The “gap” 
between unlimited authority and restricted power is not one between theory and 
practice but it in itself a political reality and is arguably becoming more pronounced 
in the constitutional system. For example, section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act 
1998128 enables judges to declare domestic legislation incompatible with Convention 
rights. It encapsulates the dichotomy of Parliament’s unlimited authority and 
unrestricted power. To revert back to Hart’s example, section 4(2) equips the 
judiciary with a power to coerce; a declaration politically obliges Parliament to repeal 
legislation but there is no obligation for it to do so. Section 4(2) respects the very real 
differentiation between Parliament’s unlimited legal authority and restricted power. 
Just because an act is “unthinkable” it does not mean that it is not possible.129 In fact, 
the very exercise of contemplating its likely occurrence confirms its feasibility. One 
would suspect that the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, which severely 
inhibited the rights of non-UK suspected terrorists, would fall into this unthinkable 
category.130 Equally, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 created an immigrant’s 
welfare scheme that ‘no civilized nation can tolerate’.131 Elliott diverts this challenge 
by suggesting that these ‘substantial inroads into fundamental rights’ ‘fall short of 
being utterly extreme’.132 This exercise in subjectivity fails to strengthen his argument. 
The “unthinkability” of legislation reduces the likelihood but not the possibility of 
enactment; it has no effect on Parliament’s “right”, to steal Dicey’s phraseology, to do 
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so. Legal authority is both very real and arguably very dangerous; the institution in 
possession of it requires political management. 
The ultra-thin model draws on this distinction between authority and power. The 
law is a source of authority that is utilized by the state. This authority has been 
utilized to achieve the unthinkable. Hitler did it; the Nazi regime was indescribably 
horrific but it was authorized in law. History is dotted with examples of legal 
authority being abused. However, the fault here is not with the source of authority but 
the political entities using it and the political landscape which has enabled this 
circumstance to come about. Unjust legal regimes are politically, not legally, flawed. 
The deficit therefore lies in their political legitimacy not legal authority. The rule of 
law is a dangerous legal phenomenon, as a man-made entity it is at the mercy of its 
creator. It is necessary to configure the political conditions to ensure that the rule of 
law is a good thing. It is important to dilute any concentration of both authority and 
power in one given institution. A substantial degree of political coercion must remain 
at the will of the demos; the aim of political accountability is not to combat or qualify 
the source of authority but to coerce its users into responsible government. Ultimately 
Valcke’s theory of civil disobedience has the same objective. The ultra-thin model is 
conducive to the ongoing interaction between law and politics. The rule of law does 
not deny the possibility, nor the independent value, of political persuasion. 
Conventional perceptions of the rule of law artificially amalgamate law and politics 
within the parameter of one entity; this dilutes its conceptual clarity and discards with 
a valuable autonomy between authority and power. ‘Majority rule by itself, and 
legality on its own, are insufficient to guarantee a civil and just society’ but together 
we have the makings of a beneficial constitutional formula.133 
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Raz’s formal requirements 
Kelsen’s paradigm legal positivist philosophy that ‘any content whatsoever 
can be legal’ arguably does not sit comfortably with Raz’s formal theory.134 It is 
inherently unclear whether Raz classifies the rule of law as a measure of the law’s 
efficiency or its validity. On one hand, Raz stresses that the rule of law is simply a 
‘specific virtue’ of the law; it is a ‘virtue of efficiency’ and is thus ‘morally 
neutral.’135 From this perspective, a discrepancy from the rule of law results in a less 
efficient law. The result is a legal deficiency rather than an invalid law. Indeed, ‘an 
object is a deficient knife if it can cut, but cuts badly because it is blunt.’136 A blunt 
knife is a deficient knife, but it is a knife all the same.137 From this perspective, Raz 
reinforces legal positivist thinking by ensuring that legal validity is established  ‘by 
showing that it conforms to tests of validity laid down by some other rules of the 
system which can be called rules of recognition’.138 The law is a ‘social fact’ because 
‘all laws have a source. The validity of every law is conditional on the existence of 
certain facts’ i.e. an Act of Parliament.139 Conformity to the rule of law, on the other 
hand, ‘is essential for securing whatever purposes the law is designed to achieve.’140 
It is thus focused on efficiency rather than validity.  
However, this stance is complicated by Raz’s later remark that ‘the law to be 
law must be capable of guiding behavior, however inefficiently.’141 He downplays 
‘the extent to which generality, clarity, prospectivity, etc., are essential to the law’ as 
                                                        134 H Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. A Translation of the First Edition of the Reine 
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‘minimal.’142 However, they are portrayed as essential all the same. Raz notes that as 
with other ‘tools, machines, and instruments a thing is not of the kind unless it has 
some ability to perform its function. A knife is not a knife unless it has some ability to 
cut.’143 Arguably, this dramatically transforms the ‘basic idea’ from a ‘specific virtue’ 
of law to a qualifying condition of legal validity: In order to qualify as law, the law 
must be capable of guiding behavior.144 The capacity to guide is in itself a mark of 
efficiency. This exposes the additional dynamics of a functional definition. Raz 
superimposes a minimum level of efficiency as a qualifying requirement for legal 
validity. This insinuates that a blunt knife is not a knife if it cannot cut: ‘A knife’s 
function is to cut. Thus an object is not a knife if it cannot cut at all.’145 This is 
because its function dictates its definition. Thus, a knife may cut with varying degrees 
of efficiency and still constitute a knife. However, it only qualifies as such once it has 
met a minimum threshold of efficiency in the first place: the ability to cut (or as it 
were the capacity to guide). Raz’s analogy is a double-edged sword. To qualify as law 
it must be functionally capable of guiding behavior. Raz’s “basic idea” contradicts his 
legal positivist intentions because it supersedes the understanding of legal validity as 
a social fact. It will be further argued that this efficiency target is not ‘morally neutral’, 
as Raz would claim.146 It is certainly agnostic towards the moral ends for which the 
law is used; however, his basic idea has a moral aim; it displays a respect for ‘human 
dignity’ that ‘entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their 
future.’147 However, this is not simply an anomaly in otherwise legal positivist 
thinking. Raz upgrades the rule of law from a ‘specific virtue’ of law to its ‘specific 
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excellence’ to the extent that ‘conformity to the rule of law is the virtue of law in 
itself.’148 He further contends that it is ‘of the essence of law to guide behavior’.149 
This points to the fact that the law’s capacity to guide is a defining political, and 
possibly moral, characteristic of the law; it is an existential condition of legal validity.  
McIlwain praises Raz for successfully distinguishing between ‘a conceptual 
definition of the rule of law, and any definitions which pick up on political 
preferences over the contents of the law and translate them into conceptual 
requirements of the rule of law.’ However, it is difficult to see how this is the case. 
Certainly Raz does not enumerate political preferences over the substantive content of 
the law in the conventional sense. However, he equally denies that his formal theory 
is ‘devoid of content’, insisting that this is in fact ‘far from the truth.’150 As evidence 
of this he cites ‘requirements which were associated with the rule of law’ which ‘can 
be derived from this one basic idea.’151 The mere “association” between these 
requirements and the rule of law suggests Raz is keen to deny their conceptual status. 
However, these requirements relating to the formal content of law, for example, that 
laws should be ‘prospective, open, and clear’ or ‘relatively stable’ do not simply 
complement his basic idea but are inextricably wound up with the law’s capacity to 
guide.152 Raz, however, suggests they merely ‘illustrate the power and fruitfulness of 
the formal conception of the rule of law’; ‘they directly concern the system and 
method of government in matters directly relevant to the rule of law.’153 However, a 
citizen cannot be guided by a secret or retrospective law; in order to guide a law must 
be ‘prospective, open and clear’.154 Thus, these requirements are definitive conceptual                                                         148 Raz (n1) 225 149 Raz (n1) 225 150 Raz (n1) 214 151 Raz (n1) 214 152 Raz (n1) 214 153 Raz (n1) 218 154 Raz (n1) 214 
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conditions; they are pre-requisites to the law’s capacity to guide. If this capacity to 
guide is a mark of a minimum level of efficiency of the law necessary for it to 
function as law, then these requirements not only quietly obtain a conceptual status 
but discreetly effectuate the definitive conditions of the law’s validity. Indeed, Raz 
logically distinguishes between these principles and more ‘indirect influences’ such as 
a free press which may ‘strengthen or weaken the rule of law’ but are not directly 
intertwined with its basic idea.155 Raz’s clumsy interchangeability of labels from 
“requirements” to “principles” to mere associations is unhelpful. Whilst the former 
two exhibit foundational connotations, the latter implies a more tenuous link. The 
status of the requirements is at best conceptual, at worst unknown. Here it is argued 
that Raz’s definition of the rule of law introduces a condition that only the law that is 
capable of guiding behavior may rule. This automatically requires that the minimum 
qualifications necessary to achieve effective guidance are internalized into the 
concept’s definition. It will further be argued that these requirements are indeed 
political; there is an inherent political morality in the basic idea that the law should be 
capable of guiding behaviour. The line between conceptual conditions and political 
preferences is blurred. 
In any event, if Raz’s intention is to disassociate the formal quality of the rule 
of law from political considerations, it was counterintuitive to enumerate common 
characteristics associated with the rule of law. This encourages extrinsic associations 
to realize a determinative conceptual status. This is not helped by the fact that Raz’s 
list is not exhaustive; it invites further contributions and heightens the risk of the rule 
of law evolving into an unrecognized political ‘slogan’, an exercise he previously 
claims to condemn.156 Thus Raz does not effectively distinguish between the political                                                         155 Raz (n1) 218-219 156 Raz (n1) 210 
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and conceptual; he fails to pre-empt the rule of law’s dangerous political dilution. In 
other words, even Raz’s “formal” theory risks politicizing the rule of law. A retreat to 
legal conformity must be made. 
 
The Political morality of Raz’s theory 
 The first three principles that Raz enumerates apply standards designed to 
enable the law to effectively guide action. Thus the laws should be ‘prospective, open, 
and clear’, ‘relatively stable’ and the making of ‘particular legal orders’ should be 
guided by ‘open, stable, clear and general rules.’157 Despite disguising his theory in 
terms of legal formality, these principles are clearly political. First, whilst Raz claims 
that the rule of law says ‘nothing about how the law is to be made’, requiring the 
substantive content of legislation to be prospective, open and clear surely automates 
the demand for safeguards to be incorporated into the legislative process.158 Thus 
Raz’s requirements are “political” in an institutional sense; they engage political 
processes.  
The principles are political. Their contestable meanings connote an 
argumentative nature that is naturally accommodated in the ‘antagonistic pluralism’ 
of the political domain.159 The first symptom of politics is conflict; these principles 
display an internal struggle for clarity in meaning whilst also conflicting with each 
other. It is uncertain how clear, stable, open or prospective a law must be; Fagan 
validly notes that ‘a statute may be unclear, but not so unclear that it fails to qualify as 
law.’160 Furthermore, Raz discounts the ambiguity inherent in requiring a law to be 
“prospective.” In light of the ‘retrospective nature of almost all legislation’, it is 
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unclear whether he eliminates both retroactive and retrospective legislation.161 He 
overlooks the inevitable ‘intertemporal conflict of laws’.162 Raz also fails to 
appreciate the difficulty in ‘differentiating between prospective laws which almost 
inevitably have a retrospective effect, and retroactive laws’ for instance ‘a prospective 
tax increase can be said to “impair legal rights” just as a law changing the terms of 
contracts currently in effect, which would surely be considered an illegitimately 
retroactive law.’163 The retrospective nature of a law is a ‘question of degree’; there 
may be a negligible degree of distinction between a legitimate retrospective law and 
an illegitimate retroactive law.164 Indeed, Troy identifies a category of laws that ‘do 
not mention prior events but that change the legal consequences of such events’ and 
are thus ‘impliedly retroactive’.165 This inherent ambiguity aggravates Raz’s 
alternative demand for clarity in the law. Furthermore, the principle of stability may 
antagonize the demand for rapid change in order to achieve the required clarity. Raz 
admits that the principles require ‘further elaboration and further justification’.166 
However, it should not be presumed that this additional elaboration would necessarily 
negate the principles’ inherently political character. This is a false assumption. The 
notion of “clarity” does not stop being contestable by requiring a law to be 
“reasonably clear” or “extremely clear”. Indeed, these additional adjectives display 
political characteristics in their own right that only serve to further conflict as to what 
is “reasonable” or “extreme”. Furthermore, Raz’s argument that the principles must 
be ‘constantly interpreted in light of the basic idea’, enabling the law to guide, 
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displays backwards reasoning.167  The ambiguity of his principles cannot be excused 
in light of the uncertainty inherent in his basic idea. His theory displays signs of 
inevitable political fluctuation that detracts from the rule of law’s function as a 
predictable legal threshold. It is pragmatic but inevitably impractical. Raz’s basic idea 
is political; it enjoys degrees of conformity and is thus an intangible political ideal. If 
the minimum function of the law is to guide, the degree to which these principles 
must be adhered to is inherently uncertain. This reduces legality to a selective and 
subjective exercise of perception.  
 Synpnowich argues ‘there is moral content in the requirement that law be 
framed in a way that renders it capable of being obeyed.’ 168 This indicates that Raz’s 
formal conception of the rule of law has a moral dimension; it seeks to secure a 
degree of ‘procedural morality’.169 This exposes the superficial distinction between 
Raz’s concept of the rule of law and his political principles. The requirements simply 
elaborate on his basic political idea of ‘procedural justice.’ 170 Therefore, the 
distinction between Raz’s principles and his concept is one of degree not kind. In this 
light it is logical to perceive Raz’s principles as extended conceptual requirements of 
the rule of law.  Arguably, there is a resemblance between Raz’s requirements and 
Fuller’s principles that form the inner morality of the law.171 The only clear difference 
is their label. Whilst Raz classifies these principles as merely formal, Fuller identifies 
them as moral. Shapiro notes that ‘(m)uch ink has been spilled over the question of 
whether the principles Fuller identifies are best characterized as moral, and, hence 
whether he has discovered an important link between law and morality.’172 Even more                                                         167 Raz (n1) 218 168 Synpnowich (n3) 192  169 Synpnowich (n3) 192 170 Synpnowich (n3) 183  171 L L Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1964) 172 S J Shapiro, Legality (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2011) 394 
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ink could be spilled in identifying the morality of Raz’s basic idea. However, the very 
fact that their status is debatable insinuates their political quality. Raz covertly allows 
political requirements to dictate the concept of the rule of law. Whilst Synpnowich 
retreats from totally equating the formal rule of law with the ‘substantive’ in a 
classical sense, labeling this as ‘misleading’, she simultaneously appears to suggest 
that it is substantive, just to a minimum degree.173 Indeed, Synpnowich claims that the 
formal rule of law is ‘political morality of the narrow, circumscribed kind’.174 
Procedural justice has a minimum substantive quality. Certainly, these formal 
requirements are less political than the ‘morality of social justice, care or democracy’; 
however, the difference is not of kind but degree.175 The formal requirements are only 
able to compete against the latter principles in the first place because they share this 
common denominator of political morality. In other words, the formal requirements 
supply a minimum degree of substantive political morality. Raz thus arbitrarily 
distinguishes between the degree and category of justice that he deems most “formal” 
and adaptable to subtly complement his legal positivist intentions and “bulk up” a 
politically vacant concept. This logically explains why Raz categorises the rule of law 
as a ‘political ideal.’176 Raz’s initial proposition that his version of the rule of law can 
co-exist with an unjust regime is thus fallacious.  
Synpnowich identifies certain risks created by the “formal” approach. For 
example, she warns of the possibility that ‘not only is procedural justice protected at 
the expense of substantive justice, but the former provides an ideological justification 
for the absence of the latter. The rule of law, trumpeting the morality of procedures, 
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thereby occludes the issue of a more contentful morality of equality.’177 Therefore, 
Raz’s theory arguably risks prioritising procedural over substantive justice.178 His 
focus on procedural adequacy could actually actively injure substantive justice. This 
is especially true in light of the fact that procedural justice is often a ‘shabby 
compromise’ of a ‘specific form of substantial justice’; it is therefore often ‘imperfect 
and not ideal.’179 In comparison, the simple requirement of legal conformity is 
agnostic towards justice.  Indeed, an apolitical rule of law does not compete with 
substantive justice because there exists no common moral denominator to enable this 
comparison. The rule of law is not more important than substantive justice; it is 
simply a separate concern altogether. The danger with the ‘political morality’ in 
Raz’s theory is that procedural justice may be deemed politically sufficient.180 The 
beauty of the rule of law as legal conformity is an overt confession that it is necessary 
but not politically sufficient. Political participants are not discouraged from 
compensating for this political deficit in the political domain nor are they duped into 
thinking that procedural morality will make do.  Furthermore, one agrees with Fagan 
that ‘…to the extent that a legal positivist were to give the rule of law a substantive 
content, he would be depriving the rule of law of its significance and usefulness. The 
more substantive the rule of law becomes, the less reason a positivist has to pay it 
attention.’181 By inadvertently supplying a minimum degree of political morality, Raz 
jeopardises the remarkability of the rule of law’s legal neutrality.  
McIlwain insists that the 39th Chapter of Magna Carta contains the ‘classical 
statement of a principle that was always insisted upon and usually enforced as a rule 
of positive coercive law, and not, as the Austinians would say, as a mere maxim of                                                         177 Synpnowich (n3) 183 178 Shapiro (n172) 214 179 Hampshire (n87) 162-163 180 Synpnowich (n3) 193 181 Fagan (n136) 110 
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positive morality.’182 The rule of law was never intended as a moral phenomenon. 
However, McIlwain provides useful support for the suggestion that Raz’s formal 
version does not totally inhibit the rule of law’s mythical association with political 
morality.  The alternative to positivism is the elevation of morality ‘to the ultimate 
criterion of validity’.183 McIlwain rightly questions whether Raz’s definition of the 
rule of law ‘via requirements’ ‘does really provide a pure and neutral depiction of the 
rule of law.’184 McIlwain summarises Raz’s definition as a ‘service conception of 
law: its ability to issue valid reasons for action, that is to guide behavior, is connected 
with the ‘dependence’ conception which refers those reasons back to the expectations 
and reasons of individuals.’185 It is inherently intertwined with human dignity. 
McIlwain is particularly skeptical of Raz’s inclusion of ‘natural justice’ as a basic 
requirement of the rule of law as it “should intuitively also incorporate premises such 
as those banning arbitrary killing, brutality, violence, torture, genocide, slavery, as 
well as unjustified discrimination’ which ‘all converge in weakening the positivistic 
closure of the rule of law “neutrality”.’186 Indeed, the inclusion of “Natural Justice” 
may act as a covert floodgate prompting the rule of law’s inundation with abstract 
political ideals. On one hand, Raz achieves a desirable differentiation between the 
‘conceptual definition’ of the rule of law and ‘any definitions which pick up on the 
political preferences over the contents of the law and translate them into conceptual 
requirements of the rule of law.’187 This is because, for Raz, the rule of law is a 
concept “which embraces technical requirements, and its virtue is efficiency in the 
light of its role as a “behavioural guide”, regardless of the good or bad goals for 
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which it may from time to time serve as a means.’188 However, in light of 
Synpnowich’s dissection of the political morality inherent in procedural justice; Raz 
arguably still fails to faithfully differentiate between the rule of law and ‘the rule of 
(this or that) good law’; his basic idea is inherently selective; it promotes only that 
law which is capable of guiding behavior.189 That capacity to guide is necessarily 
dictated by political variables such as clarity, certainty and stability. Interpreting this 
as a political preference over the content of the law reflects a departure from the 
conventional understanding of “political” and reflects a more three dimensional 
adaption of the term which is not confined to substantive justice and is more in tune 
with political morality.  
  
Why does it matter if Raz’s theory dictates legal efficiency or legal validity? 
Fagan remarks that ‘those who regard non-compliance with the rule of law as 
a legal failure are not always clear about the meaning of this.’190 Let us recall Raz’s 
formal theory. On one hand Raz suggests that a subversion of the rule of law results in 
a legal deficiency. However, if this is correct, it has impractical consequences that 
antagonize the legal system; a law may be simultaneously valid and incompliant with 
the rule of law. It is legally valid but it does not “rule”. This may be a law, which has 
passed the necessary thresholds of validity within the law-making process, but the 
result is a piece of legislation that is unclear, unstable and retrospective. In this sense 
the rule of law becomes something with which ‘existent law is asked to comply’; the 
aim exceeds mere legality; ‘it is not just the law’.191 This would result in a scenario 
whereby ‘the law does not mirror or live up to the rule of law…it has and can be at 
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odds with valid rules.’192 The ultra-thin model departs from this outlook. It is 
inappropriate to measure the compatibility of valid law with the rule of law; the rule 
of the law is neither a measure of a law’s efficiency nor its validity; it reflects a valid 
law’s state of being and is inherently intertwined with social fact. In Raz’s view a law 
rules if it is capable of guiding the behavior of the citizen so that the individual may 
be ruled by the law and obey it. With Raz there is deemed to exist a hierarchy 
between a law that is valid and a law that rules. This begs the question: In what way 
can a law be legally valid but not rule? The legal status of a legally defective law is 
uncertain. At a minimum, surely being publicly identified as a “deficient” law 
justifies legal disobedience and thus undermines the authority of the law. Equally, if 
conformity with the rule of law does not dictate legal validity, then the concept has no 
legal bite. Understanding the rule of law simply as the rule of valid law circumvents 
these impractical consequences and is faithful to the unconditional notion of the “rule 
of the law”.  
However, Raz simultaneously appears to suggest to qualify as law it must 
have a fundamental capacity to guide behavior. The basic idea of law then becomes a 
condition of legality. This would dispel the problems that result from an artificial 
hierarchy between laws that rule and those that are merely valid. However, it 
aggravates the legal positivist understanding that legal validity is simply a social fact 
dictated by legal rules and procedures within a given legal system. If this 
unquantifiable political consideration is internalised as a requirement in the legal 
validation process, legal validity becomes merely a question of degree. It is at this 
point when conceptual clarity and legal certainty are inherently interlinked, despite 
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the fact that Alexy argues to the contrary.193 If the certainty of legal validity is 
compromised by a contestable political consideration, how is the citizen able to 
deduce with certainty what is valid law and what is not? Surely this disables all 
potential guidance in the law. It is also dangerous because legality necessarily 
becomes subjective. The citizen is not guided by the law; on the contrary the citizen 
dictates legal validity by estimating whether or not a law is sufficiently clear, 
prospective, stable and general to be valid. Legality necessarily becomes a matter of 
conflict and non-compliance with the rule of law results in both a moral and a legal 
failure. 
In Raz’s theory we see an inadvertent transition of the rule of law from an 
unconditional legal concept (rule of all valid law) to a conditional political ideal (rule 
of law only that law capable of being obeyed). Raz claims to do so in order to 
discourage the perception of the phrase ‘government by law and not by men’ as an 
‘empty tautology’.194 In other words, Raz is keen to ensure that the rule of law lives 
up to its manifesto promise. However, the rule of law is incapable of guaranteeing this 
political commitment. Hutchinson admits the idea of ‘a government of laws, not 
persons’ is both ‘legally impractical and politically dubious’ anyway.195 It is better to 
simply expose the reality that the rule of law is essentially “rule through law by men”, 
rather than to liberalise the rule of law to fit the descriptive slogan. This aggravates 
the ‘old-age question of how- or indeed whether- the government can be limited by 
law when it is the ultimate source of law.’196 This tension is relieved by understanding 
the law as the ultimate authoritative mechanism utilized by men to organize a state. 
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Men have ultimately engineered this fate; it is a social fact that reflects a societal 
decision. Man is bound to the extent that it has committed itself to law. Man acts 
under law but this legal canopy may act as both a shelter and a pressing injustice. The 
law is man-made; it is a tool; it is therefore essential that it is not only used but used 
correctly. The rule of law as one of many potential components of a regime. Legality 
should not be artificially perceived in isolation. It is how well a system enables the 
beneficial interaction between the rule of law and other political virtues that is a 
testament to how sophisticated and politically developed a state is; it is this that gives 
a state bragging rights rather than empty commitments to a politically diluted version 




Bingham: the conventional understanding of the rule of law 
 As a result of the politicization of the rule of law, arriving at a succinct answer 
to the question “What is the rule of law?” necessarily requires first identifying what it 
is not. This thesis has thus far adopted a rather unorthodox approach to a definition of 
the rule of law; it has taken Raz’s formal understanding of the concept as “the rule of 
the law” and interpreted this broadly to eradicate any political conditions attaching to 
the quality or type of law that rules. In essence, one has deconstructed Raz’s 
understanding of the rule of law as more “formal” than “thin”, though it claims to 
qualify as both. The rule of law demands legal conformity rather than legal obedience 
because the latter necessarily requires that the law be capable of guiding behavior; 
this inevitably inculcates an idea of political morality within the concept of the rule of 
law. Bingham picks up where Raz finishes. He expands on the formal conception of 
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the rule of law listing a series of sub-rules which elaborate on the more conventional 
perception that ‘…all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or 
private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and 
prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts.’197 For Bingham, 
the rule of law ‘expresses the fundamental truth’ propounded by John Locke that 
‘Where- ever law ends, tyranny begins’.198 From the outset there is a fundamental 
distinction between Bingham’s and my understanding of the rule of law. For Bingham, 
the rule of law can never be compatible with tyranny; it indicates more than simply 
the legality of a system. In contrast, the notion of the “rule of the law” does not 
impose qualitative conditions on the type of law that rules; the executive is subject to 
the law but a manipulative government may minimize the scope of this restriction. 
Bingham enumerates eight sub-rules of the Rule of Law. It is necessary to assess 
these in turn in order to differentiate the conventional contemporary perception of the 
rule of law from one’s ultra-thin version.  
 Bingham’s first sub-rule encapsulates Raz’s same requirement that the law 
must be capable of guiding behavior. Bingham states that ‘the law must be accessible 
and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.’199 Both agree that the rule of 
law has a certain formal quality; ‘if everyone is bound by the law they must be able 
without undue difficulty to find out what it is.’200 Bingham usefully cites English 
authority to this effect. In particular, Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979]201 states 
that ‘…a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient 
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 52 
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct’.202 This case illustrates the 
symbiotic relationship identified between Raz’s utilization of the rule of law as a 
formal drive for legal efficiency and a minimum condition of legality. This dicta 
indicates that a law must demonstrate a minimum capacity to guide in order to qualify 
as law. It has been argued that this proposal is not wholly consistent with a legal 
positivist agenda. Indeed, to reiterate Sypnowich’s comment it demonstrates a 
substantive ‘political morality of the narrow, circumscribed kind’ by imposing a 
political threshold on legal qualification.203  The law-making body should be 
encouraged to produce sufficiently clear and precise legislation; however, this is 
merely part of the constitutional job description, the quality of the end product is an 
indication of the efficiency of the institution rather than a measure of legality. It is not 
disputed that the law should be accessible, clear, stable and prospective; it is simply 
argued that these are not requirements of the rule of law nor are they  conditions of 
legal validity.  
It is questionable to what extent it is unreasonable to leave this capacity to 
guide out of a definition of the rule of law. Indeed, Bingham admits that even the UK 
legal system suffers from a ‘legislative hyperactivity which appears to have become a 
permanent feature of our governance’; he cites as evidence the 3500 pages of primary 
legislation in 2004 and 9000 pages of statutory instruments in 2003.204 It is therefore 
questionable to what extent this accessibility is capable of being practically achieved. 
It is further questionable to what extent it should be; sometimes the law is necessarily 
complex in order to achieve justice. Indeed, there is a potential tension between how 
the law is perceived by the citizen and how the citizen is best protected. Furthermore, 
we should not discount the role of the lawyer to clarify the law and indeed the legal                                                         202 Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979] 2 EHRR 245, 271 203 Sypnowich (n3) 193 204 Bingham (n197) 7 
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system to navigate its uncertainties. The accessibility of the law is inevitably 
determined by the sophistication of the legal system and the technical efficiency of 
legislators, judges and lawyers. These variables inevitably determine how favorable 
the notion of the rule of law is perceived, however, they are not conceptual 
requirements of the thing itself.  
 The second sub-rule states that ‘questions of legal right and liability should 
ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion.’205 
This is an issue analysed in far greater detail in chapter II. It intertwines with the 
synopsis of legal conformity. Legal conformity is a normative requirement that 
derives from the law’s ultimate authority; because the law has ultimate authority, 
people (citizens and the executive alike) must conform to it. It will be argued that 
legal conformity embodies the idea that the executive may do anything that does not 
break the law. From this perspective, in theory the executive enjoys the same legal 
liberty of the citizen. The rule of law does not determine how the law is used. 
However, it is clearly desirable that the actions of the executive are subject to greater 
legal regulation and scrutiny than the ordinary citizen. Thus, whilst the rule of law 
requires only that the executive conforms to the law i.e. does not break the law, it is 
envisaged that the scope of its legal liberty will be far more restricted. Bingham, for 
example, already illustrates that ‘discretion imports a choice between two possible 
decisions and orders, and usually the scope for choice is very restricted.’206 This 
inevitably depends on how pro-active and efficient the law-making institution is and 
the extent of the separation of powers. These variables are external to the rule of law 
but inevitably impact on its perception. In order to optimize the rule of law, one 
agrees with Bingham that questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be                                                         205 Bingham (n197) 10 206 Bingham (n197) 10 
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resolved by the law rather than at the whim of the executive. However, the questions 
of whether the law has ultimate authority and how the law is to be used are two 
independent but related issues. 
 Third, ‘the laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that 
objective differences justify differentiation.’207 Bingham provides the example that 
‘we would regard legislation directed to those with red hair…as incompatible with the 
rule of law.’208 Equality before the law is a fundamental requirement of the rule of 
law. The law’s ultimate authority is universal; all must conform to the law: rich or 
poor, powerful or weak, government or individual. There is value in this so long as 
the law is not manipulated and used discriminately.  This is incorporated to a degree 
within Bingham’s sixth sub-rule that reflects the idea that laws ‘duly made, bind all to 
whom they apply’.209 However, equality before the law is not synonymous with the 
law’s equal application or non-discrimination. A law that is directed towards people 
with red hair will still bind everyone; however, those with red hair will feel its effects 
unequally and inevitably unfairly. Thus an individual may be subject to a law without 
feeling its tangible effects whilst another individual may be worse off because of that 
same law. The fact that legislation addresses a particular group does not mean that all 
men are not equally subject to it. It simply means that the impact of this law will be 
unequal. The rule of law is only receptive to the notion of equality in terms of its 
equal and universal authority; it is not concerned with how non-discriminatory or 
subjective the content of the law is. 
 Bingham’s fourth and arguably most controversial sub-rule is that ‘the law 
must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights’.210 He admits that this 
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would not be ‘universally accepted as embraced within the rule of law’.211 Indeed, 
Raz and I agree that the rule of law is not concerned with how democratic or just a 
legal system is. Therefore a legal system that does great injury to fundamental human 
rights is potentially compatible with the rule of law. This is because the rule of law is 
not concerned with the substantive content of law. Bingham, on the contrary, argues 
that a ‘state which savagely repressed or persecuted sections of its people’ could not 
be viewed as observing the rule of law.212 He certainly cites strong evidence of the 
confusion between the rule of law and protection of human rights. For instance, he 
argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 state that ‘…human 
rights should be protected by the rule of law’. 213 Furthermore the European Court of 
Human Rights has referred to ‘the notion of the rule of law from which the whole 
convention draws its inspiration.’214 He also refers to the fact that the European 
Commission ‘has consistently treated democratization, the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and good governance as inseparably interlinked.’215 However, this 
simply proves the extensive scope of the confusion and the rule of law’s 
transformation into a political slogan. It has been argued that the utilization of the law 
as the authoritative tool to organize the state provides an inherent protection of the 
citizen; the citizen is fundamentally better off with law than without it because it 
maintains a foundational order that is fundamentally essential to the welfare of the 
citizen.  
However, incorporating the protection of human rights within the meaning of 
the rule of law is problematic. Bingham himself admits that there is not ‘a standard of 
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human rights universally agreed even among civilized nations’, this results in  ‘an 
element of vagueness’ concerning this sub-rule as ‘the outer edges of fundamental 
human rights are not clear cut.’216 However, Bingham attempts to assuage this 
problem by suggesting that ‘within a given state there will ordinarily be a measure of 
agreement on where the lines are to be drawn.’217 There are two problems with this. 
First, the presumption of an element of consensus regarding rights is inherently 
optimistic. Even in states at the forefront of the protection of rights this is not the case. 
For example, in the US there is the ongoing debate on the right to arms. In the UK 
what is presumed to be the fundamental right to life is the constant subject of conflict 
in relation to abortion and euthanasia.218 Therefore, even in the confines of a nation 
state an agreement on fundamental human rights cannot be drawn with adequate 
accuracy to allow its incorporation within the meaning of the rule of law. Second, this 
artificial domestication of the rule of law is fundamentally in conflict with Bingham’s 
eighth sub-rule which requires ‘compliance by the state with its obligations in 
international law.’219 Bingham rightly identifies the rule of law as an international 
concept. However, conceptualizing the rule of law in accordance with national 
perceptions of human rights resists its transition into international currency. The law 
should be utilized to protect fundamental rights. This is an essential requirement of a 
democratic constitution, but not of the rule of law.  
 Bingham’s fifth sub-rule that people should be able ‘to go to court to have 
their rights and liabilities determined’ is described as an ‘obvious corollary’ of the 
principle that ‘everyone is bound by and entitled to the benefit of the law’.220 Thus 
Bingham suggests an essential element of the rule of law is ‘the right of unimpeded                                                         216 Bingham (n197) 19-20 217 Bingham (n197) 20 218 See E Wicks, The right to life and conflicting interests (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) 219 Bingham (n197) 29 220 Bingham (n197) 20 
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access to court’.221 It is inevitably intertwined with his seventh sub-rule that 
‘adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair.’222 Raz similary 
prioritises the independence of the judiciary, principles of natural justice, the courts’ 
review powers, accessibility of the courts and the discretion of crime preventing 
agencies.223 An obvious means of ensuring the enforcement and practical 
maintenance of the rule of law is to ensure there is access to an independent court 
occupied by an experienced and active judiciary. Certainly the principle of the 
separation of powers has the potential to invigorate the rule of law as a means to 
prevent the consolidation of power and encourage the accountability of the executive. 
However,   under the ultra-thin model rule of law may respond positively to a number 
of political variables. Indeed, Raz himself helpfully questions why the courts and not 
some other body should be in charge of securing legal conformity; a qualified 
substitute may perform the same role.224 However, judges are not necessarily 
‘essential for the preservation of the rule of law’ and may do more damage than 
good.225 For example, an independent and experienced judiciary may act to the 
detriment of the rule of law. For example, it may create misconceptions about the 
meaning of the rule of law in order to achieve a “just” result or utilize the concept as a 
scapegoat to providing proper reasoning. Furthermore, Tamanaha argues that one 
should be wary of the rule of law precisely because ‘it may evolve into the rule of 
judges (or lawyers).’226 Indeed, the court may interpret the law beyond its legal 
means; this effectively results in the rule of judicial discretion rather than the rule of 
the law. It is then dangerous to over-familiarize the rule of law with the court system. 
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Yes, the rule of law requires practical enforcement. This is probably best achieved by 
securing equal access to an independent and experienced court. However, judicial 
independence is simply another aspect of the legal and political framework that may 
be configured to optimize the rule of law. The rule of law may be partial to judicial 
independence and better accessibility to courts; these conditions do justice to the rule 
of law. However, the law may rule without them, a dissatisfactory state of affairs no 
doubt, but a possible one under the ultra-thin model. Equally it is important not to 
overstate the judges’ guardianship of the rule of law; it must not covertly evolve into 
rule by judges. It is essential to secure a ‘delicate balance…in which judges strive to 
abide by the law and render decisions with an awareness of the proper (limited) role 
of the courts in a broader polity.’227 
 Bingham devotes his sixth sub-rule to ensuring that public officials exercise 
their powers ‘reasonably, in good faith, for the purpose for which the powers were 
conferred and without exceeding the limits of such powers.’228 Bingham clearly 
perceives a significant overlap between the rule of law and judicial review. The 
operation of the ultra-thin model, in particular its relationship with judicial review 
will be discussed in far greater detail in Chapter II. It is argued that the rule of law 
feeds into the foundational ultra vires principle, the ground of legality; the judiciary 
police the extent to which the executive acts in conflict with the law. The doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty has engineered a very statutory focused conception of 
legality. Often the question of legality is not clear-cut; the ambiguity of language is 
the Achilles heel of the law and the question of legality is often a matter of legal 
interpretation. Thus, for example, statute may require the executive to act “reasonably” 
or “in the interests of the state”, such determinations necessarily have legal                                                         227 Tamanaha (n65) 15 228 Bingham (n197) 23 
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consequences. However, Bingham suggests that the rule of law is concerned with 
monitoring how governmental an executive acts; this reflects the evolution of judicial 
review; it demonstrates the development of grounds of procedural impropriety and 
irrationality which do not share the same legal pedigree but appear to have adopted 
the same legal force.  The development of good administration principles that now 
substantiate judicial review reflects a fundamental difference in motive; judicial 
review is designed to protect individual liberty and keep a check on the executive, the 
ultra-thin model is agnostic towards both. That does not mean that the rule of law 
plays no role in judicial rule, it is simply articulated via the narrow ultra vires 
principle. It constitutes merely one component, be it an essential one, of an 
increasingly liberal administrative practice that expects more of its executive than 
statutory compliance, it demands good government. Such development should be 
welcome but not confused. Equally, those proponents of judicial activism should not 
discount the value of, nor discourage, the cardinal importance of a political 
constitution to optimize the rule of law. 
 Bingham’s eighth sub-rule has already been touched upon. It states that the 
rule of law ‘requires compliance by the state with its obligations in international 
law’.229 Like Bingham “I do not think this proposition contentious.”230 Indeed, the 
notion of the “rule of the law” incorporates the idea that all valid law rules; what 
constitutes valid law is dictated by the rules and procedures of the legal system. It is 
therefore the product of social fact rather than the result of an inherent moral impetus 
in the nature of law. International law is increasingly being recognized within national 
legal systems. Therefore, the “rule of law” is inclusive of international law. It has 
already been highlighted that Bingham’s inclusion of fundamental human rights as an                                                         229 Bingham (n197) 29 230 Bingham (n197) 29 
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essential element of the rule of law aggravates this eighth sub-rule because in order to 
define the nature of fundamental human rights national rather than international 
perspectives are relied upon. This inevitably cultivates national conceptions of the 
rule of law that detract from its value as an international concept. The value of the 
ultra-thin depiction of the “rule of the law” is its neutrality and thus easy adaption as 
an international language. This is especially important in light of the modern strategy 
of exporting the rule of law to developing states. 
 Bingham concludes by suggesting that the rule of law cannot exist without 
democracy. He states that the rule of law depends on an ‘unspoken but fundamental 
bargain between the individual and the state…by which both sacrifice a measure of 
the freedom and power which they would otherwise enjoy.’231 The individual ‘accepts 
the constraints imposed by laws properly made because of the benefits which, on 
balance, they confer.’232 However, the rule of law itself embodies an agreement 
between the individual and the state to respect the authority of the law. This is not 
necessarily a fair bargain but it provides the foundation of a legal relationship. The 
rule of law can exist without democracy; it may accompany many means of 
government, good and bad. Similarly, in a sufficiently civic population it is not 
inconceivable that democracy can exist without law. However, ‘law provides essential 
support for democracy’.233 The rule of law is independent of democracy; it provides 
that essential legal foundation of a state. Democracy, however, builds on these 
necessary foundations to provide an infrastructure of governance. Democracy is a 
means of distributing power and encouraging the equal participation of eligible 
citizens in the running of the state; it inevitably relies on rules. The result is this: 
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viewed in isolation the rule of law exists but it is naked; it is vulnerable without the 
clothing of democracy. In the Crito we see how the rule of law is far from ideal; it has 
the potential to accommodate injustice. Equally, Socrates reconciles us to the fact that 
the law is invaluable as a social mechanism; it provides the ‘minimal conditions 
necessary for a livable social existence.’234 This is because a ‘peaceful social order is 
marked by the absence of routine violence’ and the presence of ‘a substantial degree 
of physical security and reliable expectations about surrounding conduct.’235 However, 
this alone is not enough. Indeed, Socrates does not discount the value of participation 
and encourages active citizenship by imploring the individual to change the state’s 
mind of what is just. Thus it encourages the idea that the law should reflect the values 
and opinions of the demos. The rule of law should operate alongside a democracy. 
They enjoy a complementary rather than symbiotic relationship. Accepting this 
independence is crucial to the ultra-thin definition of the rule of law. It accepts that 
the rule of law is essential but not necessarily sufficient.  
 The rule of law is neither conventional, nor formal, nor is it essentially 
normative: it is a descriptive indication of the law’s ultimate authority. However, it 
would be wrong to assume that the ultra-thin model deprives the rule of law of any 
value. Rather it identifies the concept as the defining legal virtue in the constitutional 
blueprint of any nation state. The ultra-thin model places significant expectations on 
the constitutional framework, not by virtue of its definition but its conceptual 
expediency. It comes to terms with the reality that the political morality of a state 
cannot be neatly packaged under one heading; it is essential that we do not allow the 
rule of law to devolve into a strap line for good government. Instead it is necessary to 
cultivate a kind of political constitution that celebrates political values and acts as a                                                         234 Tamanaha (n65) 8 235 Tamanaha (n65) 8 
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suitable partner to the rule of law. If the law rules people (individual and government) 
must conform to it. This is the definitive and sole requirement of the rule of law. The 
next chapter deduces what is meant by legal conformity; it considers how this reaches 
fruition and interacts within the messy reality of the constitutional landscape. 
  



























Viewed in isolation the “rule of valid law” is not an ideal. It secures the 
ultimate authority of the law. This assessment rests on three main points: First, it is 
not necessarily easy to identify what constitutes  “valid law” in the first place; this 
inevitably depends on the complexity of the constitutional framework. Second, even if 
it is reasonably clear what qualifies as “valid law” the rule of law does not guarantee 
that this law is necessarily moral, desirable, clear or prospective. Finally, the notion of 
legality which is coterminous with the rule of law is minimalistic; it does not require 
every government action to be legally authorized in advance. The extent to which the 
rule of law is able to contribute to an ideal state of affairs is dependent upon the 
political framework in which it operates. Therefore, in order for us to optimize this 
concept it is necessary to cultivate the appropriate political conditions for a state to 
flourish. Of course, it is inherently superficial to view the rule of law in isolation; it is 
one necessary component of a community of factors that contribute to a desirable 
constitutional framework. In this sense, the rule of law boasts an innately social aspect 
to its character, which, if only in a limited operative sense, is certainly valuable. 
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Indeed, Krygier similarly refers to the rule of law as a kind of ‘interaction technology’ 
not dissimilar to a Toyota car which may look ‘much the same all over the world’ but 
inevitably behaves ‘very differently on different roads and with different drivers.’236 
The term “rule of valid law” is able to permeate international boundaries. However, it 
will operate differently in relation to local legal and political conditions. The 
difference is not in the efficiency of the technology but the external climate. Whilst 
these three points illustrate why the rule of law, considered in isolation, is less than 
politically ideal, this does not logically translate to their interpretation as failures of 
the concept itself. What is not ideal is not necessarily flawed. However, 
improvements need to be made to the political landscape, not to compensate for the 
rule of law’s failures, but to optimize its potential for good government.  
This chapter will first address the meaning of the rule of law in terms of 
legality. It engages with the current understanding under the UK constitution that the 
executive enjoys a residual legal liberty comparable to that enjoyed by the ordinary 
citizen. The law’s rule is not indicative of its monopolization. It is argued then that the 
rule of law is only a disabling constitutional mechanism in the sense that it demands a 
legal process; however, within this legal landscape it still potentially awards the 
executive significant room for manoeuvre. It thus seems odd to label the rule of law 
as the ‘ultimate controlling factor’ of the constitution.237 It is therefore imperative to 
locate the most efficient accountability mechanism to hold the executive to account. 
Elliott’s proposal to extend judicial review to the monitoring of the executive’s 
residual acts will be countered against alternative political constitutionalist 
proposals.238 The latter are deemed more efficient and desirable. However, the 
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intention is not to compartmentalize one’s proposals as “political constitutionalist”, 
this label inevitably provokes constricting stereotypes, yet is increasingly ambiguous. 
However, the emphasis on the significance of politics and the realization that any 
normative account of the constitution will inevitably be ‘prescriptive without 
prescribing much’ certainly illustrates a fostering of political constitutional elements 
within one’s prescription of a political framework that best complements the 
operation of the rule of law.239 As well as endorsing the invigoration of politics, this 
chapter further proposes the codification of common law liberties and powers to 
cultivate an association between the rule of law and statutory supremacy. By 
consolidating the source of law which has ultimate authority it brings clarity both to 
the “rule of valid law” and its operation within the constitutional framework. It thus 
does not necessarily supplant law for politics but engages with the real-life messy 
interface between the two. 
 
The nature of law 
‘A valid law is a law, an invalid law is not.’240 To this extent both natural law 
theorists and legal positivists agree. However, legal positivists contend that legal 
validity is a question of ‘objective determination to which one’s moral or political 
views are essentially irrelevant.’241 In contrast, natural lawyers identify a ‘necessary, 
not a contingent, relationship between law and morality.’242 The natural law 
proponent believes that ‘all law must be morally justified if it is to be legitimately 
called “law” at all’.243 Legal positivist thinkers, on the contrary, argue that all laws 
have a “source” which is ‘an action or a series of actions’ thus the questions regarding                                                         239 G Gee & G Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30(2) OJLS 273, 289 240 Raz (n1) 146 241 Raz (n1) 152 242 W C Starr, “Law and Morality in H L A Hart’s Legal Philosophy”  (1984) 67 Marquette Law Review 673  243 Starr (n242) 674 
 66 
the validity of laws ‘revolve on factual questions, on issues susceptible of objective 
determination to which one’s moral or political views are essentially irrelevant.’244 In 
sum, the law is a ‘social fact’, not a moral one.245 In contrast, like Shapiro it is ‘easy 
for me to imagine legal systems that are evil…human history is littered with 
examples’; the Nazi regime is the most obvious.246 Shapiro neatly summarizes the 
legal positivist position that ‘a very unjust rule can still be a law as long as it satisfies 
the criteria of legal validity applied by the institutions of the legal system in 
question.’247 
 Identifying law and morality as distinct entities does not discount the potential 
moral value of law. Indeed, law and morality have a ‘very close relationship’, similar 
to that shared between law and politics.248 Indeed, Starr argues that it is a ‘sheer 
nonsense and a gross misrepresentation of legal positivism’ to maintain it denies an 
interaction between law and morality or contend that ‘law is not concerned with 
morality.’249 Hart in particular impresses upon his reader that the law shows ‘at a 
thousand points the influence of both the accepted social morality and wider moral 
ideals.’250 There is no discounting the fact that the law can be of great moral value but 
it is not necessarily so; it may be used as a means to achieve moral ends. To argue that 
legal positivists are not concerned with morality is a severe understatement. Starr 
emphasizes that Hart’s distinction between law and morality is in itself a ‘moral 
argument.’251 Indeed, it is dangerous to encourage a synonymy between legal validity 
and morality because it induces an ‘obsequious quietism’ in the behaviorisms of 
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society.252 This creates the danger that ‘the existing law may supplant morality as a 
final test of conduct and so escape criticism.’253 In other words people take for 
granted that what is law is moral; it thus disables their instinct to subject the law to 
moral scrutiny. Hart is consequently keen to ensure that ‘the certification of 
something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience’.254 
Therefore, distinguishing between law and morality enhances the value of morality 
and confirms the moral value of law.  
 The law is not inherently moral. However, a law may have moral value subject 
to the existence of a healthy political system. Laws are after all merely ‘expressions of 
the human will’.255 This is because political actors (the government, MPs, the 
electorate and arguably even the judiciary in its political capacity) dictate the 
substantive content of legislation, not the rule of law. In other words, “human will” is 
capable of moral insight but the law as a neutral template is not.  Shapiro insists that 
‘what makes the law the law is that it has a moral aim, not that it satisfies that aim.’256 
Shapiro’s Moral Aim Thesis seems to exist in limbo between legal positivism and the 
natural law theory. It is unclear how the law can both be amoral but have a moral aim. 
Certainly, one agrees with Shapiro that the ‘moral benefits generated by a just legal 
system are not accidental or side effects of legal activity’.257 However, these moral 
benefits result from the political actors rather than a moral aim within the law itself. 
Indeed, these moral benefits derive not from the legal system but the political system 
that dictates a regime’s just character. These moral benefits are neither deliberately 
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produced by the law nor are they “side effects” of its existence, they are genetically 
linked to the moral aspirations cultivated in the political domain. 
Raz further contends that ‘actions not authorized by law cannot be the actions 
of a government as a government.’258 This is because ‘they would be without legal 
effect and often unlawful.’259 Thus, Raz suggests that the requirement of explicit legal 
authority does not merely indicate the legality of executive acts but it also dictates 
their governmental nature. However, perceiving the legal status of executive actions 
and their governmental nature as synonymous characteristics threatens to devalue the 
former attribute. This perception of formal legality justifies Allan’s complaint that 
formal legality then ‘serves only to distinguish the commands of the government in 
power (whatever their content) from those of anyone else.’260 He thus concludes that 
it ‘offers little of value to the constitutional theorist.’261 Actions taken by the 
executive outside the law should not be denied governmental status; when the 
executive acts ultra vires it is still acting as the government but simply abusing its 
position. Legality should not simply be perceived as a distinguishing criterion 
between governmental and non-governmental acts. Furthermore, just because an 
action lacks explicit legal authority does not mean that it is negligent or immoral. This 
association derives from an assumption that legal authorization necessarily connotes 
efficiency, morality and democratic approval. In many legal systems this may be the 
case; however, this cannot be guaranteed. Just as the law is not, by necessity, moral, 
neither is it politically efficient. Nor is this prospect desirable. Indeed, the incentive to 
disassociate governmental and legal actions as coterminous litmus tests can be located 
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in the criticism of ‘obsequious quietism’.262 Viewing law and morality as indistinct 
discourages people from making an independent moral judgment of executive actions; 
the law is taken for granted as the primary moral indicator. Similarly, if legality is 
perceived as the unit of measurement for how “governmental” an action is, it 
discourages people from making independent political assessments of official activity. 
A stamp of legality indicates a lack of conflict with the law; it does not indicate how 
“governmental”, “moral” or “politically efficient” an action is. This is partly because 
“legality” is not a label preserved solely to describe government actions; it navigates 
the behavior of both the individual and the state. 
 
A necessary distinction 
A distinction has been alluded to that requires further discussion. There exist 
two independent questions: The first asks whether the law has ultimate authority in a 
state, the second, whether this ultimate authority is optimized for the good of the state. 
They are related but distinct; the former does not guarantee the latter. The rule of law 
is concerned with the first. Whilst a positive response to both questions depends on a 
state’s legal sophistication and political culture, a greater degree of both is required 
for the second. However, this does not understate the initial significance of assigning 
the law ultimate authority. Indeed, in some countries, such as Communist Bulgaria, 
law is thought of as ‘like a door in the middle of an open meadow. Of course, you 
could go through the door, but why bother?’263  
It is legitimate to question the value of legality if it has no moral or political 
merit. Hobbes claims that the social condition without law and government would be 
essentially ‘a war of all against all’ in which life would be ‘solitary, poore, nasty,                                                         262 Bentham (n252) 498  263 Krygier (n7) 23 
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brutish and short.’264 However, Shapiro adequately dismisses this hypothesis by 
insisting that ‘cooperation and order have not only been possible throughout human 
prehistory: they have been the norm.’265 He alludes to the fact that 12,000 years ago 
humans lived in groups called “Bands”; despite no law, life was neither short nor 
brutish.266 In essence, without law, people got by. However, the introduction of law 
clearly proved a valuable social and regulatory resource. Indeed, Shapiro comments 
that people were able to use the law to ‘create, modify, and apply rules, and thereby 
manage the myriad aspects of social life without having to rely solely on custom, 
tradition, persuasion or consensus.’267 In other words, with law, society does not 
merely survive; it develops. Laws are ‘universal means that enable us to coordinate 
our behavior intra- and interpersonally’ and their ‘very point is to create norms that 
are supposed to settle questions about how to act.’268 In this sense, the law saves time, 
it in essence attempts to pre-empt conflict by setting pre-configured standards. The 
law therefore has real social value. Regarding the “rule of the law” as an empty 
concept underestimates the law’s social and regulatory merits. ‘Orderliness is a 
demand we make on the world…This is not to say that the world itself is chaotic, 
lacking a prior order, but it may not be the order we desire or need.’269  
In a state where the law exists but it fails to have ultimate authority there is no 
rule of law. Arguably such a state of affairs exists in Afghanistan where disparate 
sources of “law”, Shari’a Law, State Law and Customary Law in the form of Tribal 
Codes compete for ultimate authority; there exist ‘competing models of 
                                                        264 T Hobbes, Leviathan (ed) R Tuck (2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 89 265 Shapiro (n96) 36 266 Shapiro (n96) 36 267 Shapiro (n96) 36 268 Shapiro (n96) 194 & 202 269 K Winston, “Connecting Law’s Mandate” in D Dyzenhaus (ed) Recrafting the Rule of Law: the Limits of 
Legal Order (Oxford, Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 1999) 283 
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legitimacy’.270 No Law, as such, rules. Thus, acknowledging the existence of a single 
door in the first place is not necessarily a simple task; ‘a major problem of transitional 
architecture is to get people to approach the door, let alone go through it...’271 
However, Krygier differentiates between acknowledging the door and actually using 
it; recognizing that the law has ultimate authority does not necessarily mean that it 
will be ‘used-even better, useful.’272 Admittedly, accrediting the law with ultimate 
authority is arguably the first incentive to use it. Yet this does not qualify the 
independence of the two questions. The law may be utilized as a beneficial source of 
technology. However, this is ultimately a political choice, engineered by political 
means. If at a very minimum the rule of law simply requires that the executive must 
not break the law, in a state where the law does not play an important role in 
regulating the powers of the executive or protecting the liberties of the citizen, the 
rule of law will not act as a safeguard for a fair and just legal system. However, it is 
legitimate to expect that the areas unregulated by law will be sparse in a society where 
positive law is properly utilized. Equally the law must not suffer from “over-use” and 
the courts must not supplant Parliament in securing political accountability of the 




One has agreed with Raz that the rule of law means the ‘rule of the law.’273 
The law has ultimate authority; legality is the cardinal principle at the heart of the rule 
of law. It is therefore necessary to deduce what legality requires. Raz argues that in its                                                         270 W Maley “The Rule of Law and the Weight of Politics” in Whit Mason (ed) The Rule of Law in Afghanistan, 
Missing Inaction (CUP, 2011) 69 271 Krygier (n7) 23 272 Krygier (n7) 23 273 Raz (n1) 212 
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broadest sense, “the rule of the law” necessarily means – the rule of only that law 
which is capable of guiding behavior. He imputes a degree of political morality into 
the concept. This interpretation has been rejected. The rule of law means simply the 
rule of valid law; it requires legal conformity and does not impose additional 
procedural conditions on the law enabling guided obedience. Raz states that ‘a person 
conforms to the law to the extent that he does not break the law’.274 Legal action can 
therefore be compartmentalized into two categories: the law commands it, because it 
is enabling as well as disabling, or the law does not prohibit it. On the other hand, if 
legal conformity rested on the extent to which a person acts in accordance with the 
law, legal actions would simply be those actions regulated by the applicable law. In 
this sense, a person conforms to the law if explicit legal authority supports his actions. 
Under these conditions, activities not regulated by law are necessarily illegal. This is 
clearly undesirable; the law cannot have a say on everything, nor should it. Nor can 
we necessarily infer the law’s treatment of the citizen in these blind spots. The law is 
usually silent on an issue either because it remains undecided, agnostic or simply 
because legal regulation is not required. Yet, arguably the same criticism could be 
made of Raz’s perception of legal conformity; simply because an action does not 
break the law is it necessarily legal? Should there exist an alternative category in 
which an action is considered “non-legal”, for example, in relation to those day-to-
day activities which the law does not need to regulate? 
The answer is no. In a legal state the law does not have a say on everything; 
indeed, this is both impractical and arguably impossible. Therefore, to a degree, every 
legal state will ‘lack law’; it accommodates pockets of ‘lawlessness’.275 However, 
                                                        274 Raz (n1) 213 275 Krygier (n7) 19 and 16 
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contrary to Krygier’s opinion, this is not ‘antithetical’ to the rule of law.276 This is 
because the essence of legality is not constricted to the law’s application but to its 
authority; legality indicates more than ‘the mere existence of law’.277 An action is 
classified as legal if it recognizes the ultimate authority of the law. The authority of 
the law exceeds the tangible limits of its application. Thus, it makes sense to state that 
every act must be legal but not necessarily explicitly authorized by law. These legal 
“vacuums” in which we are at liberty to act in any manner which does not break the 
law are “legal” (and cannot be classified as “non-legal”) because their parameters are 
negatively defined by the law itself- where the law begins, these vacuums end. 
Importantly, it is not beyond the law’s authority to extend its application to these 
“non-legal” actions; the law dictates the scope of my liberty. In this sense, the 
significance of the law is not restricted to its application but the threat of its potential 
application, its authority. If a ‘person conforms to the law to the extent that he does 
not break the law’, he is not necessarily actively ruled by a specific law but he is still 
subject to the law’s ultimate authority.278 Hobbes argued that the social condition 
without law would result in a ‘war of all against all’ in which life would be ‘solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish and short.’279 If his philosophy were correct surely every legal 
state would be a continuous mix of chaos and order. However, this is not the case; 
there are certainly elements of societal affairs that exist without laws. It is thus 
necessary to qualify Hobbes’ statement. The order that derives from the law originates 
from the consequences of its ultimate authority rather than the tangible evidence of its 
universal application. In reality a legal state can operate without many laws but not 
without the law’s ultimate authority. 







Raz reserves legal conformity as a method by which the ‘people’ preserve 
legality in a state.280 Raz’s liberal construction of legal conformity encapsulates the 
idea that the citizen is always subject to the law but not necessarily always ruled by it. 
The legality of people’s actions is secured to the extent that their actions do not break 
the law. Essentially, this conception of legal conformity distinguishes between two 
different notions: “rule of” law and “ruled by” law. The latter requires a positive legal 
authority to precede every action; it thus dissolves any expectation of liberty. The 
former “rule of” law encapsulates the ultimate authority of law in a state; legal 
conformity secures legality and is thus the quintessential component of a legal state. 
However, Raz indicates that in relation to executive acts more than legal conformity 
is required; ‘government shall be ruled by law and subject to it.’281 Raz thus hints that 
the rule of law is not enough; the government must also be ruled by it. The legal 
threshold is raised when measuring the legality of governmental acts. This suggests 
that legality is Janus-faced, for the citizen it means one thing and for the executive it 
means another. The requirement of legality is then naturally more demanding on the 
executive than on the individual. The law thus contracts with each party on different 
terms.  
It is argued that legality should not have a multi-faceted character; it should 
mean the same thing for the individual and the executive. Of course governmental                                                         280 Raz (n1) 213-214 281 Raz (n1) 212 
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activity should be subject to greater legal regulation. However, ensuring this 
consistency in the definition of legality is not equivalent to placing equal legal 
demands on the individual and the state. Primarily, surely this bi-polar aspect to 
legality brings the notion of equality before the law into disrepute. Equality before the 
law is formal; it simply demands that all are subject to the law. This has no bearing on 
how substantively discriminatory a particular law is. Thus, for instance, it was argued 
that section 23 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 undermined the rule of 
law because it discriminated against non-British suspected terrorists.282 However, 
whilst this legislation certainly treated citizens unequally and in a discriminatory 
manner, it did not undermine the principle of equality before the law. British and non-
British suspected terrorists were equally subject to the law; the consequences of this 
subjection were however unequal and inevitably unfair on one of the parties. The term 
“equality” is thus misleading because it necessarily connotes principles of fairness 
and non-discrimination. It is more accurate to refer instead to the universality of the 
law rather than its equal application. On first appearance, this heightened version of 
legality imposed on the executive still requires the minimum level of subjection to the 
law. In this sense it does not undermine the principle of equality before the law. 
However, unlike the arguments on the discriminatory substantive content of 
legislation, requiring the executive to be also ruled by the law threatens to alter the 
terms of the relationship. The executive and the citizen are not equal before the law 
because the terms of the relationship regarding the former are inherently more 
demanding. Simply stating that this is justified does not alter this detriment to the 
conceptual consistency of the rule of law. 
                                                        282 See A (and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 
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Secondly, this heightened version of legality in relation to executive acts is 
arguably inconsistent with precedent. Indeed, whilst in Eshugbayi Eleko v 
Government of Nigeria [1931]283 Lord Atkin states that ‘As the executive he can only 
act in pursuance of the powers given to him by law’, this judgment sits uneasily with 
other case law.284 Entick v Carrington (1765)285 epitomizes the required legality of 
executive acts. It is debatable to what extent this case confirms the notion of legal 
justification in terms of legal conformity. On one hand, Lord Camden appears to 
dismiss the legality of the warrant sanctioning the seizure of a man’s property on the 
grounds that it was ‘not supported by one single citation from any law book 
extant.’286 This arguably indicates the need for a preceding statute for every executive 
act. Indeed, Cane interprets the adjudged illegality of the warrant in light of the fact 
that the powers were not ‘legally recognized’; this contradicted the ‘principle that all 
governmental acts be justified by reference to legal powers.’287 Yet, on further 
analysis, it appears that the case upholds the more liberal conception of legal 
conformity. Indeed, the objection to the warrant derives not from the government’s 
failure to explicitly validate the action in existing statute but rather from its active 
breach of the ‘laws of England’ which held that ‘every invasion of property, be it ever 
so minute, is a trespass.’288 Thus, the executive actions do not qualify as legal because 
they break the law. This is not a matter of debate. What is at issue is whether having 
broken the law ‘an excuse can be found or produced’ in ‘the books’ which 
indemnifies the executive’s illegal actions.289 The ‘silence of the books is an authority 
                                                        283 Eshugbayi Eleko v Officer Administering  the Government of Nigeria [1931] AC 662 284 Lord Atkin (n283) at 670  285 (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 286 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n285)  287 P Cane,  “Prerogative Acts, Acts of State and Justiciability” (29(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1980) 680, 686 288 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n285) 289 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n285) 
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against the defendant.’290 Thus, whilst every executive act must be justified in law (in 
terms of conforming to the law), every excuse for an illegal act must be found in 
statute. This secondary resort to the ‘books’ does not change the fact that the activity 
is deemed ‘illegal and void’, it merely provides a temporary ‘lawful’ excuse to act in 
an illegal manner.291 However, Lord Camden concludes that ‘it is said that it is better 
for the government and the public to seize the libel before it is published; if the 
legislature be of that opinion they will make it lawful’, but it had not done so.292 What 
is clear from this is that the primary determinative factor dictating the “legality” of 
executive acts is legal conformity. The government is at liberty to act as it deems 
appropriate as long as it does not break the law. Lord Camden’s consistent reference 
to “man” rather than government further implies a level playing ground for both 
individual and executive.293  
This interpretation of Entick is certainly consistent with the court’s approach 
in Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979]294 which held that as seen as 
‘[telephone] tapping entailed no breach of the ordinary law, no authorization by 
statute or common law was needed…It could lawfully be done because there was 
nothing to make it unlawful.’295 Allan disputes the integrity of this statement claiming 
it is ‘weak authority for treating the state, or the Crown, as if it were a private 
individual.’296 He contends that ‘the whole point of the rule of law would be lost if the 
government were treated in all respects like an ordinary citizen, even in private 
law.’297 This criticism is flawed for two reasons: First, proposing that legality for the 
                                                        290 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n285) 291 John Entick, Clerk v Nathan Carrington and Three Others, Messengers in Ordinary to the King (1765) 2 Wils K.B. 275 at 292, 95 ER 807 at 818 292 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n285) 293 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n285) 294 [1979] 19 St Tr 1030 295 [1979] 19 St Tr 1030 at 1067 296 Allan (n101) 159 297 Allan (n101) 157-158 
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government means simply acting in a manner which does not break the law certainly 
indicates that “legality” means the same thing for the executive as it does for the 
private individual. However, this does not necessarily mean that the law will treat the 
government as it does a private citizen. In a legally sophisticated society it is 
anticipated that the government will be subject to far greater legal regulation and 
scrutiny. Thus, whilst the executive is at liberty to act in a manner which does not 
break the law, the probability of it running into legal barriers is far greater than it is 
for the private individual. Thus, I agree that there is ‘no simple analogy’ between 
government and individual action because the former is inherently different from the 
latter: ‘it asserts the authority of the state.’298   
Second, the purpose of the rule of law exceeds merely controlling the 
executive. By perceiving the ‘whole point’ of the rule of law as navigating the 
distinction between governmental and individual acts, legality is portrayed merely as 
a distinguishing criterion.299 Allan suggests that the “whole point” of the rule of law is 
to ensure that the executive is treated differently. Arguably this encourages a negative 
perception of the rule of law. Conveying the rule of law as merely a disabling 
mechanism undermines its social wide significance. However, portraying the rule of 
law as the ‘ultimate controlling factor’ artificially devalues its purpose and scope.300 
The notion of the ultimate authority of law must be respected not just by the executive 
but by other institutions and, of course, the people. Thus, the rule of law is not just 
concerned with the executive. Indeed, Allan himself comments that ‘If the law were 
largely a mechanism for the execution of government objectives, it would be right to 
accept his (Raz’s) contention that the rule of law was only a ‘negative’ virtue, 
                                                        298 Allan (n101) 159 299 Allan (n101) 157-158 300 Lord Hope, R (Jackson and others) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, par 126 
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restraining government from certain kinds of arbitrary rule.’301 However, the law is 
clearly a tool at large for society, not necessarily one customized for executive-use; 
the rule of law necessarily has a correlative societal impact. 
 
 
The executive can do anything not prohibited by law. 
Legality is the cardinal principle at the heart of the rule of law. It is argued that 
the legality of an action is determined to the extent that it does not infringe the law. 
This perception applies both to the individual and the state. It is necessary to assess to 
what extent this version of legality “holds up” in political reality. The existence of the 
Ram doctrine in the UK, accompanied by a plethora of case law discussing the 
meaning of legality, is a useful reference point. Indeed, Harris helpfully summarises 
the doctrine in the following terms: 
 
‘The current law of England and Wales hesitatingly accepts that the Government does 
not have to find authority in positive law for its every action, since like a natural legal 
person it has the freedom to do that which is not prohibited by law.’302  
 
The hesitancy referred to reflects an intuitive reluctance to award the executive legal 
liberty. In R v Somerset County Council ex p Fewings [1995]303 (Fewings) whilst 
Laws LJ recognises that ‘public bodies and private persons are both subject to the rule 
of law’, he contests that ‘the principles which govern their relationships with the law 
are wholly different.’304 Therefore, for private persons ‘the rule is that you may do 
                                                        301 Allan (n101) 24 302 B V Harris, “Government “third source” Action and Common Law Constitutionalism” (2010) LQR 373  303 [1995] 1 All ER 513 304 Laws LJ (n303) 524 
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anything you choose which the law does not prohibit…for public bodies the rule is 
opposite, and so of another character altogether.’305 However, one questions whether 
his subsequent summary of the executive’s position was truly “opposite” to that 
detailed for the private individual. Indeed, he concludes that in relation to the 
executive ‘any action taken must be justified by positive law.’306 However, he fails to 
explore the meaning of legal justification. Certainly, it has been argued thus far that 
those actions taken which are not directly regulated by law remain legally justified 
because by setting the limits, the law still defines the parameters of executive action. 
It is therefore possible for those executive actions without a positive legal authority to 
be justified by law, if not in law. Furthermore, Laws LJ’s argument assumes an 
obvious distinction between public bodies and private persons. In light of recent case 
law on the application of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, this appears to not 
be a foregone conclusion and the potential for confusion to infiltrate non-human 
rights case law cannot be discounted.307  However, Laws LJ’s approach certainly has 
appeal. His argument is particularly attractive because it would essentially “bulk up” 
one’s rather minimalistic approach to the rule of law; the demand for every action to 
be substantiated in positive law accredits law with an obvious value and quietens the 
inevitable criticism of this piece: what is the point of law? However, it will be argued 
that Laws LJ’s approach is unrealistic, unnecessary and potentially counter-intuitive. 
 Initially it is necessary to point out the technical deficiencies in Laws J’s 
judgment in Fewings. Elliott illustrates that whilst the ‘conclusion in Fewings was 
                                                        305 Laws LJ (n303) 524 306 Laws LJ (n303) 524 307 See A Williams, “Public authorities: What is a hybrid public authority under the HRA?” in The Impact of 
the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law (D Hoffman, Cambridge, CUP, 48-65); A Williams, “A fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities under the Human Rights Act: Private Contractors, Rights-Stripping and “Chameleonic” Horizontal Effect” Public Law (1): 139-163; H Quane, “The Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the meaning of “Public Authority” under the Human Rights Act” (2006) Public Law 106; “The Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act” Joint Committee on Human Rights (Seventh Report of Session 03-04) (HL Paper 39, HC 382) 
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sound, the same is not true of the reasoning process which preceded it.’308 The 
respondent council, which had decided to prohibit deer hunting on certain land, was a 
creature of statute. Elliott therefore concludes that it was ‘entirely unsurprising’ that 
the Court accepted the applicant’s argument that the council had to prove it was 
acting within the scope of its statutory power.309 Indeed, it is a ‘well-established 
principle that local authorities, being statutory corporations, possess only those 
powers which are expressly or impliedly given to them by Act of Parliament.’310 
However, Elliott points out that it does not necessarily follow that ‘all public 
authorities have to demonstrate legal authorization for everything which they do.’311 
Thus Laws J’s conclusion does not logically flow from his reasoning. Indeed, as 
pointed out by Harris, Laws J’s conclusion ‘contrasts starkly with both government 
practice and established legal principle.’312 
Beyond these technicalities, Harris further emphasizes that Fewings is an 
anomaly in case law. Primarily, Laws LJ’s judgment directly contradicts the outcome 
in R (on the application of Hooper and others) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2005]313 in which the court refused to find the government’s provision of 
pensions to widowers unlawful, despite failing to find positive legal authorization for 
the policy. It demonstrated ‘recognition at the highest judicial appellate level that the 
government is free to do that which is not legally prohibited or contrary to the legal 
rights of others.’314 Furthermore, it was held in Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [1979]315 that as seen as ‘[telephone] tapping entailed no breach of the 
ordinary law, no authorization by statute or common law was needed…It could                                                         308 Elliott (n238) 169 (emphasis added) 309 Elliott (n238) 169 310 Elliott (n238) 169 311 Elliott (n238) 169 312 Elliott (n238) 170 313 [2005] UKHL 29 314 B V Harris, “The third source of authority for Government Action Re-visited” (2007) LQR 225, 230 315 [1979] 2 All ER 620 
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lawfully be done because there was nothing to make it unlawful.’316 Laws LJ’s 
judgment also sits at odds with political practice. In the UK ‘thousands of government 
actions’ occur daily which are not substantiated in positive law.317 Examples include: 
entering into contracts, making pensions available to widowers318, making ex gratia 
payments, making available lists of persons ‘whose suitability to work with children 
was in doubt’.319 Daintith further lists the government’s ordinary capacity to ‘make 
promises, conclude contracts, acquire and dispose of property, acquire and 
disseminate information, make and receive gifts, form companies, set up committees 
and agencies, and perform a wide variety of other functions within the policy 
process.’320 Indeed, Cohn identifies such actions as a necessary consequence of 
‘modern reality’ which calls for ‘executive leadership and initiative.’321 Therefore, 
‘since statute can never fully provide answers to all future needs…some non-statutory 
action is bound to emerge.’322 This reality is not exclusive to statute; the common law 
cannot foresee all necessary future action either. Therefore, Laws J’s perception of 
legality is wholly unrealistic. 
Furthermore, inherent in Laws J’s perception of legality is an implicit 
presumption that such a requirement will inevitably increase Parliamentary scrutiny 
of executive acts. It assumes that such a requirement constrains executive action by 
requiring it to be substantiated in positive law. However, this is counter-intuitive. In 
practice such an approach would not guarantee pre-action scrutiny and accountability. 
On the other hand, it would likely result in the enactment of very broad legislative 
                                                        316 [1979] 2 All ER 620 at 1067 317 Harris (n314) 226 318 R (on the application of Hooper and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2005) UKHL 29 319 R v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte C [2000] 1 FLR 627 320 T C Daintith, “The Techniques of Government” in The Changing Constitution (eds) J Jowell and D Oliver (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 211 321 M Cohn, “Judicial Review of non-statutory executive powers after Bancoult: a unified anxious model” (2009) PL 260 at 264-265 322 Cohn (n321) 264-265 
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powers designed to legitimate a spectrum of government actions without wasting time 
or resources. Indeed, Harris similarly anticipates ‘inevitably incomplete specific 
authorization…and the provision of more general authorisations which would ensure 
that the government was not left short of positive law authority when needed.’323 
Furthermore, simply requiring legislation to precede government action does not 
logically guarantee parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, the Constitutional Committee 
exposed a number of dangers deriving from fast-tracked legislation. When legislation 
is introduced and passed in a matter of ‘a few weeks or even days it is impossible for 
Parliament to fully analyse and debate the proposals put before it.’324 It essentially 
entails a ‘trade off between speed and the quality of scrutiny’.325 The Law Society 
thus concludes that ‘legislation that is introduced in a rushed manner is invariably 
bad.’326 The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, for instance, was passed in 
record time and legitimated discriminatory and arbitrary governmental action. This 
pressure for pre-action legislative endorsement can also have ‘knock on’ effects.327 
For instance, the Aggravated Vehicle Taking Act 1992 and Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 
disturbed and delayed the parliamentary itinerary.328 The heightened demand for 
legislation is also likely to disable other pressure groups and interested organisations 
from scrutinizing prospective legislation.329 Furthermore, the extent to which 
legislation evidences effective scrutiny inevitably depends, in the UK at least, on the 
executive’s dominance in the legislative arena. In other words, it depends on the 
political climate. The heightened demand for legislation is likely to compromise 
effective scrutiny and therefore it ‘may not have the benefit of appropriate focused                                                         323 Harris (n314) 237 324  House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fifteenth Report (2009) Fast Track Legislation: 
Constitutional Implications and Safeguards (par 33) 325 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n324) par34 (clerk of the parliaments) 326 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n324) par39 (The Law Society) 327 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n324) par43 328 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (n324) par 43 (Lord Baker) 329  House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution(n324) par44 
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consideration and approval by the legislature before the government action takes 
place.’330 Thus, Laws J’s perception of legality is not necessarily more effective as a 
controlling mechanism on the government. On the contrary, it may actually inhibit 
accountability. Furthermore, the focus of debate on pre-action scrutiny neglects 
consideration of post-action political mechanisms of accountability, a topic that will 
be returned to in due course. 
Harris also draws on Laws J’s extra-judicial writing to provide a ‘possible 
explanation’ for his judgment.331 He suggests that ‘Laws J was thinking only of 
situations where the public body was in its actions intending to assert legal rights over 
the residuary freedoms of others’, as was occurring on the facts of the case relating to 
the local authority’s ban on hunting.332 Elliott agrees that ‘[a]ction which aims to 
produce legal consequences - by, for example, affecting the legal rights or status of 
others - must be justified by reference to positive law.’333 However, Harris contests 
that the third source ‘has never been recognized as giving the central government 
rights over others. Citizens are always free to ignore without legal consequence that 
which the government attempts to do under the third source.’334 This indicates that 
whilst this residuary freedom is legally justified it bears no legal consequences on the 
individual. Indeed, ‘[t]heory would say that the government does not have the 
potential to interfere under the third source with an individual’s liberty because the 
individual can ignore the government’s action if that action is not authorized by 
positive law.’335 In other words, the executive’s actions conform to the law but they 
have no legal bite. Harris in particular draws on Sir John Laws’ extra-judicial writings 
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to highlight the distinction between his approach and the understanding of the third 
source. Whereas Sir John Laws argues that ‘any interference with another’s liberty 
stands in need of justification’, the third source ‘does not recognize a bald natural 
right to the guarantee of freedom of the individual form interference.’336 In other 
words, the individual enjoys freedom from interference to the extent that it is 
‘judicially enforceable’, therefore when there is ‘available identifiable and relevant 
positive law, often in the form of torts, criminal law, common law recognition of 
fundamental rights in the course of judicial review or statutory human rights law.’337 
 However, admittedly, Sir John Laws validly exposes a weakness in the third 
source theory and indeed the rule of law. As it stands the residual freedom of the 
individual is susceptible to interference by the government’s abuse of liberty. This 
interference is not positively substantiated in law but it has practical consequences. 
The interference may not legally obligate the individual but the government may act 
in a way that ‘physically or for another practical reason, rendered it impossible for an 
individual to do what they wished to do.’338 The individual is not protected by 
positive law; even though the government cannot pursue its motive through the courts 
‘the individual cannot from a practical point of view escape the effect of the 
interference by the government.’339 The effect is not legal but it is intrusive and 
inescapable. Harris points to R v Secretary of State for Health ex p C [2000]340 as an 
example of such a scenario.341 The government’s decision to construct a list of 
persons who might not be suitable to work with children and subsequently advise 
employers on its contents did not conflict with positive law. However, whilst the                                                         336 Sir John Laws, “Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse of Power” (1997) PL 455 at 465; and Harris (n314) 232 337 Harris (n314) 232 338 Harris (n314) 233 339 Harris (n314) 233 340 [2000] 1 FCR 471; [2000] 1 FLR 627 341 Harris (n314) 233 
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effects on the individual were not “legal” as such, in reality there was no practical 
way for the individual to avoid the inevitable negative impact on his employment 
prospects and reputation. It is presumed that for Sir John Laws the third source should 
be modified to the extent that the government is at liberty to act in any manner that 
does not conflict with the law or the liberty of the individual. The law is thus allocated 
the role as mediator between the conflicting residual freedom of the government and 
the individual. Where there is conflict, statutory authority is required to determine the 
outcome. This proposal inevitably determines that the individual’s residuary freedom 
always prevails over that of the executive by requiring the state to demonstrate 
positive legal authority for interference with the individual’s freedom. However, this 
suggestion is inherently problematic: By requiring positive legal authority for 
interference with “the rest”, that residual liberty left unregulated by the law, it 
inevitably demands it for the whole. Yet, requiring every executive act to be 
supported by positive legal authority is simply unrealistic and impractical. On the 
other hand, if the intention is to protect certain types of non-legal liberties existing 
within this residual freedom, there exists an inevitable problem of identification. 
 This problem of classification lies in the meaning we allocate to “liberty”. On 
an elementary level, it is difficult to determine what constitutes an interference with a 
citizen’s non-legal liberty. Surely it is usually the law that acts as a valuable indicator 
of which liberties deserve protection. There is certainly a distinction between liberty 
and liberties. Dworkin distinguished between rights to particular liberties and the idea 
of a general right to liberty.342 Allan helpfully explains: 
 
                                                        342 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, 1977) ch12 
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 ‘My right (for example) to freedom of speech is the outcome, first, of my 
undifferentiated residual liberty- whose restriction needs lawful authority- and, 
secondly, of the court’s attachment to freedom of speech.’343 
 
He therefore concludes that ‘a constitutional right at common law is a product of 
these two interacting faces of the rule of law.’344 One agrees that liberties protected by 
common law may well derive from that initial residual liberty. Liberty by its very 
nature is residual in character. Liberties, however, may acquire legal protection 
because they are identifiable and often of obvious significance; they therefore may be 
easily segregated from residual liberty and given legal standing. However, Allan 
argues that the ‘idea of liberty as residual reflects the fundamental principle of the 
rule of law that every invasion of individual liberty by the state is prima facie 
illegal…No government measure or action which infringes my liberty is lawful unless 
it is authorized.’345 He draws authority from the case of Entick v Carrington [1765]346 
which he believes asserted the ‘foundation of constitutional rights.’347 He and I depart 
ways early: It is only once a court attaches importance to a liberty that its restriction 
requires lawful authority. Indeed, Entick’s significance derives not from the 
infringement of that residual liberty enjoyed by every individual but those specific 
liberties (in this case relating to the protection of property) protected by the ‘laws of 
England’ which held that ‘every invasion of property, be it ever so minute, is a 
trespass.’348 On the facts, this case did not require lawful authority to protect that 
residual liberty enjoyed by every citizen but those specific liberties protected by valid 
                                                        343 Allan (n101) 136-7 344 Allan (n101) 136 345 Allan (n101) 136 346 [1765] 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 347  Allan (n101) 136 348 Lord Chief Judge Camden (n346) 
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law. Arguably, then, this case does not directly contradict the contention that the 
government is at liberty to act in any manner that does not conflict with valid law. 
Admittedly, in the UK such a proposal is inevitably more complex because what 
constitutes “valid law” is in itself slightly more confusing as a result of the unwritten 
constitution. This is because in the UK constitution common law qualifies as valid 
law. It will be argued that confidence would be restored in this controversial model of 
legality if the border between liberty and the law were more accurately defined and 
the liberties of the citizens more visibly protected in law through statute. 
 It may be argued that such a proposal inevitably intrudes on the rule of 
recognition.349 However, it does not demand an alteration in the recognition of what 
classifies as valid law, nor does it change the dynamic of the hierarchical relationship 
between common law and statute. Rather, it calls for greater use of statute in order to 
secure a conceptual consistency between the rule of law and statutory supremacy. It 
therefore demands greater utilization of a source of law already recognized as 
supreme; the exploitation of statute as a means to protect liberties and authorize 
governmental powers lends itself to the current rule of recognition. It therefore 
accommodates more neatly primary and secondary rules within the constitutional 
working structure. The rule of recognition is ‘a rule about rules’.350 It is a secondary, 
as opposed to a primary, rule because it is a ‘rule about the validity of other rules’; it 
sets out ‘the criteria of legal validity’ and also ‘specifies orders of precedence among 
sources of law’.351 It is both a “social” and “ultimate” rule because ‘its existence is 
secured simply because of its acceptance and practice.’352 In the context of the UK 
Constitution both common law and statute meet the criteria of legal validity. However,                                                         349 Hart (n250) 350 S J Shapiro, “What is the Rule of Recognition (and does it exist)?” Public Law and Legal Theory, Research 
Paper Series, Research Paper No.181, 3 351 Shapiro (n350) 4 352 Shapiro (n350) 5 
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it is a recognized fact that statute trumps the common law.353 Therefore, the incentive 
to greater utilize statute lies in the rule of recognition itself. It is logical to assume that 
those liberties or powers deemed most significant should acquire the support of the 
highest form of legal authority. Thus one is proposing merely to exploit the rule of 
recognition in order to first, encourage a more beneficial use of statute and second, 
ascertain greater logical fluidity between the concept of the “rule of valid law” and 
constitutional practice. It is a practice of aligning primary and secondary rules. 
 
How do we monitor the executive’s residual liberty? 
 It is necessary to discuss the most effective mechanism to remedy the 
susceptibility of the citizen to interference by an executive who acts in the realms of 
its residual liberty. One solution is essentially defensive; ensure that valid law 
effectively protects those liberties deemed significant. The protection of liberties is 
therefore bound up with the rule of valid law. This is not because the rule of law is 
inherently virtuous but because an abuse of the citizen’s liberty is coterminous with 
legal conflict. Logically, then, an abuse of its own liberty therefore constitutes an 
illegality. In the UK it is suggested that the complexity as to what constitutes valid 
law should be clarified through greater codification in statute and the dilution of 
common law rights. A second possibility is the extension of judicial review. The 
paradox of subjecting the residual liberty of the executive to judicial review is a 
proposal observed in recent case law and discussed in detail by Mark Elliott. 354 
Elliott argues that judicial review has evolved and outgrown its hereditary links with 
parliamentary intent; a trend solidified by the development of good administration                                                         353 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel ltd [1920] AC 508 354 R (Shrewsbury & Atcham BC and Congleton BC v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
and Shropshire CC [2008] EWCA Civ 148; see M Elliott, “Beyond the Logical Boundary? Judicial Review of Non-Statutory Power”, Chapter 5 in The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2001) 
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principles. In this light, extending judicial review to the executive’s residual acts does 
not necessarily breach its ‘logical boundaries’ as Wade presumes, especially if these 
good administration principles are transformed into positive legal obligations.355 
However, it is necessary to discuss whether the extension of judicial review is 
actually necessary. This discussion inevitably assumes that the political accountability 
mechanisms are inadequate. It is argued that we should be focused on developing pre 
and post-action political accountability mechanisms designed to enhance the 
individual’s participation in promoting good government. Politics ensures that the law 
is used; legal liberties epitomise the law at its most useful.  
 
Statute 
In the United Kingdom greater statutory codification of legal liberties and 
executive powers is desirable. A distinction was previously made between a question 
of the law’s ultimate authority and the role it is appointed in society. The law’s status 
and its utilization are two different issues; however, strengthening the latter naturally 
reinforces the value of the former. It is suggested that, in the UK in particular, 
increased use of statute in the place of the common law would give greater bite and 




It is initially necessary to point out that confirming the existence of the 
executive’s residual liberty does not devalue or disable law-making in this field. In 
Fewings, Elliott suggests that the court’s unorthodox reasoning derived from an 
                                                        355 H W R Wade, “Judicial Review of Ministerial Guidance” (1986) 102 LQR 173, 175 
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understandable reluctance to allow the government to rely on its residual liberty to 
avoid a statutory scheme. However, Elliott relies on Attorney General v De Keyser’s 
Royal Hotel Ltd [1920]356 to assuage such fears. The case considered whether the 
Crown was required to make compensation payments when taking possession of 
property in connection with the defence of the realm. Existing prerogative did not 
require it but the Defence Act 1942 did. It was held by Lord Atkinson that statute 
‘abridges’ prerogative and that following the enactment of legislation in this field ‘the 
thing it empowers the Crown to do can thenceforth only be done by and under the 
statute’.357 The later statute therefore supplanted the prerogative. Whilst admitting 
that this case concerns the relationship between statute and the prerogative, Elliott 
argues that the ‘logic which underpins this decision is equally applicable to the 
relationship between statutory power and residual liberty.’358 Therefore, residual 
liberty is not eternally immune from statutory intrusion. Where it is deemed 
appropriate for greater legal regulation in a certain field, a statute may be enacted and 
even retrospectively applied. Lord Lester of Herne Hill agrees that the Government 
cannot rely on its residual liberty ‘to enable the Government to pre-empt Parliament’s 
legislative process, and to contend otherwise would be contrary to the rule of law.’359 
One has already highlighted a lack of aversion to the accommodation of retrospective 
laws within the rule of law. Here retrospective law-making may be beneficial as a 
legitimate means to control the executive. Therefore, the legislature is not prohibited 
from interfering with the executive’s residual liberty where it deems it appropriate for 
the law to intervene. 
                                                         356 [1920] AC 508 357 Lord Atkinson, Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 at 539-40 358 Elliott (n238) 172 359 Lord Lester of Herne Hill in The Pre-emption of Parliament (Constitution Committee, Thirteenth Report) Chapter 3 “The Legal Basis of Pre-emption”, par 61 
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Rule of “valid law”? 
At first instance, the concept of the “rule of valid law” is not a complicated 
one. It simply allocates ultimate legal authority to the law. However, in the UK there 
exists an internal legal hierarchy within the category of “valid law” that complicates 
matters. In the previous chapter a criticism was made of Raz’s apparent differentiation 
between laws which are said to rule and those laws that are simply valid but less 
efficient and therefore not of the ruling variety.360 It was argued that this approach 
superficially created a legal hierarchy within valid law. However, in the UK, this 
hierarchy is genetic rather than externally imposed by the conceptualization of the 
rule of law. Indeed, the notion of Parliamentary Sovereignty indicates that whilst all 
valid law rules, there exists a constitutional hierarchy which places statute above the 
common law. Of course this simplification that statute trumps common law fails to do 
justice to a debate that exceeds the scope of this thesis.361 However, for our purposes, 
what is important to recognize is that there is no single item neatly marked “the law”, 
rather different sources of law exist (for example, legislation, case law, customary law, 
European Law) which inevitably compete for pre-eminence. Thus, the notion of the 
‘rule of valid law’ encounters difficulties when it interacts with the constitutional 
framework. For instance, the conclusion that the common law has ultimate authority 
(as a natural derivation from the notion of the rule of valid law) is arguably 
constitutionally false in light of the notion of parliamentary sovereignty. This suggests 
that in the UK context the rule of law is demoted to a penultimate issue. It has initial 
relevance in distinguishing valid law but it is the constitutional status quo that 
deliberates which type of valid law has “ultimate” authority. It is therefore desirable 
to tidy-up the constitutional landscape in order for the “rule of valid law” to be more                                                         360 See Chapter I 361 See J Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1999) and T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
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appropriately accommodated. It will be argued that it is in the interests of conceptual 
and constitutional clarity to encourage the transition from common law to statute in 
relation to the protection of liberties and the empowerment of the executive. This will 
encourage a stronger and more coherent association to be made between the rule of 
law and statutory supremacy. 
 
Statutory Powers 
 Conservative normativists ‘believe strongly in the legal supremacy of statute 
and in a rather weak, largely formal, notion of the rule of law.’362 In other words, the 
executive should ‘govern through legal forms and instruments, through rules rather 
than discretion’.363 This ensures that government policy ‘should, on the whole, remain 
a matter for Parliamentary government and should not be generally subject to wide-
ranging substantive review by the judges.’364 In this light, Tomkins conjoins two 
proposals which one would seek to segregate. His first is the abolition of prerogative 
powers, in the form of the Prerogative (Abolition) Act, and their replacement in 
legislation.365 Such a move is welcome. It tidies up the current dispersal of powers 
between statute and the common law and embraces the supremacy of statute. It would 
consolidate the relationship between the rule of law and statutory supremacy. This is 
not a novel proposal. Indeed, the Public Administration Select Committee made a 
similar suggestion in March 2004.366 Admittedly, simply codifying prerogative 
powers does not necessarily correlate with heightened parliamentary scrutiny of 
executive action. Indeed, the Government highlighted in its response to the 2004 
                                                        362 A Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing; Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005) 34 363 Tomkins (n362) 34 364 Tomkins (n362) 34 365 Tomkins (n362) 133 366 Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament (Public Administration Select Committee, March 2004) 
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report that ‘Ministers are already accountable to Parliament for action taken under 
prerogative powers, as for anything else.’367 In particular prerogative powers are 
subject to scrutiny by Departmental Select Committees and the Prime Minister 
undergoes twice yearly questioning by the Liaison Committee. The Government 
therefore argued that ‘It is for ministers to account for and to justify their actions to 
Parliament and for Parliament to hold ministers to account.’368 Certainly, the primary 
source of accountability in the constitution should be political. Codification does not 
seek to subvert this. However, those powers already constitutionally recognized by 
the common law should be placed clearly on a statutory footing. In other words, 
existing legal powers should be clarified as such. Prerogative powers are legal and are 
already largely subject to judicial review. Therefore, here, codification is not a legal 
subversion of political accountability mechanisms but a process of clarification.  
Of course ‘Parliamentary scrutiny and accountability can also be increased 
without statutory provision.’369 However, increased use of statute would provide 
Parliament with the important opportunity to decide whether such a power is justly 
maintained or whether it requires amendment or abolition. It provides the legislature 
with the opportunity to ‘delimit the government’s powers and attach appropriate 
conditions to their exercise.’370  However, the very fact that legislation is no guarantee 
of securing political accountability is one reason why one does not endorse Tomkins’ 
further proposal that ‘Government should possess only those powers which the people, 
through their elected representatives in Parliament, have expressly or by necessary 
implication conferred upon it by statute.’371 Indeed, whilst one endorses the statutory 
codification of existing legal powers, this does not necessarily correlate to the                                                         367 Mr Hoon, House of Commons Hansard Written answers for 22 Nov 2005: Column 1887W 368 Lord Bassam of Brighton, Lord Hansard Text for 5 March 2004 (240305-02) Column 928 369 Standard Note: SN/PC/03861, L Maer & O Gay, The Royal Preorgative at 4.1 370 Elliott (n238) 178 371 Tomkins (n362) 132 
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requirement that all government actions require statutory authority, nor would such a 
suggestion be feasible in terms of legislative efficiency. Indeed, referring back to 
Tomkins’ proposal, maintaining the executive’s residual liberty to act does not 
necessarily mean that such actions are no longer deemed matters for Parliamentary 
government. Certainly, Parliament does not have to legislate on a matter for it to hold 
the Government to account for its policies. Indeed Harris proposes a number of 
political methods by which the government may be held to account without resorting 
to legislation.372 It is later argued that such actions should be subject to political 
scrutiny rather than distorting the logical boundaries of judicial review.  
 
Statutory Liberties 
If the law has ultimate authority it is natural to bring fundamental liberties 
under its protection. Or at least it is to be expected that a state with a degree of legal 
sophistication would adopt such a philosophy. In the UK constitutional context, this is 
not to suggest that the Common Law is somehow less sophisticated; indeed, it is often 
the Common Law that nurtures these fundamental liberties in the first place.373 
However, their graduation to statutory status should be encouraged. Indeed, in order 
to do justice to the importance of fundamental liberties in a legal state it is essential to 
bring them under the protection of that legal source which retains ultimate authority. 
Therefore, when alluding to the importance of bringing fundamental liberties under 
the protection of the law in the UK, it is envisaged that this will primarily occur 
through statutory means. This merely effectuates in practice what is already 
considered a theoretical status quo.  
                                                        372 see B V Harris “The “third source” of authority for Government action revisited” (2007) LQR 225 at 247-248 373 See T Poole “Back to the Future? Unearthing the theory of Common Law Constitutionalism” (2003) 23 OJLS 435 
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Allan, on the other hand, is against such a proposal. His initial reluctance 
clearly derives from his misperception that the common law is an inherently better 
vehicle by which to realize the rule of law. Allan overstates the association between 
the common law and the protection of liberties. In turn arises the politicization of the 
rule of law as a force for “good”. Indeed, Tomkins particularly opposes Allan’s 
contention that important liberties only gain protection ‘ultimately because…they find 
expression in the common law.’374 From this Tomkins deduces Allan’s assumption 
that Acts of Parliament ‘are instruments only of repression and not of liberation’ and 
that we owe all our freedom to the courts.375 However, this is ‘simply 
wrong…Parliament has frequently legislated, often in face of overt judicial hostility, 
to extend liberty.’376 After all, it was Parliament which passed the Human Rights Act 
1998. Furthermore, Tomkins contends that the ‘entirety of British social justice- of 
the welfare state- is a creation of progressive governments enacting law in 
Parliament’.377 In contrast, Tomkins correctly argues that the courts have often been 
deemed ‘more executive minded than the executive’.378 If the opposition to placing 
constitutional common law rights on a statutory footing derives from this mythical 
association between liberty and the common law, this fallacy must be exposed. The 
citizen’s liberties are not necessarily safer in the hands of the judges. Indeed, the UK 
judiciary have ensured that ‘…even the extraordinary counterterror measures of 
detention without trial and subjection to control orders are clothed in legal authority 
and apparent human rights compliance.’379 Fenwick and Phillipson refer to ‘a kind of 
                                                        374 Tomkins (n362) 13, See T R S Allan (n101)  4 375 Tomkins (n362) 13 376 Tomkins (n362) 13 377 Tomkins (n362) 13-14 378 Lord Atkin, Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 at 244 379 H Fenwick & G Phillipson ‘Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining Liberty and Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism Law and Beyond.’ (2011) 56(4) McGill Law Journal 863, 865 
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unholy trinity of decisions by the UK Court of Appeal’380: accepting the lawfulness of 
detention without trial in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]381, 
finding the admissibility of torture evidence obtained by foreign agents did not violate 
article 6 in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No2) [2004]382 and 
finally finding that article 6 imposed no irreducible minimum of disclosure of the case 
against the suspect in control order cases in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF (No3) [2008].383 
 Allan further argues that it is ‘mistakenly thought that restatement of 
individual rights in a constitutional document could transform their strength, when 
they have to be asserted in opposition to countervailing public interests.’384 He 
suggests that it is ‘quite confused’ to presume that the ‘weight or force of basic rights 
may be enhanced by enactment’.385 This is because whether in statutory or common 
law form, both mediums essentially express principles that by their very nature vary 
in weight according to the circumstances of the case, no degrees of expression can 
alter this inherent characteristic. Allan therefore argues that there is simply no point in 
codifying constitutional rights as both common law and convention should be 
understood as ‘analogous expressions of principle’.386 However, Allan contradicts 
himself. He initially argues that the manner of expression of a principle has no impact 
on a principle’s structural integrity; hence he sees no point in codification. However, 
he then suggests that ‘it is in the nature of principles to resist enactment’ because their 
‘range or scope…cannot be dictated in advance…Nor can their appropriate compass 
                                                        380 H Fenwick and G Phillipson (n379) 869 381 [2002] EWCA Civ 1502 382 [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 383 [2008] EWCA Civ 1148 384 Allan (n101) 143 385 Allan (n101) 144 386 Allan (n101) 148 
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or scope be exhaustively defined.’387 He thus appears to condemn codification for the 
very reason that it corrupts the intrinsic qualities of legal principles. There is an 
inconsistency here. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the manner of expression of a 
principle is irrelevant to its weight. Codification may not alter the genetic makeup of a 
principle but it does alter its status. Even Allan is willing to concede that a ‘“higher” 
constitutional status’ does have practical value in the sense that a Charter of Rights 
‘may serve to frustrate rules’ which would otherwise jeopardise constitutional 
rights.388 Status then clearly counts for something. It does not necessarily change the 
nature of a principle as a principle but it certainly contributes to a principle’s 
constitutional rather than intrinsic weight. However, he argues that codification fails 
to ‘enhance the value of fundamental rights, or alter the intrinsic weight of 
principles.’389 Yet surely a decision to place a specific liberty on a constitutional 
pedestal “weighs-in” to its value when it is matched against other non-statutory 
common law rights. The value of codification is not restatement but recognition. The 
manner of expression may not intrinsically alter the principle but the way in which it 
is perceived, externally weighed-up, does change. This is an inevitable consequence 
of status.  
 Allan’s next objection arises from the possible consequence of putting 
common law rights on a statutory footing. He argues that ‘…a principle, which 
enshrines a fundamental right, cannot be reduced to a rule.’390 Allan therefore 
assumes that the result of statutory codification is inevitably a legal rule. He argues 
that codification inevitably distorts that inherent malleability of a principle. Again this 
proposition conflicts with his original contention that statutory codification is simply 
                                                        387 Allan (n101) 151-153 388 Allan (n101) 154 389 Allan (n101) 154 390 Allan (n101) 153 
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a method of restatement that has no impact on the inherent nature of a principle. 
However, it is not necessarily correct that statute cannot accommodate legal 
principles. Indeed, the European Convention on Human Rights appears to be a clear 
example of a codified set of principles that in its very structure compensates for the 
inevitable weights and balances inherent in their nature. Finally, Allan in dismissing 
the value of codification focuses too intently on the end product; in doing so he fails 
to appreciate the value of the process of statutory codification itself. This process 
inevitably involves detailed scrutiny, discussion and clarification of those rights 
actually deemed to be fundamental. Such a process may even result in a principle 
losing its status at common law if it is snubbed by the legislature. It also inevitably 
puts a decision on liberties in the hands of a political institution rather than 
consolidating power in the hands of the unelected judges.  
 If the purpose of legality is to distinguish between residual acts of liberty and 
acts that break the law, it is important that we can differentiate between the two. It is 
also important that those interests/liberties deemed significant enough to deserve legal 
protection should acquire it. This is certainly not a requirement of the rule of law, nor 
is the desirability of clarity in statute. However, it beneficially exploits that ultimate 
authority appropriated to the law. In other words, it means approaching the door and 
walking through it.391 The notion of the “rule of valid law” is not a complex idea. 
However, in the UK it is inevitably more complicated because valid law is itself an 
‘eclectic mix’ of sources.392 It is argued that the label “valid law” should become 
more closely associated with statute to both clarify the concept and reinforce an 
existing constitutional truth of statutory supremacy. The problem of abuse of liberty is 
not remedied but mitigated by strengthening and clarifying the legal boundaries                                                         391 See Kyrgier (n7) 22  392 B V Harris, “Government “third source” action and common law constitutionalism” (2010) LQR 373, 377  
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within which the executive is able to act. A privileged legal upbringing in the UK 
constitution prompts the presumption that “valid law” will be sufficiently clear and 
precise to have qualified as valid law in the first place. However, this is a dangerous 
presumption as it draws in quality criteria within the meaning of the rule of law and 
threatens to politicise the concept. It should be noted then that clarifying what “valid 
law” means does not in itself guarantee that the law will be clear. This is a further 





Ultra-thin and Ultra Vires 
It is necessary to discuss the relevance of judicial review in relation to 
monitoring the executive’s residual liberty. However, before doing so, it is necessary 
to clarify how the ultra-thin model translates in practice, in particular its relationship 
with judicial review. The ‘traditional British understanding’ of Judicial Review is 
‘dominated by the notion of ultra vires’ hence the ‘primary function of judicial review 
is to enforce the commands of Parliament as expressed, for the most part, in enacted 
statutes.’393 It is this narrow ultra vires principle that resonates with the ultra-thin 
model; it supports the notion that the executive cannot exceed its legal capacity as 
demarcated in statute. The notion of ultra vires in a UK Constitutional context draws 
together the cardinal doctrines of the rule of law and Parliamentary Sovereignty. 
Indeed, Jowell notes that ‘the sovereignty of Parliament and the principle of the rule 
of law justify the courts in insisting that officials properly implement the instructions                                                         393 T Poole, “Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism” (2003) 23(3) OJLS 435 at 451 
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of the legislature (and therefore provide the principal support for the ground of 
legality).’394 This is not to say that the ultra-thin model is synonymous with 
Parliamentary Sovereignty; the latter is a means of tailoring the rule of law to the UK 
Constitutional context; within the expanse of the law’s ultimate authority, 
Parliamentary Sovereignty assigns legal supremacy to statute. Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and the ultra vires principle necessarily exist to domesticate the rule of 
law; the upshot of this legal triumvirate is a ‘very limited role’ role for the courts in 
‘interpreting the will of the legislature- express or implied.’395  
However, the reality is that judicial review has outgrown the rule of law (or at 
least, the ultra-thin model). Indeed, Jowell points out that ‘legality’ only provides one 
ground of judicial review; he points also to the alternative grounds of ‘procedural 
propriety and rationality.’396 It is clear, that Jowell has a far more substantive and 
liberal conception of the rule of law; it is through this conceptual liberalisation that 
Jowell justifies the expansion of judicial review. For example, he argues that the rule 
of law ‘also requires that no person be condemned unheard (thus supporting much of 
the ground of procedural propriety)’ whilst also remarking that the rule of law 
‘provides that power not be arbitrarily exercised (a principle which underpins a good 
deal of the ground of irrationality).’397 For Jowell then, the rule of law requires more 
than legality and these additional substantive characteristics find fruition in the 
alternative grounds of judicial review. He even suggests that some of the ‘qualities of 
the rule of law have been implicitly subsumed under administrative law standards.’398 
For example, ‘the requirement that a fair hearing must be provided where legitimate 
expectations have been disappointed (the breach of the expectation being a violation                                                         394 J Jowell, “Beyond the rule of law: Towards constitutional judicial review” (2000) PL 671 at 672 395 Jowell (n394) 673 396 Jowell (n394) 672 397 Jowell (n394) 672 398 Jowell (n394) 672 
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of the rule of law’s demand for legal certainty)’ whilst other qualities such as ‘the 
requirement of equal application of the law, or no punishment without a law’ have 
been ‘endorsed under the notion of irrationality or unreasonableness.’399   
Jowell clearly envisages a mutual evolution of the rule of law and judicial 
review. However, one questions why this is deemed necessary. Having an ultra-thin 
conception of the rule of law does not automatically translate into a demand for the 
parallel emasculation of judicial review, though it does require constitutional 
clarification. Nor does the emancipation of judicial review require a conceptual 
liberalisation of the rule of law. Constricting the practice to parliamentary 
interpretation would be a retrograde step for judicial review- hence this thesis does 
not suggest it. However, it is argued that the ultra-thin model continues to provide the 
foundation of judicial review via the ultra vires principle; it is only one component 
but it is an important one at least. It would be a mistake to allow the rule of law to 
define judicial review (the latter being a far more diverse and politically motivated 
practice).   
Jowell’s additional grounds of review do not impose a condition of legality; 
they are political principles requiring the executive to act in a governmental rather 
than explicitly legal fashion. The grounds of legality, irrationality and procedural 
impropriety all enjoy a “legal” status by virtue of their articulation in the common law. 
Their legal status, as such, is an inadvertent consequence of common law articulation.  
However, requiring the executive to act reasonably or in a procedurally coherent 
manner are not substantively legal impositions. The very essence of these additional 
grounds of review is to require the executive to act in a governmental manner beyond 
simply compliance with the letter of the law. They are political demands fashioned in 
                                                        399 Jowell (n394) 672-673 
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the legal attire of obligation. Therefore, the ground of review which resonates with the 
ultra-thin model is the ground of legality i.e. the ultra vires notion of compliance with 
parliamentary intent. This is because it is the ground of review which explicitly 
requires legal conformity by virtue of its substance rather than status. As a result of 
constitutional engineering (the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty) this 
requirement of legal conformity is primarily directed at statutory compliance. 
Therefore, in the UK context, the ultra-thin model is principally articulated in terms of 
statutory compliance. 
An on-going theme of this thesis has been to argue that the rule of law alone 
does not secure the individual’s liberty nor does it guarantee or indeed promote good 
government. This must be counterbalanced by the shaping influences of a flourishing 
political system. In the context of judicial review, the rule of law is very statutory 
focussed; it has been argued that the “legality” of the executive’s actions are 
measured by the extent to which they conflict with the law. Thus the rule of law is 
inevitably interwoven with the will of Parliament. Judicial review has outgrown the 
rule of law; it has evolved from the traditional ultra vires model into an eclectic mix 
of legal and political grounds of review. Jowell has listed various factors that the court 
now takes into account: legal certainty, a fair hearing, the grounds of irrationality and 
reasonableness. This evolution of the administrative practice epitomises the 
realisation that legality (in terms of navigating the executive’s conflict with the law) is 
not a sufficient check on the executive. This does not mean that the ultra- thin model 
is redundant in practice. Rather, it simply reiterates the reality that simply requiring 
the executive to act in a legal fashion is insufficient. It will however further be argued 
that politics is the best vehicle to optimise the rule of law; the common law 
constitutionalist belief in a ‘higher order of rights’ which emanate not from 
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parliamentary intent but modern democracy has the potential to dilute or even subvert 
the ultra-thin model with a higher source of ‘fundamental standards of political 
morality.’400 Thus, whilst the ultra-thin model is not inconsistent with the 
development of judicial review; equally this thesis foresees an end point; judicial 
review must not be permitted to usurp the role of the political constitution. Political 
growth best complements the rule of law. However, before embarking on this debate, 
there remains another outstanding issue; having argued that the rule of law awards the 
executive residual liberty, how are these residual actions to be held in check and, 
indeed, does the scope of judicial review extend to the executive’s legal liberty? 
 
Judicial Review- Beyond its logical boundaries? 
Judicial review is relevant in relation to the executive’s exercise of its residual 
liberty. Indeed, as we have seen, there is still an expectation that the courts will first 
look for statutory authority and then, in the absence of such, assess whether the 
government action contravenes the law. These issues still engage questions of legality 
that inevitably enlist the courts. Indeed, the principle of legality certainly ‘lies at the 
heart of any conception of the rule of law.’401 Furthermore, it is certainly 
‘constitutionally imperative that governmental claims of legal power must be open to 
judicial scrutiny’, however, the question of legality is not confined solely to issues of 
power.402 The courts patrol and demarcate the boundary between what is legal and 
what is not. The former territory is not solely occupied with legal power but also legal 
liberty. Thus, the question of legality, in this elementary sense, is applicable to 
determining the legitimate exercise of residual liberty. However, judicial review has 
evolved to exceed the simple question of legality and the ultra vires principle (i.e. the                                                         400 Jowell (n394) 675; Poole (n393) 452 401 Elliott (n238) 177 402 Elliott (n238) 177 
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extent to which executive actions conflict with parliamentary intent). It is now 
concerned with monitoring good administration, and indeed, more judges are prone to 
conceive of legality as a notion that transcends the letter of the law and is embedded 
with ‘fundamental standards of political morality’.403 Elliott proposes a method to 
encompass this development within the issue of legality. However, the question of 
good administration is essentially a political one; it asks not whether a power is 
legally permitted but how that power is exercised and for what purpose. It therefore 
seems logical to allow it to be asked by a political body apt to deal with actions that 
affect the political, rather than legal, interests of the citizen. 
Traditionally judicial review is concerned with statutory power. Exercise of 
legal power must ‘be shown to have a strictly legal pedigree.’404 Elliott neatly 
summarises the process: ‘cases of this type involve, first, a determination that legal 
power is needed to support the relevant action and, secondly, examination of whether 
the government remained within or trespassed beyond the limits of the power, 
properly defined.’405 Judicial review is then concerned with ascertaining if the 
government has exceeded the appropriate limits of its statutory power. At a very 
minimum, judicial review encapsulates the courts patrolling the legal border. It 
evaluates the legality of executive acts. To this extent, Wade is wrong to suggest that 
judicial review has no bearing on non-statutory actions of the executive.406 After all it 
is necessary to ascertain whether the government’s actions have conflicted with the 
law in order to see if it is conforming to it. In the same way as reviewing purportedly 
“legal actions” the courts must ‘ensure that the state has remained within the bounds 
of the legal authority upon which the legality and effectiveness of its action depends’, 
                                                        403 Poole (n393) 452 404 H W R Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford, OUP, 2000) 20 405 Elliott (n238) 167 406 H W R Wade, “Judicial Review of Ministerial Guidance” (1986) 102 LQR 173 at 175 
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the court must also check that the government remains within the bounds of its liberty 
upon which the legality of its action depends.407 The claim to residual liberty must be 
justified by reference to statute; the courts still need to check that the executive is 
acting within the bounds of its legal liberty by ensuring that Parliament has in fact left 
room for manoeuvre. Therefore, this minimum level of judicial review is still 
necessary.  
The court then, in both circumstances, patrols the borders of the law. Elliott 
notes that when acting in its field of residual liberty, ‘the government does not need to 
identify any “power” in order to justify its conduct. Rather, it can argue that its action 
is lawful because nothing makes it unlawful.’408 However, this does not mean that its 
actions will not be the subject of elementary review; Elliott implies this in stating that 
the government may still be expected to “argue” its case. The reality is that in order to 
defend its liberty the government must prove that its actions do not conflict with law. 
This is a question of legality. Therefore, logically the courts may legitimately proceed 
with review by the two-stage process outlined by Elliott above. However, Elliott is 
keen to disassociate ‘vires-based’ judicial review from that review required of its 
residual liberty by arguing that this category of review necessarily ‘concerns the 
identification of the scope of the actor’s legal power; an excess of power renders the 
act invalid or unlawful.’409 He reinforces elsewhere that with the government’s 
residual liberty we are not concerned with the ‘scope and contours of the relevant 
power’.410 However, one questions whether such a clear distinction exists. Indeed, of 
course, whilst with residual liberty we are not concerned with the scope of the 
government’s legal powers, the judiciary still navigates the parameters of its legal 
                                                        407 Elliott (n238) 167 408 Elliott (n238) 168 409 Elliott (n238) 227 410 Elliott (n238) 174 
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activity. Elliott concedes that ‘narrow review’ of the prerogative is ‘premised on the 
fact that, like statutory discretionary power, it is not infinite but, instead, exists only 
within defined areas.’411 However, paradoxically, the same can be said of residual 
liberty which is similarly contained by law, hence the juxtaposition legal liberty. 
Legal liberty exists in vacuums that are negatively defined by the law’s boundaries. 
The question of legality is not always clear-cut. Indeed, for instance, if statute 
prohibits “unreasonable” interference with a particular right, deducing whether the 
government is acting in its residual liberty or in conflict with the law necessarily 
requires a review of the “reasonableness” of the government’s actions. Indeed, often it 
is through this legal channel that questions of reasonability are precariuosly subsumed 
within the question of legality. However, this uncertainty is arguably circumvented 
through the adoption of Harris and Cohn’s endorsement of ‘the principle of 
residuality’ which ‘reflects a systemic commitment to the supremacy of statute law 
over non-statutory executive powers.’412 Thus, if the government purports to act in a 
field regulated by statute, statute automatically prevails. The question of legality in 
relation to the government’s residual liberty is therefore less complex because the 
border exists between the government’s liberty and fields of activity regulated by 
statute. The scope of the government’s liberty is therefore not determined by the 
interpretation of a particular statutory provision. The boundaries are therefore more 
clearly defined. Actions taken within a “field” regulated by statute may be 
legitimately subject to judicial review taking into account the intentions and purpose 
behind any relevant legislation in that field. Therefore, when assessing whether the 
government’s activities conflict with law, we are really reviewing whether the 
government is acting in a field completely unregulated by law. The conflict therefore                                                         411 Elliott (n238) 176-177 412 M Cohn, “Judicial Review of non-statutory executive powers after Bancoult: a unified anxious model” (2006) PL 260, 272 & 274  
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arises from mutual operation in a legal field. There is evidence of a common law 
reversion to this “territorial” language which complements the undergoing message of 
the Residuality Principle.  Indeed, Elliott insists that De Keyser413 represents the idea 
that residual liberty only exists so long as ‘…Parliament desists from enacting a 
statutory framework governing the relevant area’.414 This certainly indicates that 
statute prevails in a general field rather than simply in relation to a specific 
government action. Lord Mustill in Fire Brigades Union Case415 reinforces this 
consistency between the De Keyser Principle and the Residuality Principle. Indeed, he 
comments that ‘Once the superior power of Parliament has occupied the territory the 
prerogative must quit the field.’416  There are of course weaknesses in this model. 
Indeed, Cohn admits that it is ‘highly malleable’ and the government may simply 
avert further scrutiny by arguing its operation in a different field, as occurred in Laker 
Airways Ltd v Department of Trade [1977]417 where the Court of Appeal upheld 
Government action by finding that the case concerned the field of foreign affairs 
rather than civil aviation, thus the Civil Aviation Act did not apply.418 The 
Government also successfully argued in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1989]419 that the Police Act 
1964 was not intended by Parliament to create a monopoly over regulation in this 
field. However, this undermines the advantage of the residuality principle. Under my 
understanding, this would still require judicial review of legal powers in the normal 
sense because the government is still acting in the field of policing regulated by law. 
Therefore, to the extent that judicial review manages the legal boundaries of the                                                         413 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 75 414 Elliott (n238) 172 (emphasis added) 415 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Fire Brigades Union & others [1995] 2 AC 513 416 Lord Mustill, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Fire Brigades Union & others (1995) 2 AC 513 at 564 417 [1977] 1 QB 643 418 Cohn (n412) 272 419 [1989] QB 26 CA 
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government’s actions, it is applicable to these actions taken at the government’s 
liberty.  
However, there are two stages to judicial review: The first is purely a question 
of legality, the second concerns abuse of power. Elliott prefers to distinguish between 
two widths of review: narrow and broad.420 The former concerns jurisdictional limits, 
the latter relates to good administration. Regardless of taxonomy, the latter stage 
exceeds the question of bare legality and reviews the quality of government decision-
making in relation to the intentions of the statute. However, there is no statute to act 
as a necessary reference point; the issue is not an abuse of power but an abuse of 
liberty.  However, in order to prevent the government’s abuse of liberty, which 
infringes the individual’s non-legal interests, it has been proposed that the judiciary 
should review the quality of the government’s decision-making. Indeed, in R v the 
Secretary of Health ex p C [2000]421 the court reviewed whether the Secretary of 
State had the power to maintain a Consultancy Service Index. The Court of Appeal 
stated that the Crown, as a corporation sole, could do anything that an individual 
could yet ‘it nonetheless held (oblivious of this obvious contradiction) that the court 
could find that what it did was unlawful as an abuse of power.’422 Thus, Howell 
highlights the paradox that even the Court of Appeal ‘who thought that 
ministers…could do anything that an individual may do, did not accept the logical 
consequence of that approach.’423 It also took the view that the government could not 
enjoy ‘unfettered discretion to operate it in whatever way it chooses’, and ‘if 
exercised unreasonably or unfairly, such powers as it thus had would not be lawfully 
                                                        420 Elliott (n238) 176 421 [2000] HRLR 400 422 J Howell, ‘What the Crown may do’ (ALBA Summer Conference, St John’s College, Cambridge, 25 July 2009) par29 423 Howell (n422) par28 
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exercised.’424 Carnwath LJ confirmed in R (Shrewsbury & Atcham BC & Congleton 
BC) v the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Shropshire 
CC [2008]425 (‘Shrewsbury’) that the Government’s powers ‘were not confined to 
those conferred by statute or prerogative, but, subject to any relevant statutory or 
public law constraints and to the competing rights of other parties, they extended to 
anything a natural person do’.426 However, Carnwath LJ also emphasized that this 
residual class of ministerial power was ‘exceptional and should be strictly 
confined.’427 Therefore, he concluded that whilst ‘as a matter of capacity [the Crown] 
had the power to do anything which a private person could do…as an organ of 
government it could only exercise that power for the public benefit, and for 
identifiable “governmental” purposes.’428 In other words, Carnwath LJ adopted the 
paradoxical position that an abuse of liberty was unlawful. This arguably clearly 
displays how judicial review has ‘burst through its logical boundaries.’429  
Elliott agrees that the “logical boundaries” of judicial review have evolved. 
Indeed, he suggests that judicial review has out-grown its ‘one-dimensional 
foundation of judicial implementation of legislative intention’.430 He therefore argues 
that the ‘will of Parliament’ whilst ‘constitutionally important’, only ‘represents part 
of the picture.’431 This indicates that the focus has shifted from the source of power to 
the way it is exercised- those principles of good administration. In other words, 
judicial review is now equally as focused on the lawfulness, rather than simply the 
legality, of government actions. He thus concludes that a ‘much richer set of 
constitutional principles’ underlies judicial review and the ‘question of sources is now                                                         424 Hale LJ, R v the Secretary of Health, ex p C [2000] HRLR 400 at 407; Howell (n422) par28 425 [2008] EWCA Civ 148 426 Carnwath LJ (n425) at 223 427 Carnwath LJ (n425) at 223 428 Carnwath LJ (n425) at 223 429 H W R Wade, “Judicial Review of Ministerial Guidance” (1986) 102 LQR 173, 175 430 Elliott (n238) 165-166 431 Elliott (n238) 165 
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largely irrelevant to the question whether a particular government activity may be 
reviewed’ though it is not irrelevant to the question of why it must be.432 Elliott thus 
endorses the subjection of ‘other forms of power’ (such as de facto powers) to judicial 
review.433 However, he helpfully footnotes that this expression ‘power’ does not 
connote legal power; rather it is used more broadly to describe factual ‘control or 
influence over individual legal persons or a section of the community.’434  
Before discussing this expansion of judicial review, it is necessary to relay 
how this discussion intertwines with the meaning of the rule of law. It has been 
argued that the rule of law is purely concerned with formal legality. In practice this 
“version” of the rule of law can be enforced by the courts which police the boundaries 
of the law. It has been conceded that identifying what is legal and what is not is not 
always clear-cut but this task is relieved by the residuality principle so what is “legal” 
does not rest on the subjective interpretation of a particular phrase, instead statute 
automatically applies in particular “fields”. However, recent case law such as ex p C 
and Shrewsbury indicates that the judiciary has exceeded the logical boundaries of 
judicial review by declaring unlawful the actions of the government that are within its 
liberty to perform but are politically questionable. This therefore begs the question 
how the rule of law, and indeed legality, can “fit” with the evolution of the role of the 
judge who looks beyond pure legality and analyses the political adequacy of 
executive action. The answer is quite simple. It is not the rule of law that has evolved 
but the role of the court. The rule of law, and therefore legality, is simply an element 
determining the executive’s capacity to act; it is an element that is rightly being 
overtaken by political controls. The constitutional confusion arises because it is the 
                                                        432 Elliott (n238) 166 433 Elliott (n238) 165 434 Elliot (n238) 166, footnote 3; see B V Harris “The “Third Source” of Authority for Governmental Action” (1992) 108 LQR 626, 629 
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judiciary (speaking in the name of the rule of law) that has adopted a new political 
role and is evolving into a political institution. However, it is important to remember 
that when the judge is acting politically he is not defending the rule of law; he is 
playing a vital constitutional role that complements its operation. It is thus important 
to distinguish between the court’s legal and political responsibilities in order to 
maintain the integrity of legality. 
Despite this evolution in judicial review, it is still incoherent to declare that an 
abuse of liberty is legally invalid when it never purported to express explicit legal 
authority. Indeed, Elliott remarks that ‘it simply makes no sense to impugn the 
legality of an act for want of legal power when such power is not in the first place a 
condition precedent to the act’s legality.’435 However, it is possible to realign this new 
emphasis on good administration with legal formality. For example, it is possible to 
incorporate these principles of good administration into this ‘condition precedent’ that 
determines the legality of residual liberty; this is the requirement that the 
Government’s acts are legal to the extent that it does not break the law. Indeed, Elliott 
similarly proposes that ‘the principles of good administration must be conceptualized 
as a set of positive legal obligations’.436 Therefore, failure to adhere to one of these 
principles constitutes ‘a breach of the corresponding common law rule.’437 Thus, 
Elliott effectively circumvents the previous illogicality of subjecting the government’s 
liberty to judicial review because the unlawfulness ‘derives not from an absence of 
legal power…but breach of a common law rule which makes it unlawful to act in such 
a manner.’438 However, whilst Elliott argues that this is an area in which ‘a common 
law model of review is both appropriate and necessary’, placing these administrative 
                                                        435 Elliot (n238) 193 436 Elliott (n238) 194 437 Elliott (n238) 194 438 Elliott (n238) 194 
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principles on a statutory footing would arguably more obviously distinguish them as 
positive legal obligations.439 Indeed, the question of good administration therefore 
becomes a legal one and is accommodated within the rule of law as a formal legal 
concept. Note, this is not a requirement of the ultra-thin model but a means of 
clarifying the relationship between the rule of law and the judicial review of the 
executive’s residual liberty. This is a clear example of accepting more than simply the 
law’s existence but using the law and moreover ensuring that it is useful in securing 
good government. The rule of law alone cannot secure this; it is a form of ‘interaction 
technology’.440  
However, the codification of good administration principles into a set of legal 
criteria is arguably still inappropriate. There exist outstanding issues as to how 
Carnwath LJ’s proposals would work in practice. Indeed, it is difficult to ascertain 
and therefore legally codify what the “public benefit” means and in what way a 
government’s actions may or may not qualify as “governmental” in nature. It further 
risks jeopardising the residuality principle; if the good administration principles apply 
to all government decision-making it would appear that there is no “field” vacant of 
legal regulation. This suggests that the Government would enjoy no legal liberty 
whatsoever, a prospect that arguably undermines the trust inherent in the operation of 
a representative democracy. Equally, conceding the political evolution of the judiciary 
does not jeopardise the legality of the rule of law. It simply further illustrates that 
legality is increasingly not enough to control the actions of the executive. The law 
must work alongside political controls in a sophisticated legal state. However, the 
court’s adoption of a political role appears to complicate the interrelationship between 
the judge’s political and legal personalities.  An alternative would be to allow the                                                         439 Elliott (n238) 194 440 Krygier (n7) 22 (emphasis added) 
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existing political institutions to reclaim the role of assessing the political adequacy of 
executive acts. The evolving role of the courts has triggered an expectation that the 
rule of law should mimic this politicization. However, it is important to maintain a 
comfortable distance between the rule of law and the courts. Legal formality can and 
should complement good politics but good politics is not synonymous with the rule of 
law. Furthermore, by re-distributing political responsibility to other political 
institutions such as the legislature, pressure groups and the electorate, it inhibits the 
court’s monopoly over accountability in the state that has the potential to stagnate 
what must be a multi-faceted operation. Certainly, requiring greater scrutiny earlier on 
in the government’s decision-making process would pre-empt the increasing reliance 
on the court’s limited reactionary input. It is thus necessary to discuss how the rule of 
law can operate alongside political ideals to secure a good administration. 
 
The Conventional Expectation Model 
Tomkins’ first proposition in his republican constitution is that all government 
powers should be put on a statutory footing.441 This has onerous consequences for the 
meaning of legality, which, it has been proposed, is central to the meaning of the rule 
of law. The notion that all government action should be legally authorized in advance 
is not a legal condition of the rule of law because it is not a requirement of legality. 
The law should rule but it should not monopolise. It has been argued that whilst the 
dilution of common law prerogative powers is wise, the universal requirement that all 
powers be legally authorized in advance is undesirable, impractical and unnecessary. 
This does not contradict the previous endorsement of greater use of statute. Promoting 
a closer association between the rule of valid law and statutory supremacy is in the 
                                                        441 Tomkins (n362) 132  
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interests of conceptual clarity and constitutional fluidity. However, denying the 
executive a residual liberty to act arguably flies in the face of an alternative ‘reality of 
government’ overlooked by Tomkins.442 Harris’ conventional expectation model 
appreciates and builds upon this reality. Harris suggests that whilst the meaning of 
legality does not require every executive act to be rooted in legal authority, the ‘clear 
expectation from constitutional convention could be that executive action will 
normally be authorized in advance by statute put in place with appropriate scrutiny 
through the parliamentary processes.’443  Indeed, in the hands of an efficient 
legislative body, the law provides a useful tool to clearly and publicly demarcate the 
powers of the executive.  Whilst one is reluctant to endorse the constitutional 
undertones of Harris’ proposal, diluting Harris’ language of convention to that of 
political expectation still ingrains the utilization of statute into the political culture of 
a state without endorsing an overly prescriptive approach. It promotes the idea that 
the law, if it is recognized, should be used well and for the correct purposes. If this 
expectation is neglected the political consequences that ensue should only be deemed 
constitutional in the sense that they are an example of ‘what happens.’444 The 
Government is not breaking any constitutional “rule” as such but it is acting contrary 
to the expectations of the political community. Of course political accountability 
mechanisms such as parliamentary scrutiny, back-bench rebellions and the threat of 
not being re-elected are likely, and designed, to pre-empt this. Equally the media and 
pressure groups will play an important role in forcing the government to justify its 
actions in the law.  
Cohn offers a different model. It requires that all executive action anticipated 
to have a ‘long-lasting bearing on society’ must be authorized in statute                                                         442 Tomkins (n362) 15 443 Harris (n314) 246-247 444 J Griffith, “The Political Constitution” (1979) 42(1) Modern Law Review 1, 19  
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beforehand.445 However, there is the inevitable problem of identifying ‘What is meant 
by “long-lasting bearing”?’ and Harris points out that government actions ‘having a 
short-term impact’ may be just as ‘deserving of parliamentary pre-action scrutiny.’446 
Harris’ model discards with these semantic issues; he does not specify a particular 
type of action that requires legislative endorsement. Instead, there exists an over-
arching political expectation that all government action will usually be legally 
authorized in advance. This flexible approach does not artificially delineate between 
significant powers on the longevity of their impact. Harris rightly presumes that in a 
legally sophisticated and politically developed society there will exist an accepted 
expectation that because the law has ultimate authority, it will be used. To the extent 
that this is evidence of ‘what happens’ in the UK constitution; it may be classified as 
vaguely “constitutional”.447 This loose adoption of constitutional language aligns 
itself with Griffiths’ tendency to be ‘prescriptive without prescribing much’.448 It is 
politically unwise for the UK government to act extra-legally because it aggravates an 
underlying political consensus interlinked with the UK’s representative democracy. It 
is the inevitable political backlash that deters the government from bypassing the 
legal framework; this discontent is the product of a political expectation embedded in 
political culture rather than a constitutional convention. Harris’ model does not have 
to be classified as conventional to have a constitutional effect. What is important is 
that this expectation occupies the mind of the electorate and political institutions.  
Indeed, in the UK this political expectation is habitually recognised without 
the assistance of a constitutional convention. For example, in R v Secretary of State 
                                                        445 M Cohn, “Medieval Chains, Invisible Links: on Non-statutory Powers of the Executive” (2005) 25(1) OJLS 97, 100 446 Harris (n314) 246 447 Griffith (n444) 19 448 Gee and Webber (n239) 289 
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for the Home Department ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1989]449 the Court, 
in assessing the legality of the government’s acts, primarily sought evidence of pre-
action statutory authorization. This does not infer a rule that all executive action 
requires positive legal authority but reflects an imbedded expectation in the political 
culture of the UK that for the courts, statute is logically still the first port of call. 450 
Acting without statutory authority is essentially viewed as a ‘last resort’.451 This is a 
sentiment arguably shared by the executive itself. For example, in the UK we have 
seen the government insist on procuring Parliamentary approval for both the Iraq War 
and the 2011 Libya conflict, Brown’s commitment to surrendering certain prerogative 
powers and in 2013 Cameron’s decision to put a vote to the Commons on 
involvement in the Syria conflict, which was subsequently lost. This suggests that 
there has been a subtle shift in the behaviorisms of the executive. Therefore this 
assumption that the executive wishes to act in the territory of its residual liberty rather 
than under statutory regulation is false. Tomkins certainly presumes that ‘[n]o 
government can realistically be expected to volunteer such powers: this is not the way 
politics works.’452 However, arguably this is exactly how politics works. Pre-action 
legislative approval (whether in the form of a vote or actual statute) provides 
legitimacy and offers the benefit of dispersing culpability. These inherent insecurities 
of the executive are themselves products of a state’s healthy political culture which 
imposes political consequences on an inadequate governmental decision. Even if 
Tomkins is unwilling to accept that seeking parliamentary approval is a voluntary 
concession by the executive, he is willing to concede that Parliament ensured that the 
decision to move troops into Iraq was a decision for which Blair would be ‘fully 
                                                        449 [1989] 1 QB 26 450 see, however, Harris (n314) 231  451 Harris (n314) 247 452 Tomkins (n362) 134 
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constitutionally responsible.’453 What this illustrates is that a discussion of judicial 
review of the government’s residual liberty is potentially an ancillary concern. In the 
UK such actions will be rare and inevitably a last resort. What is essential is that the 
political mechanisms in place in the UK pre-empt the executive’s resort to such 
measures in the first place. 
Of course, it must be remembered that there is a distinction between seeking 
parliamentary approval and obtaining statutory authority. The former provides 
political justification whilst the latter is concerned with legal authority. We have 
already discussed that statutory authority does not necessarily indicate democratic 
consent. Indeed, a disproportionately representative legislature is capable of passing 
legislation. Legislation is often unpopular with the people. Therefore, the democratic 
significance of legislation should not be overstated. Moreover, statutory authority 
should not be deemed to be synonymous with democratic consent. Equally, 
Parliament’s political responsibility exceeds mere law-making. Thus, even when the 
executive is acting within its residual liberty, it may still seek parliamentary approval 
by means of a Commons’ vote or, as has been the recent trend, the government may 
demonstrate a more direct democratic approach by procuring a referendum instead.454 
Ironically, in the context of Britain’s membership of the EU, it has been Parliament 
that has encouraged the executive to optimize the residual liberty awarded by a 
representative democracy rather than resorting to a referendum on the matter. What 
this demonstrates is that “non-legal” executive action is not free from political 
restraint nor does the executive intend it to. Furthermore, there are alternative means 
of gauging the popularity of measures without demanding the impractical resort to 
statutory authorization. It is interesting that Francois Hollande has labeled Cameron’s                                                         453 Tomkins (n362) 129 454 For example, Cameron’s proposed 2017 EU referendum and see Scottish Independence Referendum Bill 2014 
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insistence on a Commons vote on the Syria conflict as a ‘schoolboy error’.455 It is a 
reminder that every state is different and political culture is uni generis.  
Harris reinforces the argument that politics should be utilized as a check on 
the residual liberty of the executive. This approach clearly complements Wade’s 
opinion that Judicial Review should not be extended to this realm of political activity. 
For example, Harris proposes that in the scenario where the “third source” was used, 
it should be ensured that this only occurs in ‘justifiable circumstances’.456 Harris 
makes the valid point that in a society where there exists a political consensus that 
executive actions should be authorized in law, ‘there obviously would be an increased 
consciousness of any use of the third source.’457 Thus, he suggests that ‘formal 
accountability mechanisms could be put in place by positive law’.458 For instance, 
actions under the residual liberty of the executive could be required to be ‘fully 
recorded and reported upon to Parliament.’459 He further proposes that ‘such a report 
be referred by Parliament to an appropriate select committee within a specified time 
period of the action being taken.’460 This would have the additional advantage that 
upon receiving the report, Parliament ‘could not only call the executive to account, 
but in theory could enact legislation to counter the action taken by the 
government.’461 Arguably, the impact of these suggestions is two-fold. In requiring 
formal accountability mechanisms to be put in place by “positive law”, this 
effectively shrinks the liberty of the executive by constructing legal hurdles which it 
must overcome in order to enjoy its liberty to act. These legal obligations put the 
political institutions on notice and enable them to scrutinize the government’s actions                                                         455 See H Samuel “Francois Hollande: David Cameron committed ‘schoolboy error’ on Syria” The Telegraph, 11 Sept 2013  456 Harris (n314) 247 457 Harris (n314) 247 458 Harris (n314) 247 459 Harris (n314) 247 460 Harris (n314) 247 461 Harris (n314) 247 
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and anticipate whether legislation is required. Furthermore, it is necessary to re-state 
that allowing the government to exercise its residual liberty, free of statutory 
authorization, does not pre-empt the future application of statute to this field. Indeed, 
‘retrospective statutory authority’ may be awarded whilst similarly retrospective 
illegalization may also be exercised.462 
Of course the effectiveness of these political accountability mechanisms 
depends on the political makeup of Parliament. Indeed, a government-dominated 
legislature, such as that of the Labour Government in 1997 and 2001, would hardly 
ensure the executive is kept to account. Yet, equally the current Coalition 
arrangements and division within the Conservative majority, particularly over gay 
marriage issues and the EU, would suggest the political climate is ripe for political 
methods to be exploited. The success of political accountability ultimately rests on the 
political culture and climate at a given time, thus it is difficult, and ill advised, to 
translate these political proposals into exact constitutional prescriptions. In turn, the 
efficiency of political accountability has inevitable consequences for the perception of 
the rule of law. In a weak political system, the suggestion that the executive should 
enjoy the same residual liberty as the citizen is an unfavourable one. However, what 
this circumstance elucidates is that if we do not trust the Government to act 
constitutionally or we do not have confidence in the political institutions which are 
designed to pre-empt this, our political expectations are too low. Equally, the proposal 
that the rule of law does not require justice, clarity or “prospectivity” in the law is not 
a radical suggestion if I expect the political system to guarantee these political 
demands. Denying the rule of law a political title is not an arbitrary suggestion once 
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the rule of law is contextualized as a significant but not sole component of the 
constitutional framework. 
 
The rule of law and political prescriptions 
The rule of law will operate most effectively in a system that optimizes 
political accountability as the vehicle for securing good government. A legal state 
accommodates vacuums of residual liberty. These vacuums are externally defined but 
not internally monitored by the law. Here, politics is the appropriate check on 
government. Those who perceive the rule of law as the epitome of good government 
jeaopardise the clarity of an essential component of any legal constitutional structure. 
What constitutes “good government” is not easily prescribed and any attempts at 
listing explicit criteria is inevitably defeated by changing political, economic and 
legal circumstances. This is a constitutional reality that Griffith engaged with in his 
formulation of a political constitution. Whilst his theory has been criticized for its 
normative deficit, Gee and Webber suggest that Griffith’s theory exceeds a mere 
‘reading of prevailing practices in the British political system’ and argue that it is 
necessarily ‘prescriptive without prescribing much.’463 Rather Gee and Webber 
identify a primary direction within Griffith’s political constitution: ‘that it is for us 
all…to do the prescribing’ as political actors.464 The operation of politics is messy, as 
is its interface with the law. This is a constitutional reality. Any attempts to prescribe 
in exacting terms how the constitution should operate reeks of legal constitutionalist 
philosophy and fails to appreciate this reality. Thus, one endorses Griffith’s intention 
to prescribe ‘no more than the bare minimal conditions for political equality and 
                                                        463 Gee & Webber (n239) 275 and 289 464 Gee & Webber (n239) 289 
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accountability and non-domination.’465 The key argument in this section is that the 
rule of law should operate alongside a constitution that prioritises political 
accountability. Political accountability is a central, but not the only, claim of political 
constitutionalists. Further, what is meant by a political constitution is a ‘beguilingly 
simple question’ which will not be resolved in this thesis.466 However, this section 
seeks to propose that the “rule of valid law” can help secure good government when it 
interacts with a healthy political system. 
Underlying the debate about the normative value of Griffith’s political 
constitution is a presumption that a descriptive theory is somehow less useful. 
However, this is not necessarily true, particularly in a scenario where academics 
cannot agree on an accurate description of what actually “happens”. Certainly, for our 
own purposes of deducing the meaning of legality within the UK constitution, 
Griffith’s observations are enlightening. Indeed, according to Griffith, what lies at the 
‘heart’ of the UK constitution is the idea that the government ‘may take any action 
necessary for the proper government of the UK, as they see it…’467 Thus, on 
Griffith’s account, the executive is allocated a degree of political freedom. He states 
that the executive’s liberty is subject to two limitations. For our purposes the first is 
the most significant as it states that the executive ‘may not infringe the legal rights of 
others unless expressly authorized to do so under statute or the prerogative.’468 The 
second illustrates the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty which insists that any 
change in the law must be approved by Parliament.469 Returning to the former, 
Griffith’s reading of the constitution clearly supports a minimal version of legality; 
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the executive is at liberty to act as it deems necessary unless its actions conflict with 
the law.  
Yet, arguably Tomkins’ description does greater justice to the idea of political 
accountability that plays an imperative role in Griffith’s overarching theory. Indeed, 
whilst Griffith explicitly highlights two legal limitations to the executive’s freedom, 
he fails initially to allude to the additional political mechanisms that inhibit executive 
action. Griffith’s initial description is arguably incomplete. Griffith insists that what 
qualifies as ‘necessary’ action should be determined by the government ‘as they see 
it.’470 It is therefore suggested that what lies at the “heart” of Griffith’s description 
fails to do justice to his over-arching aim. Griffith simultaneously reinforces politics 
as the foundation of constitutionalism, yet, initially omits to allocate political controls 
as limitations of the executive’s liberty. Whilst this discrepancy between his 
constitutional sketch and political aspiration arguably evidences a prescriptive 
element to his theory, arguably, what Tomkins identifies as the ‘reality of government’ 
is more appropriate: ‘those in political office are liable to try to do whatever they can 
politically get away with.’471 This clearly anticipates actions that the government will 
not be able to politically get away with. It thus incorporates an inherent political 
limitation within the notion of the executive’s legal liberty (though admittedly it omits 
to mention the inevitable legal boundaries). What is “necessary” then is not a matter 
solely determined by the executive but monitored in the political arena. Tomkins’ 
description is arguably more accurate and explicit. 
Tomkins’ perception of the “reality of government” usefully complements the 
notion previously argued that the executive, like the natural legal person, may do 
anything as long as it does not break the law. Viewing this concept in the context of                                                         470 Griffith (n444) 15 471 Tomkins (n362) 2 (emphasis added) 
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Tomkins’ “reality of government” portrays a far less radical picture. Identifying the 
individual and the state as natural legal persons does not equate to a political 
equilibrium. In constitutional terms it is easy to distinguish between the two. First, the 
executive’s residual liberty is a lot more confined considering its subjection to greater 
legal regulation. This is the result of a politically sophisticated society that appreciates 
the power: legal regulation ratio. Thus, whilst the executive can do anything that does 
not break the law, these laws are far more prevalent resulting in far less room to 
maneuver. Second, within its designated area of residual liberty the executive is 
subject to political accountability mechanisms. Therefore, it is an over-simplification 
to insist that the Ram doctrine somehow places the executive and the citizen on the 
same footing. It is not the case that ‘a minister may do anything an individual may 
do’.472 This narrow interpretation superficially isolates a concept that should be 
viewed in its political and constitutional context. The formal version of the rule of law 
has suffered from similar unfair treatment. What this discussion illustrates is that 
descriptive theories should not simply be dismissed as less valuable or worthy of our 
attention. 
Gee and Webber summarise a political constitution as a ‘constitutional model 
which oscillates between the descriptive and the normative.’473 There are certainly 
descriptive components to Griffith’s theory. Indeed, the most obvious example is his 
testament that the constitution is ‘no more and no less than what happens’.474 
However, both Griffith and Tomkins emerge from the same necessarily descriptive 
standpoint: ‘The law is not and cannot be a substitute for politics.’475 There are two 
stages to this analysis: the “is not” and the “cannot”. Any prescriptive account of the 
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constitution must commence from a descriptive footing. Indeed, no prescription about 
what the constitution should be is complete without an initial accurate account of 
what it is. Thus Tomkins similarly sketches out what he believes is ‘beautiful’ about 
the constitution; its utilization of ‘politics as the vehicle through which the purpose of 
the constitution (that is, to check the government) may be accomplished.’476 This is 
arguably something that Elliott, in his promotion of judicial review, overlooks. Both 
Griffith and Tomkins observe that politics, not law, is the most effective means of 
holding the government to account. ‘Only political control, politically exercised, can 
supply the remedy...’ to tyranny.477 This reality is reflected in the prevailing attempt 
to substitute the legal heart of the rule of law with political concepts in order to make 
the law’s ultimate authority compatible with the ultimate constitutional effectiveness 
of politics. However, this is possible without superficially forcing the marriage of the 
two under one concept.  
Tomkins prescribes various constitutional mechanisms to maintain this 
“beauty”. However, he perceives Griffith’s ‘wholly descriptive’ account of the 
political constitution as the ‘one major limitation’ of his work as it limits Griffith’s 
theory to a mere ‘political preference’ rather than a constitutional blueprint.478 In 
other words, Griffith may have believed that ‘the political model of accountability 
was to be preferred over the legal’ and even considered it to be ‘more democratic and 
more effective’, however, it was not deemed ‘constitutionally required, still less 
constitutionally entrenched.’479 Tomkins, however, believes that the government is 
accountable to Parliament ‘because the constitution insists upon it’, not simply 
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because it is ‘what happens.’480 Thus, Tomkins perceives the role of politics as a 
constitutional requirement and prescribes set criteria to ensure that this remains a 
constitutional reality. What may be deduced from this criticism is that Griffith’s 
theory is arguably still prescriptive, it is simply not constitutionally prescriptive. He 
still presents a political preference of how things should work but fails to translate this 
into constitutional terms. Thus, Tomkins’ label of Griffith’s political constitution as 
‘wholly descriptive’ is contradictory and false.481 Certainly, Gee and Webber note 
Griffith’s ‘not infrequent appeal to the vocabulary of “ought”’.482 Indeed, Griffith 
testifies that ‘political decisions should be taken by politicians’ and advocates forcing 
governments ‘out of secrecy and into the open.’483 Furthermore, he encourages 
‘greater opportunities for discussion, more open government, less restriction on 
debate, weaker Official Secrets Acts, more access to information, stronger pressure 
from backbenchers, changes in the law of Contempt of Court.’484 Indeed, Harlow 
insists that Griffith’s political constitution is a ‘benchmark for those who see 
representative and parliamentary government as important constitutional 
desiderata.’485 Thus, Griffith’s political constitution is prescriptive, if not 
constitutionally so. 
 However, arguably such a translation to constitutional language would be 
counter-intuitive; it fails to engage with the messy reality of the constitution. In other 
words, it is the very nature of the constitution that prevents it from being prescribed in 
exacting terms because there is something ‘inherent’ in its very idea ‘that invites some 
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necessary (and welcome) ambiguity.’486 Indeed, Gee and Webber argue that the 
‘workings of a political constitution are themselves less visible than a legal 
constitution.’487 A political constitution is thus ‘difficult to identify as a phenomenon 
distinct from day-to-day political activity’ as it ‘works primarily, and often 
imperceptibly, inside Parliament and the executive and, where visible, its workings 
will often appear less dignified and more haphazard than court proceedings…’488 
Tomkins however overlooks this reality by proposing to constitutionally entrench the 
idea of  ‘open government.’489 He states that in order to enable ‘effective scrutiny’ of 
the executive, ‘what the government is doing and is proposing to do must be freely 
available.’490 Certainly, if this is the case then the prospect of the executive retaining 
its residual liberty is less severe. This is because the law is not perceived as the sole 
device by which the government’s actions are publicized and communicated to the 
citizens. In light of Tomkins’ dissatisfaction with the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 which enshrined a ‘discretionary power to choose what information to disclose’, 
returning us to ‘an all-pervasive culture of secrecy and of seeking to find a reason for 
not disclosing’,491 he proposes that ‘all government information is presumed to be 
open and freely available both to Parliament and to the Public unless it can be 
objectively shown (and independently verified) that its disclosure would cause 
substantial harm to a specified public good.’492  
However, classifying “open government” as a constitutional requirement 
creates complications and contradictions which derive from its constitutional status. 
For example, it is unclear how this proposal would sit with the convention of                                                         486 Gee and Webber (n239) 287 487 Gee and Webber (n239) 286 488 Gee and Webber (n239) 286 489 Tomkins (n362) 134 490 Tomkins (n362) 134 491 R Austin, ‘The Freedom of Information Act 2000- A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (5th edn, Oxford, OUP, 2004) 415 492 Tomkins (n362) 136 
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collective responsibility that necessarily impresses on the cabinet an obligation of 
confidentiality. In this context, the value of secrecy is crucial; it is in itself the key to 
political accountability within the inner circle of government as cabinet members feel 
free to openly criticize and debate matters with the reassurance of confidentiality. 
This may also contribute to dispelling factions within the cabinet. Ironically the 
dilution of party politics is also one of Tomkins’ proposals. Equally, the Government 
must maintain an air of secrecy. Indeed, Griffith and Hartley (272) concede that 
‘secret operations are a legitimate means of achieving foreign policy objectives and 
that deceit cannot always be avoided in affairs of state.’493 A key modern day US 
example is Operation Neptune Spear 2011. It is clear that such a delicate balance is 
hard to constitutionally entrench in a calculated manner. Tomkins also overlooks the 
reality of an “open secret.” For instance, after wikileaks it was revealed that 
legislation allowed the government to tap into various online sources of private 
information. Thus the government was openly allowed to act in secret. Again 
Tomkins’ constitutional prescription fails to take note of these loopholes of day-to-
day politics. 
This discussion arguably highlights the reality that “open government” is 
inherently a “political preference” and cannot be genetically reconfigured as a 
constitutional requirement. Griffith, however, indicates a political preference for open 
government without constitutionally eradicating the value of secrecy within a state. 
Arguably his political preference is more realistic and desirable. He recognises “open 
government” as an ideal that should be sought not only within the constitution but in 
the wider political framework. Indeed, he comments loosely on forcing governments 
                                                        493 T C Hartley & J A G Griffith, Government and Law, An Introduction to the Working of the Constitution in 
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‘out of secrecy and into the open’.494 Griffith depicts “open government” as not 
merely a constitutional issue but one relating to political culture. He therefore does 
not refine his suggestions in the same way as Tomkins. Instead he more generally 
encourages ‘greater opportunities for discussion, more open government, less 
restriction on debate, weaker Official Secrets Acts, more access to information, 
stronger pressure from backbenchers, changes in the law of Contempt of Court.’495 
Whilst he endorses the strengthening of existing institutions such as the House of 
Commons, he openly admits to being ‘more concerned to create situations in which 
groups of individuals may make their political claims and seek to persuade 
governments to accept them.’496 Indeed, Griffith lays particular emphasis on the role 
of the press. He and Hartley suggest that ‘Politics is impossible without 
communication’ and that ‘[c]orruption or inefficiency in public bodies, scandals 
involving prominent politicians, in-fighting among opposition leaders, or the failure 
of Government policies- all these can be exposed in the press with considerable 
effect.’497 Griffith therefore appears to realize that notions of “open government” 
exceed the scope of the constitutional framework and his political prescriptions are 
therefore far less confined. Perhaps the reason for his reluctance to enter the realm of 
constitutional prescription is because his ambitions exceed a mere constitutional 
discussion. Griffith is less concerned with “constitutional” issues such as minority 
governments and sees greater danger in the prosecution of investigative journalists.498 
He is therefore more concerned with the political landscape outside the immediate 
constitutional territory. Arguably Griffith did himself an injustice by naming his 
theory the “political constitution” when his ideas resonate beyond these constitutional                                                         494 Griffith (n444) 16  495 Griffith (n444) 18 496 Griffith (n444) 18 497 Griffith and Hartley (n493) 261 498 See Griffith (n444) 18 
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boundaries. Indeed, arguably Griffith cannot be taken as ‘sketching his vision of a 
good constitution’ but a good society with a cultivated political culture.499 A political 
constitution is oxymoronic in the sense that politics cannot be constitutionally 
contained; it has a viscous quality that fluctuates in its embodiment of both 
constitutional and cultural norms.  
Tomkins’ third republican proposal is another example of the discrepancy that 
exists between his prescriptive approach and political reality. The ‘separation of 
interests’ between parliament and government would enable political accountability to 
operate most effectively.500 Tomkins argues that the current partisan nature of 
parliament means that there is ‘no way of securing or guaranteeing that 
parliamentarians will not allow loyalty to party to obscure or even to obstruct loyalty 
to Parliament’s constitutional function of holding the government to account.’501 
However, his proposal that ‘whips should be prohibited’ is a rather naïve suggestion 
that would arguably not threaten the prioritization of party-loyalty and ambition.502 
This goes to the nature of man, not politics, which in turn makes it a political reality. 
Indeed, just as Griffith argues that a society by laws and not by men is an 
‘unattainable ideal’, so is a society by constitutional rules and not by men.503 He 
insists that the abolition of the whips would bring about ‘radical’ changes in the way 
Parliament operates.504 However, it is unclear how this would be the case. The 
operation of Parliament will always be obscured by political motives. Indeed, it is 
personal ambition and factionalism that often motivate political accountability. 
Arguably strong backbench factions within a party often apply greater coercion than 
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the government’s own whips. Furthermore, abolishing party whips is not necessarily 
beneficial to political accountability. Indeed, party whips secure party discipline and 
may maintain the credibility of political accountability that would otherwise suffer 
disrepute if frivolous objections frequently took up valuable parliamentary time. The 
prevalence of backbench rebellions in the current Conservative government, 
particularly in relation to gay marriage and the EU in 2013, suggests that even with 
the existence of party whips, the government cannot silence its own party. Political 
accountability inevitably enjoys an ebb and flow depending on the issue at hand and 
the current status of the political and economic climate. The success of political 
accountability is not simply dependent on constitutional rules but it is often dictated 
by external circumstances. Perhaps Griffith’s apprehension to prescribe derived from 




Rule of law and political culture 
The law is worthless if it counts for nothing. Accepting the notion that the law 
“rules” and has ultimate authority in a state illustrates a pivotal step in a state’s 
development; it demands authority above power and beyond man. Allocating ultimate 
authority to a neutral “higher” entity is a stabilizing concept in a state, a continuing 
presence above the fluctuations of politics. Indeed, in fear of over simplification, the 
English Civil War arguably demonstrates the state displacing the law of God 
(embodied in the divine right of the king) with the law of man (communicated 
through Parliament). It was the fact that this was a dispute about ultimate authority 
rather than power that meant it shook the foundations rather than the political 
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cosmetics of the state. Accepting the rule of law reflects a point of view about how 
the state should be run: those who have power must justify it in authority. Whether 
this process of justification is an extremely restrictive task or simply red tape does not 
detract from the rule of law as an indication of allocation rather than efficiency. 
Certainly those who urgently seek the rule of law are not focused on a package of 
legal techniques but an “outcome”: ‘that salutary state of affairs where law counts in a 
society as a reliable constraint on the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power.’505 
Justification is still restricting, even if to a minimal degree. That desire to dress power 
in legal authority reflects an inner legal consciousness of a state. This is what the rule 
of law encapsulates. Equally, portraying the rule of law as a ‘state of affairs’ may be 
dangerously misleading; it encourages a perception of the rule of law as a package 
deal.506 From this angle, the law does not just “count” in terms of authority but it 
counts for something good. Thus, those states that seek to ascertain the rule of law, 
such as Afghanistan, do not disassociate between the rule of law and the political 
culture within which it operates; the concept is idealized as an “outcome” rather than 
a means to an end. This view is dangerous; it encourages the naïve assumption that 
constructing the legal mechanics of a state is enough. However, deciding which 
political bodies will run this legal machine and how they will do so inevitably 
determines the success of the end product. 
The potential of the rule of law is inevitably dictated by society and its culture. 
The rule of law only matters if the law ‘counts’ for something; culture dictates 
whether we take the law seriously.507 
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‘These traditions and this culture grow around and encrust the rules and 
institutions, shaping the routine expectations of participant and observers. Moreover, 
the wider social efficacy of official law requires not merely that elites observe and 
seek to enforce it, but also that it enter into the normative structures that nourish, 
guide, inform and coordinate the actions of ordinary people’508 
Krygier goes a step further; he warns that ‘too much emphasis on problems of 
“culture” might simply blind us to the real problems that remain to be addressed’.509 
Indeed, Krygier suggests that problems often exceed even cultural boundaries and are 
‘embedded in social structures, networks, institutions, and the ways all of these 
operate and interconnect...’510 Krygier thus differentiates between political and social 
factors, associating culture with the former. Arguably such a clean delineation is 
unrealistic. However, what Krygier does rightly indicate is that there are a host of 
factors that dictate how well a state operates; the rule of law is merely a piece of the 
jigsaw. Krygier thus concludes that ‘with regards to the rule of law, it pays to be a 
contextual universalist: universalist about the value of it; deeply contextual about how 
to get there’.511 Those seeking to replicate a “state of affairs” should not solely look to 
the rule of law for the blueprint. The rule of law does not encapsulate “the good 
constitution”. It is certainly a necessary piece of machinery. However, whilst it may 
be possible to export the rule of law, the same cannot be said of a political culture.512 
Furthermore, nurturing the conditions for the law’s ultimate authority to be used for 
good purposes is inevitably a long process of evolution. Post-war Iraq is testament to 
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this. ‘Institutions and codes are important, but without the cultural and political 
commitment to back them up, they are rarely more than window-dressing.’513  
It is interesting to consider what should be given the highest priority when re-
establishing a state- the law and the necessary institutions for its enforcement or 
political reform. Paddy Ashdown, the high representative in Bosnia, stated that in 
Bosnia ‘we thought that democracy was the highest priority and we measured it by 
the number of elections we could organize. In hindsight, we should have put the 
establishment of the rule of law first, for everything else depends on it: a functioning 
economy, a free and fair political system, the development of civil society, and public 
confidence in police and courts.’514 Ashdown appears to adopt a contextual 
universalist approach to the rule of law. However, a state cannot simply “start” with 
the rule of law. It reflects a political attitude, be it only that ultimate authority should 
lie with the law rather than any other entity. Furthermore, to be sufficient, rather than 
merely adequate, the rule of law requires political commitment. It is therefore 
inevitably a product of a state’s legal and political conscience. Ashdown rightly 
identifies the interdependency of political and legal factors to create an effective 
system; without the rule of law political and social factors struggle to develop. 
However, equally, without these factors the rule of law has little positive value. Thus, 
identifying which has highest priority is a futile and unfruitful task. However, 
realizing the interdependency (without doubting the distinction) of law and politics is 
essential to one’s understanding of the rule of law. Contrary to Brooks’ opinion, the 
rule of law is not ‘in its substantive sense…a culture’.515 However, its potential is 
dictated by the culture within which it operates. In this light, it is easy to observe how 
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the rule of law is mistaken for a state of affairs rather than a simple, succinct, legal 
concept. This is an inevitably consequence of the concept’s incredibly sociable 
character, as a form of interaction technology, which makes it so hard to export and 
decipher from the political conditions with which it so easily cooperates. This 
inherent difficulty of segregating the rule of law has meant that ‘exporting the rule of 
law has become harder’.516 
Adopting Griffith’s quasi-prescriptive approach, it is necessary to provide a 
non-exhaustive list, of these political factors which best complement the operation of 
the rule of law. Primarily, a state should have strong mechanisms of political 
accountability and an independent institution concerned with policing the legality of 
executive acts. This independence must not be jeopardized in an attempt to 
compensate for the inadequacy of legislation. Valid law should therefore be easily 
identifiable and clear. The law should be used to achieve ends which correlate with 
the moral direction of the community. There should exist a strong attachment to 
justice, not simply by the executive but society at large. Outside the immediate 
constitutional framework a strong press who are willing to act as watchdogs is crucial. 
However, recent events with the News of the World should discourage the media 
from being too invasive; this is a delicate balance that cannot be exactly prescribed. 
The executive must be strong but not arbitrary and it must be constantly reminded of 
the political consequences for its negligence. Arguably, a necessary component of any 
state structure is experience, a history of having suffered the consequences of 
mistakes. A culture of political activism is also essential. Such intangible assets are a 
necessary component of growth. Meanwhile, in the modern state, strong international 
relations are inevitably crucial. Many of these suggestions would find fruition in a                                                         516 R Worley, “Exporting Liberal Democracy, Market Capitalism, and Rule of Law” Huffpost Politics (10/30/2013) 
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constitutional framework, others are not so easily prescribed or simply resist tangible 
expression. If these suggestions appear abstract and random, this is because they are. 
They are merely tasters of a climate in which the rule of law could help obtain an 
ideal. They are political prescriptions which would complement the rule of valid law. 























The rule of law alone cannot silence the ‘passion of men’; moreover, it is 
essential that it does not do so.517 Mandela foresaw a ‘government bound by a higher 
body of rules- an empire of laws’ which ‘will not govern at its discretion.’518 He 
rejected “an empire of man” and instead demanded “the rule of law”.519 However, 
these are not mutually exclusive. The reality is that the law has ultimate authority as a 
constitutional mechanism; but this authority is worthless if the law is not used. The 
rule of law requires the passion of men to drive it. The law may be used for good and 
bad; this is the inherent risk of government. It is therefore essential to ameliorate this 
risk. This thesis has touched upon three layers of risk aversion: First, establish the 
rule of the law; second, use the law; third ensure that it is used well i.e. it is managed 
by and for the benefit of the demos. 
It is in the first layer where we find the rule of law. It provides the legal 
foundation of a state. The rule of law is not concerned with monitoring the morality or 
the formal efficiency of laws; it is not a constitutional unit of measurement. Rather it 
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reflects an idea of law, the basic notion that the law has ultimate authority as a social 
ordering mechanism. The rule of law is not an endorsement product for good 
government. Equally this does not mean that it is an empty self-evident truth. It 
reflects an important liberating ideal, that we must sacrifice a degree of liberty to 
enjoy our freedom.  
A society based on law may exist in all kinds of guises; it is often the common 
denominator within a continuum of governance structures. The question of how to 
utilize the law is a lot more divisive than the issue of acknowledging its existence and 
authority. There exists a global eclectic mix of legal states indicating that the rule of 
law does not impose a formulaic expectation of government. The rule of law responds 
to an infinite number of political and legal variables. It is a canvas that does justice to 
the intricate contours and colours of political landscape. However, the ultra-thin 
model is not just a blank canvas, an inevitable prescription derives from the notion of 
the rule of the law; if the law rules, people must conform to it.  The term “people” 
serves two purposes: it reiterates the universality of the law’s authority encapsulated 
in a more unconventional interpretation of the phrase “equality before the law”; it is 
also inclusive of both the individual and the state. Both Government and the citizen 
must not act in conflict with the law. The use made of the law (at the second level of 
risk aversion) must compensate for this equalization by subjecting the government to 
greater legal regulation. It has been argued that in the UK in particular, greater 
codification of Common Law powers and liberties would serve to more certainly 
delineate the boundaries of the government’s legal liberty and heighten the conceptual 
compatibility of the rule of valid law with the existing legal constitutional hierarchy. 
Furthermore, the ultra-thin model is not incompatible with judicial review. Judicial 
review has outgrown its legal pedigree; legal conformity now only reflects one 
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component of this judicial exercise. It is important not to romanticize the relationship 
between the judiciary and the rule of law; the politicization of the judiciary need not 
be mirrored by the concept. Codifying the good administration principles may be a 
means of creating a greater consistency between the rule of law and judicial review. 
However, this is arguably unnecessary; a more suitable alternative is to encourage 
political accountability as a complementary partner to the rule of law. 
The rule of law should not displace politics as the ‘ultimate controlling factor’ 
of the constitution.520 The contemporary perception of the rule of law as a device to 
restrain government ironically understates its social significance. The ultra thin model 
certainly induces the executive to conform to the law. However, it imposes the same 
demand on the citizen; it therefore provides a mutual means of managing the 
relationship between the individual and the state. The rule of law should not be 
artificially construed as the antithesis of arbitrary government; it may equally liberate 
as well as constrain the executive. It has been consistently argued that the rule of law 
may co-exist with a wicked regime. The law is the authoritative tool of social ordering 
but it remains a tool; it is a creature of man. It is therefore essential that it is the 
passion of the demos, rather than the whim of a few men that dictates the terms of its 
use. Democracy is essential to the rule of law, not as a defining element but as an 
extrinsic mitigation of its wicked potential. Equally, conventional perceptions of the 
rule of law display a naïve assumption that the makings of a “good government” can 
first, be easily prescribed and second, neatly packaged under the heading “the rule of 
law”. This approach to conceptualization fails to engage with the messy reality of the 
constitution and deprives the rule of law of its interactive quality. The third layer of 
risk aversion is not so easily prescribed; it constitutes that enigmatic ideal, a political                                                         520 Lord Hope, R(Jackson and others) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, par 126  
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constitution. The ultra thin model starkly exposes the delicate complexity of a nation 
state; “good government” is the result of an intricate network of political, legal and 
cultural threads. This is impossible to replicate; we can export the notion of “the rule 
of the law” but we cannot guarantee how well it will function on foreign soil. Thus, 
the rule of law constitutes the foundation but it does not provide the whole story. The 
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